Ryan D'Orazio

Samuel Sokota, Ryan D'Orazio, Chun Kai Ling et al.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

Dustin Morrill, Ryan D'Orazio, Marc Lanctot et al.

Hindsight rationality is an approach to playing general-sum games that prescribes no-regret learning dynamics for individual agents with respect to a set of deviations, and further describes jointly rational behavior among multiple agents with mediated equilibria. To develop hindsight rational learning in sequential decision-making settings, we formalize behavioral deviations as a general class of deviations that respect the structure of extensive-form games. Integrating the idea of time selection into counterfactual regret minimization (CFR), we introduce the extensive-form regret minimization (EFR) algorithm that achieves hindsight rationality for any given set of behavioral deviations with computation that scales closely with the complexity of the set. We identify behavioral deviation subsets, the partial sequence deviation types, that subsume previously studied types and lead to efficient EFR instances in games with moderate lengths. In addition, we present a thorough empirical analysis of EFR instantiated with different deviation types in benchmark games, where we find that stronger types typically induce better performance.

Samuel Sokota, Ryan D'Orazio, J. Zico Kolter et al.

This work studies an algorithm, which we call magnetic mirror descent, that is inspired by mirror descent and the non-Euclidean proximal gradient algorithm. Our contribution is demonstrating the virtues of magnetic mirror descent as both an equilibrium solver and as an approach to reinforcement learning in two-player zero-sum games. These virtues include: 1) Being the first quantal response equilibria solver to achieve linear convergence for extensive-form games with first order feedback; 2) Being the first standard reinforcement learning algorithm to achieve empirically competitive results with CFR in tabular settings; 3) Achieving favorable performance in 3x3 Dark Hex and Phantom Tic-Tac-Toe as a self-play deep reinforcement learning algorithm.

Samuel Sokota, Edward Lockhart, Finbarr Timbers et al.

For artificially intelligent learning systems to have widespread applicability in real-world settings, it is important that they be able to operate decentrally. Unfortunately, decentralized control is difficult -- computing even an epsilon-optimal joint policy is a NEXP complete problem. Nevertheless, a recently rediscovered insight -- that a team of agents can coordinate via common knowledge -- has given rise to algorithms capable of finding optimal joint policies in small common-payoff games. The Bayesian action decoder (BAD) leverages this insight and deep reinforcement learning to scale to games as large as two-player Hanabi. However, the approximations it uses to do so prevent it from discovering optimal joint policies even in games small enough to brute force optimal solutions. This work proposes CAPI, a novel algorithm which, like BAD, combines common knowledge with deep reinforcement learning. However, unlike BAD, CAPI prioritizes the propensity to discover optimal joint policies over scalability. While this choice precludes CAPI from scaling to games as large as Hanabi, empirical results demonstrate that, on the games to which CAPI does scale, it is capable of discovering optimal joint policies even when other modern multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms are unable to do so. Code is available at https://github.com/ssokota/capi .

Samuel Sokota, Ryan D'Orazio, Khurram Javed et al.

Accurate models of patient survival probabilities provide important information to clinicians prescribing care for life-threatening and terminal ailments. A recently developed class of models - known as individual survival distributions (ISDs) - produces patient-specific survival functions that offer greater descriptive power of patient outcomes than was previously possible. Unfortunately, at the time of writing, ISD models almost universally lack uncertainty quantification. In this paper, we demonstrate that an existing method for estimating simultaneous prediction intervals from samples can easily be adapted for patient-specific survival curve analysis and yields accurate results. Furthermore, we introduce both a modification to the existing method and a novel method for estimating simultaneous prediction intervals and show that they offer competitive performance. It is worth emphasizing that these methods are not limited to survival analysis and can be applied in any context in which sampling the distribution of interest is tractable. Code is available at https://github.com/ssokota/spie .

Ryan D'Orazio, Danilo Vucetic, Zichu Liu et al.

Deep learning has proven to be effective in a wide variety of loss minimization problems. However, many applications of interest, like minimizing projected Bellman error and min-max optimization, cannot be modelled as minimizing a scalar loss function but instead correspond to solving a variational inequality (VI) problem. This difference in setting has caused many practical challenges as naive gradient-based approaches from supervised learning tend to diverge and cycle in the VI case. In this work, we propose a principled surrogate-based approach compatible with deep learning to solve VIs. We show that our surrogate-based approach has three main benefits: (1) under assumptions that are realistic in practice (when hidden monotone structure is present, interpolation, and sufficient optimization of the surrogates), it guarantees convergence, (2) it provides a unifying perspective of existing methods, and (3) is amenable to existing deep learning optimizers like ADAM. Experimentally, we demonstrate our surrogate-based approach is effective in min-max optimization and minimizing projected Bellman error. Furthermore, in the deep reinforcement learning case, we propose a novel variant of TD(0) which is more compute and sample efficient.

Ryan D'Orazio, Nicolas Loizou, Issam Laradji et al.

We investigate the convergence of stochastic mirror descent (SMD) under interpolation in relatively smooth and smooth convex optimization. In relatively smooth convex optimization we provide new convergence guarantees for SMD with a constant stepsize. For smooth convex optimization we propose a new adaptive stepsize scheme -- the mirror stochastic Polyak stepsize (mSPS). Notably, our convergence results in both settings do not make bounded gradient assumptions or bounded variance assumptions, and we show convergence to a neighborhood that vanishes under interpolation. Consequently, these results correspond to the first convergence guarantees under interpolation for the exponentiated gradient algorithm for fixed or adaptive stepsizes. mSPS generalizes the recently proposed stochastic Polyak stepsize (SPS) (Loizou et al. 2021) to mirror descent and remains both practical and efficient for modern machine learning applications while inheriting the benefits of mirror descent. We complement our results with experiments across various supervised learning tasks and different instances of SMD, demonstrating the effectiveness of mSPS.

Dustin Morrill, Ryan D'Orazio, Marc Lanctot et al.

Hindsight rationality is an approach to playing general-sum games that prescribes no-regret learning dynamics for individual agents with respect to a set of deviations, and further describes jointly rational behavior among multiple agents with mediated equilibria. To develop hindsight rational learning in sequential decision-making settings, we formalize behavioral deviations as a general class of deviations that respect the structure of extensive-form games. Integrating the idea of time selection into counterfactual regret minimization (CFR), we introduce the extensive-form regret minimization (EFR) algorithm that achieves hindsight rationality for any given set of behavioral deviations with computation that scales closely with the complexity of the set. We identify behavioral deviation subsets, the partial sequence deviation types, that subsume previously studied types and lead to efficient EFR instances in games with moderate lengths. In addition, we present a thorough empirical analysis of EFR instantiated with different deviation types in benchmark games, where we find that stronger types typically induce better performance.

Ryan D'Orazio, Ruitong Huang

In online learning an algorithm plays against an environment with losses possibly picked by an adversary at each round. The generality of this framework includes problems that are not adversarial, for example offline optimization, or saddle point problems (i.e. min max optimization). However, online algorithms are typically not designed to leverage additional structure present in non-adversarial problems. Recently, slight modifications to well-known online algorithms such as optimism and adaptive step sizes have been used in several domains to accelerate online learning -- recovering optimal rates in offline smooth optimization, and accelerating convergence to saddle points or social welfare in smooth games. In this work we introduce optimism and adaptive stepsizes to Lagrangian hedging, a class of online algorithms that includes regret-matching, and hedge (i.e. multiplicative weights). Our results include: a general general regret bound; a path length regret bound for a fixed smooth loss, applicable to an optimistic variant of regret-matching and regret-matching+; optimistic regret bounds for $Φ$ regret, a framework that includes external, internal, and swap regret; and optimistic bounds for a family of algorithms that includes regret-matching+ as a special case.

Dustin Morrill, Ryan D'Orazio, Reca Sarfati et al.

Driven by recent successes in two-player, zero-sum game solving and playing, artificial intelligence work on games has increasingly focused on algorithms that produce equilibrium-based strategies. However, this approach has been less effective at producing competent players in general-sum games or those with more than two players than in two-player, zero-sum games. An appealing alternative is to consider adaptive algorithms that ensure strong performance in hindsight relative to what could have been achieved with modified behavior. This approach also leads to a game-theoretic analysis, but in the correlated play that arises from joint learning dynamics rather than factored agent behavior at equilibrium. We develop and advocate for this hindsight rationality framing of learning in general sequential decision-making settings. To this end, we re-examine mediated equilibrium and deviation types in extensive-form games, thereby gaining a more complete understanding and resolving past misconceptions. We present a set of examples illustrating the distinct strengths and weaknesses of each type of equilibrium in the literature, and prove that no tractable concept subsumes all others. This line of inquiry culminates in the definition of the deviation and equilibrium classes that correspond to algorithms in the counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) family, relating them to all others in the literature. Examining CFR in greater detail further leads to a new recursive definition of rationality in correlated play that extends sequential rationality in a way that naturally applies to hindsight evaluation.

Ryan D'Orazio, Dustin Morrill, James R. Wright et al.

Function approximation is a powerful approach for structuring large decision problems that has facilitated great achievements in the areas of reinforcement learning and game playing. Regression counterfactual regret minimization (RCFR) is a simple algorithm for approximately solving imperfect information games with normalized rectified linear unit (ReLU) parameterized policies. In contrast, the more conventional softmax parameterization is standard in the field of reinforcement learning and yields a regret bound with a better dependence on the number of actions. We derive approximation error-aware regret bounds for $(Φ, f)$-regret matching, which applies to a general class of link functions and regret objectives. These bounds recover a tighter bound for RCFR and provide a theoretical justification for RCFR implementations with alternative policy parameterizations ($f$-RCFR), including softmax. We provide exploitability bounds for $f$-RCFR with the polynomial and exponential link functions in zero-sum imperfect information games and examine empirically how the link function interacts with the severity of the approximation. We find that the previously studied ReLU parameterization performs better when the approximation error is small while the softmax parameterization can perform better when the approximation error is large.

Ryan D'Orazio, Dustin Morrill, James R. Wright

A dominant approach to solving large imperfect-information games is Counterfactural Regret Minimization (CFR). In CFR, many regret minimization problems are combined to solve the game. For very large games, abstraction is typically needed to render CFR tractable. Abstractions are often manually tuned, possibly removing important strategic differences in the full game and harming performance. Function approximation provides a natural solution to finding good abstractions to approximate the full game. A common approach to incorporating function approximation is to learn the inputs needed for a regret minimizing algorithm, allowing for generalization across many regret minimization problems. This paper gives regret bounds when a regret minimizing algorithm uses estimates instead of true values. This form of analysis is the first to generalize to a larger class of $(Φ, f)$-regret matching algorithms, and includes different forms of regret such as swap, internal, and external regret. We demonstrate how these results give a slightly tighter bound for Regression Regret-Matching (RRM), and present a novel bound for combining regression with Hedge.