Yufan Wu

CL
h-index9
3papers
178citations
Novelty52%
AI Score31

3 Papers

24.5CLOct 25, 2023Code
HI-TOM: A Benchmark for Evaluating Higher-Order Theory of Mind Reasoning in Large Language Models

Yinghui He, Yufan Wu, Yilin Jia et al.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to reason about one's own and others' mental states. ToM plays a critical role in the development of intelligence, language understanding, and cognitive processes. While previous work has primarily focused on first and second-order ToM, we explore higher-order ToM, which involves recursive reasoning on others' beliefs. We introduce HI-TOM, a Higher Order Theory of Mind benchmark. Our experimental evaluation using various Large Language Models (LLMs) indicates a decline in performance on higher-order ToM tasks, demonstrating the limitations of current LLMs. We conduct a thorough analysis of different failure cases of LLMs, and share our thoughts on the implications of our findings on the future of NLP.

14.3LGApr 14, 2023
Interpretability is a Kind of Safety: An Interpreter-based Ensemble for Adversary Defense

Jingyuan Wang, Yufan Wu, Mingxuan Li et al.

While having achieved great success in rich real-life applications, deep neural network (DNN) models have long been criticized for their vulnerability to adversarial attacks. Tremendous research efforts have been dedicated to mitigating the threats of adversarial attacks, but the essential trait of adversarial examples is not yet clear, and most existing methods are yet vulnerable to hybrid attacks and suffer from counterattacks. In light of this, in this paper, we first reveal a gradient-based correlation between sensitivity analysis-based DNN interpreters and the generation process of adversarial examples, which indicates the Achilles's heel of adversarial attacks and sheds light on linking together the two long-standing challenges of DNN: fragility and unexplainability. We then propose an interpreter-based ensemble framework called X-Ensemble for robust adversary defense. X-Ensemble adopts a novel detection-rectification process and features in building multiple sub-detectors and a rectifier upon various types of interpretation information toward target classifiers. Moreover, X-Ensemble employs the Random Forests (RF) model to combine sub-detectors into an ensemble detector for adversarial hybrid attacks defense. The non-differentiable property of RF further makes it a precious choice against the counterattack of adversaries. Extensive experiments under various types of state-of-the-art attacks and diverse attack scenarios demonstrate the advantages of X-Ensemble to competitive baseline methods.

1.2CVFeb 28, 2020
Are L2 adversarial examples intrinsically different?

Mingxuan Li, Jingyuan Wang, Yufan Wu

Deep Neural Network (DDN) has achieved notable success in various tasks, including many security concerning scenarios. However, a considerable amount of work has proved its vulnerability to adversaries. We unravel the properties that can intrinsically differentiate adversarial examples and normal inputs through theoretical analysis. That is, adversarial examples generated by $L_2$ attacks usually have larger input sensitivity which can be used to identify them efficiently. We also found that those generated by $L_\infty$ attacks will be different enough in the pixel domain to be detected empirically. To verify our analysis, we proposed a \textbf{G}uided \textbf{C}omplementary \textbf{D}efense module (\textbf{GCD}) integrating detection and recovery processes. When compared with adversarial detection methods, our detector achieves a detection AUC of over 0.98 against most of the attacks. When comparing our guided rectifier with commonly used adversarial training methods and other rectification methods, our rectifier outperforms them by a large margin. We achieve a recovered classification accuracy of up to 99\% on MNIST, 89\% on CIFAR-10, and 87\% on ImageNet subsets against $L_2$ attacks. Furthermore, under the white-box setting, our holistic defensive module shows a promising degree of robustness. Thus, we confirm that at least $L_2$ adversarial examples are intrinsically different enough from normal inputs both theoretically and empirically. And we shed light upon designing simple yet effective defensive methods with these properties.