Heqi Peng

Shengpeng Xiao, Yuanfang Guo, Heqi Peng et al.

The generalization performance of AI-generated image detection remains a critical challenge. Although most existing methods perform well in detecting images from generative models included in the training set, their accuracy drops significantly when faced with images from unseen generators. To address this limitation, we propose a novel detection method based on the fractal self-similarity of the spectrum, a common feature among images generated by different models. Specifically, we demonstrate that AI-generated images exhibit fractal-like spectral growth through periodic extension and low-pass filtering. This observation motivates us to exploit the similarity among different fractal branches of the spectrum. Instead of directly analyzing the spectrum, our method mitigates the impact of varying spectral characteristics across different generators, improving detection performance for images from unseen models. Experiments on a public benchmark demonstrated the generalized detection performance across both GANs and diffusion models.

Heqi Peng, Yunhong Wang, Ruijie Yang et al.

Adversarial example detection, which can be conveniently applied in many scenarios, is important in the area of adversarial defense. Unfortunately, existing detection methods suffer from poor generalization performance, because their training process usually relies on the examples generated from a single known adversarial attack and there exists a large discrepancy between the training and unseen testing adversarial examples. To address this issue, we propose a novel method, named Adversarial Example Detection via Principal Adversarial Domain Adaptation (AED-PADA). Specifically, our approach identifies the Principal Adversarial Domains (PADs), i.e., a combination of features of the adversarial examples generated by different attacks, which possesses a large portion of the entire adversarial feature space. Subsequently, we pioneer to exploit Multi-source Unsupervised Domain Adaptation in adversarial example detection, with PADs as the source domains. Experimental results demonstrate the superior generalization ability of our proposed AED-PADA. Note that this superiority is particularly achieved in challenging scenarios characterized by employing the minimal magnitude constraint for the perturbations.

Beichen Li, Yuanfang Guo, Heqi Peng et al.

Deep neural networks are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Among the existing backdoor defense methods, trigger reverse engineering based approaches, which reconstruct the backdoor triggers via optimizations, are the most versatile and effective ones compared to other types of methods. In this paper, we summarize and construct a generic paradigm for the typical trigger reverse engineering process. Based on this paradigm, we propose a new perspective to defeat trigger reverse engineering by manipulating the classification confidence of backdoor samples. To determine the specific modifications of classification confidence, we propose a compensatory model to compute the lower bound of the modification. With proper modifications, the backdoor attack can easily bypass the trigger reverse engineering based methods. To achieve this objective, we propose a Label Smoothing Poisoning (LSP) framework, which leverages label smoothing to specifically manipulate the classification confidences of backdoor samples. Extensive experiments demonstrate that the proposed work can defeat the state-of-the-art trigger reverse engineering based methods, and possess good compatibility with a variety of existing backdoor attacks.