Idan Barnea

Idan Barnea, Ofir Schlisselberg, Yishay Mansour

We study collaborative learning in multi-agent Bayesian bandit problems, where strategic agents collectively solve the same bandit instance. While multiple agents can accelerate learning by sharing information, strategic agents might prefer to free-ride and avoid exploration. We consider a setting with persistent agents that participate in multiple time periods. This is in contrast to most previous works on incentives in multi-agent MAB, which assume short-lived agents, namely each agent has a single decision to make and optimizes their expected reward in that single decision. As in the multi-agent MAB model with incentives, our model does not have monetary transfers, and the only incentives are through information sharing. We propose \texttt{CAOS}, a mechanism that sustains collaboration as a Nash equilibrium while achieving strong regret guarantees. Our results demonstrate that collaborative exploration can be sustained purely through information sharing, achieving performance close to that of fully cooperative systems despite strategic behavior.

Idan Barnea, Tal Lancewicki, Yishay Mansour

We study the regret in stochastic Multi-Armed Bandits (MAB) with multiple agents that communicate over an arbitrary connected communication graph. We show a near-optimal individual regret bound of $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{AT/m}+A)$, where $A$ is the number of actions, $T$ the time horizon, and $m$ the number of agents. In particular, assuming a sufficient number of agents, we achieve a regret bound of $\tilde{O}(A)$, which is independent of the sub-optimality gaps and the diameter of the communication graph. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to show an individual regret bound in cooperative stochastic MAB that is independent of the graph's diameter and applicable to non-fully-connected communication graphs.

Idan Barnea, Orin Levy, Yishay Mansour

We study cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning in the setting of reward-free exploration, where multiple agents jointly explore an unknown MDP in order to learn its dynamics (without observing rewards). We focus on a tabular finite-horizon MDP and adopt a phased learning framework. In each learning phase, multiple agents independently interact with the environment. More specifically, in each learning phase, each agent is assigned a policy, executes it, and observes the resulting trajectory. Our primary goal is to characterize the tradeoff between the number of learning phases and the number of agents, especially when the number of learning phases is small. Our results identify a sharp transition governed by the horizon $H$. When the number of learning phases equals $H$, we present a computationally efficient algorithm that uses only $\tilde{O}(S^6 H^6 A / ε^2)$ agents to obtain an $ε$ approximation of the dynamics (i.e., yields an $ε$-optimal policy for any reward function). We complement our algorithm with a lower bound showing that any algorithm restricted to $ρ< H$ phases requires at least $A^{H/ρ}$ agents to achieve constant accuracy. Thus, we show that it is essential to have an order of $H$ learning phases if we limit the number of agents to be polynomial.