Ruoxi Cheng

Ruoxi Cheng, Haoxuan Ma, Teng Ma et al.

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) exhibit powerful reasoning capabilities but suffer sophisticated jailbreak vulnerabilities. Fundamentally, aligning LVLMs is not just a safety challenge but a problem of economic efficiency. Current alignment methods struggle with the trade-off between safety, utility, and operational costs. Critically, a focus solely on final outputs (process-blindness) wastes significant computational budget on unsafe deliberation. This flaw allows harmful reasoning to be disguised with benign justifications, thereby circumventing simple additive safety scores. To address this, we propose EcoAlign, an inference-time framework that reframes alignment as an economically rational search by treating the LVLM as a boundedly rational agent. EcoAlign incrementally expands a thought graph and scores actions using a forward-looking function (analogous to net present value) that dynamically weighs expected safety, utility, and cost against the remaining budget. To prevent deception, path safety is enforced via the weakest-link principle. Extensive experiments across 3 closed-source and 2 open-source models on 6 datasets show that EcoAlign matches or surpasses state-of-the-art safety and utility at a lower computational cost, thereby offering a principled, economical pathway to robust LVLM alignment.

Ranjie Duan, Jiexi Liu, Xiaojun Jia et al.

Large language models (LLMs) typically deploy safety mechanisms to prevent harmful content generation. Most current approaches focus narrowly on risks posed by malicious actors, often framing risks as adversarial events and relying on defensive refusals. However, in real-world settings, risks also come from non-malicious users seeking help while under psychological distress (e.g., self-harm intentions). In such cases, the model's response can strongly influence the user's next actions. Simple refusals may lead them to repeat, escalate, or move to unsafe platforms, creating worse outcomes. We introduce Constructive Safety Alignment (CSA), a human-centric paradigm that protects against malicious misuse while actively guiding vulnerable users toward safe and helpful results. Implemented in Oyster-I (Oy1), CSA combines game-theoretic anticipation of user reactions, fine-grained risk boundary discovery, and interpretable reasoning control, turning safety into a trust-building process. Oy1 achieves state-of-the-art safety among open models while retaining high general capabilities. On our Constructive Benchmark, it shows strong constructive engagement, close to GPT-5, and unmatched robustness on the Strata-Sword jailbreak dataset, nearing GPT-o1 levels. By shifting from refusal-first to guidance-first safety, CSA redefines the model-user relationship, aiming for systems that are not just safe, but meaningfully helpful. We release Oy1, code, and the benchmark to support responsible, user-centered AI.