Ander Artola Velasco

Eleni Straitouri, Stratis Tsirtsis, Ander Artola Velasco et al.

Recent work has shown that, in classification tasks, it is possible to design decision support systems that do not require human experts to understand when to cede agency to a classifier or when to exercise their own agency to achieve complementarity$\unicode{x2014}$experts using these systems make more accurate predictions than those made by the experts or the classifier alone. The key principle underpinning these systems reduces to adaptively controlling the level of human agency, by design. Can we use the same principle to achieve complementarity in sequential decision making tasks? In this paper, we answer this question affirmatively. We develop a decision support system that uses a pre-trained AI agent to narrow down the set of actions a human can take to a subset, and then asks the human to take an action from this action set. Along the way, we also introduce a bandit algorithm that leverages the smoothness properties of the action sets provided by our system to efficiently optimize the level of human agency. To evaluate our decision support system, we conduct a large-scale human subject study ($n = 1{,}600$) where participants play a wildfire mitigation game. We find that participants who play the game supported by our system outperform those who play on their own by $\sim$$30$% and the AI agent used by our system by $>$$2$%, even though the AI agent largely outperforms participants playing without support. We have made available the data gathered in our human subject study as well as an open source implementation of our system at https://github.com/Networks-Learning/narrowing-action-choices .

Ander Artola Velasco, Dimitrios Rontogiannis, Stratis Tsirtsis et al.

Test-time compute has emerged as a promising strategy to enhance the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). However, this strategy has in turn increased how much users pay cloud-based providers offering LLM-as-a-service, since providers charge users for the amount of test-time compute they use to generate an output. In our work, we show that the market of LLM-as-a-service is socially inefficient: providers have a financial incentive to increase the amount of test-time compute, even if this increase contributes little to the quality of the outputs. To address this inefficiency, we introduce a reverse second-price auction mechanism where providers bid their offered price and (expected) quality for the opportunity to serve a user, and users pay proportionally to the marginal value generated by the winning provider relative to the second-highest bidder. To illustrate and complement our theoretical results, we conduct experiments with multiple instruct models from the $\texttt{Llama}$ and $\texttt{Qwen}$ families, as well as reasoning models distilled from $\texttt{DeepSeek-R1}$, on math and science benchmark datasets.

Ander Artola Velasco, Stratis Tsirtsis, Manuel Gomez-Rodriguez

Regulatory approval of products in high-stakes domains such as drug development requires statistical evidence of safety and efficacy through large-scale randomized controlled trials. However, the high financial cost of these trials may deter developers who lack absolute certainty in their product's efficacy, ultimately stifling the development of `moonshot' products that could offer high social utility. To address this inefficiency, in this paper, we introduce a statistical protocol for experimentation where the product developer (the agent) conducts a randomized controlled trial sequentially and the regulator (the principal) partially subsidizes its cost. By modeling the protocol using a belief Markov decision process, we show that the agent's optimal strategy can be found efficiently using dynamic programming. Further, we show that the social utility is a piecewise linear and convex function over the subsidy level the principal selects, and thus the socially optimal subsidy can also be found efficiently using divide-and-conquer. Simulation experiments using publicly available data on antibiotic development and approval demonstrate that our statistical protocol can be used to increase social utility by more than $35$$\%$ relative to standard, non-sequential protocols.

Nina Corvelo Benz, Stratis Tsirtsis, Eleni Straitouri et al.

State of the art large language models rely on randomization to respond to a prompt. As an immediate consequence, a model may respond differently to the same prompt if asked multiple times. In this work, we argue that the evaluation and ranking of large language models should control for the randomization underpinning their functioning. Our starting point is the development of a causal model for coupled autoregressive generation, which allows different large language models to sample responses with the same source of randomness. Building upon our causal model, we first show that, on evaluations based on benchmark datasets, coupled autoregressive generation leads to the same conclusions as vanilla autoregressive generation but using provably fewer samples. However, we further show that, on evaluations based on (human) pairwise comparisons, coupled and vanilla autoregressive generation can surprisingly lead to different rankings when comparing more than two models, even with an infinite amount of samples. This suggests that the apparent advantage of a model over others in existing evaluation protocols may not be genuine but rather confounded by the randomness inherent to the generation process. To illustrate and complement our theoretical results, we conduct experiments with several large language models from the Llama, Mistral and Qwen families. We find that, across multiple benchmark datasets, coupled autoregressive generation requires up to 75% fewer samples to reach the same conclusions as vanilla autoregressive generation. Further, we find that the win-rates derived from pairwise comparisons by a strong large language model to prompts from the LMSYS Chatbot Arena platform differ under coupled and vanilla autoregressive generation.

Ander Artola Velasco, Stratis Tsirtsis, Nastaran Okati et al.

State-of-the-art large language models require specialized hardware and substantial energy to operate. As a consequence, cloud-based services that provide access to large language models have become very popular. In these services, the price users pay for an output provided by a model depends on the number of tokens the model uses to generate it -- they pay a fixed price per token. In this work, we show that this pricing mechanism creates a financial incentive for providers to strategize and misreport the (number of) tokens a model used to generate an output, and users cannot prove, or even know, whether a provider is overcharging them. However, we also show that, if an unfaithful provider is obliged to be transparent about the generative process used by the model, misreporting optimally without raising suspicion is hard. Nevertheless, as a proof-of-concept, we develop an efficient heuristic algorithm that allows providers to significantly overcharge users without raising suspicion. Crucially, we demonstrate that the cost of running the algorithm is lower than the additional revenue from overcharging users, highlighting the vulnerability of users under the current pay-per-token pricing mechanism. Further, we show that, to eliminate the financial incentive to strategize, a pricing mechanism must price tokens linearly on their character count. While this makes a provider's profit margin vary across tokens, we introduce a simple prescription under which the provider who adopts such an incentive-compatible pricing mechanism can maintain the average profit margin they had under the pay-per-token pricing mechanism. Along the way, to illustrate and complement our theoretical results, we conduct experiments with several large language models from the $\texttt{Llama}$, $\texttt{Gemma}$ and $\texttt{Ministral}$ families, and input prompts from the LMSYS Chatbot Arena platform.

Ander Artola Velasco, Stratis Tsirtsis, Manuel Gomez-Rodriguez

Millions of users rely on a market of cloud-based services to obtain access to state-of-the-art large language models. However, it has been very recently shown that the de facto pay-per-token pricing mechanism used by providers creates a financial incentive for them to strategize and misreport the (number of) tokens a model used to generate an output. In this paper, we develop an auditing framework based on martingale theory that enables a trusted third-party auditor who sequentially queries a provider to detect token misreporting. Crucially, we show that our framework is guaranteed to always detect token misreporting, regardless of the provider's (mis-)reporting policy, and not falsely flag a faithful provider as unfaithful with high probability. To validate our auditing framework, we conduct experiments across a wide range of (mis-)reporting policies using several large language models from the $\texttt{Llama}$, $\texttt{Gemma}$ and $\texttt{Ministral}$ families, and input prompts from a popular crowdsourced benchmarking platform. The results show that our framework detects an unfaithful provider after observing fewer than $\sim 70$ reported outputs, while maintaining the probability of falsely flagging a faithful provider below $α= 0.05$.