Xuewen Wang

Wenhui Tan, Boyuan Li, Chuhao Jin et al.

Modeling human-like action-to-reaction generation has significant real-world applications, like human-robot interaction and games. Despite recent advancements in single-person motion generation, it is still challenging to well handle action-to-reaction generation, due to the difficulty of directly predicting reaction from action sequence without prompts, and the absence of a unified representation that effectively encodes multi-person motion. To address these challenges, we introduce Think-Then-React (TTR), a large language-model-based framework designed to generate human-like reactions. First, with our fine-grained multimodal training strategy, TTR is capable to unify two processes during inference: a thinking process that explicitly infers action intentions and reasons corresponding reaction description, which serve as semantic prompts, and a reacting process that predicts reactions based on input action and the inferred semantic prompts. Second, to effectively represent multi-person motion in language models, we propose a unified motion tokenizer by decoupling egocentric pose and absolute space features, which effectively represents action and reaction motion with same encoding. Extensive experiments demonstrate that TTR outperforms existing baselines, achieving significant improvements in evaluation metrics, such as reducing FID from 3.988 to 1.942.

Qingyu Yin, Chak Tou Leong, Linyi Yang et al.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) with multi-step reasoning capabilities have shown remarkable problem-solving abilities, yet they exhibit concerning safety vulnerabilities that remain poorly understood. In this work, we investigate why safety alignment fails in reasoning models through a mechanistic interpretability lens. Using a linear probing approach to trace refusal intentions across token positions, we discover a striking phenomenon termed as \textbf{refusal cliff}: many poorly-aligned reasoning models correctly identify harmful prompts and maintain strong refusal intentions during their thinking process, but experience a sharp drop in refusal scores at the final tokens before output generation. This suggests that these models are not inherently unsafe; rather, their refusal intentions are systematically suppressed. Through causal intervention analysis, we identify a sparse set of attention heads that negatively contribute to refusal behavior. Ablating just 3\% of these heads can reduce attack success rates below 10\%. Building on these mechanistic insights, we propose \textbf{Cliff-as-a-Judge}, a novel data selection method that identifies training examples exhibiting the largest refusal cliff to efficiently repair reasoning models' safety alignment. This approach achieves comparable safety improvements using only 1.7\% of the vanilla safety training data, demonstrating a less-is-more effect in safety alignment.