Jennifer Hu

Daniel Fried, Nicholas Tomlin, Jennifer Hu et al. · cmu

People rely heavily on context to enrich meaning beyond what is literally said, enabling concise but effective communication. To interact successfully and naturally with people, user-facing artificial intelligence systems will require similar skills in pragmatics: relying on various types of context -- from shared linguistic goals and conventions, to the visual and embodied world -- to use language effectively. We survey existing grounded settings and pragmatic modeling approaches and analyze how the task goals, environmental contexts, and communicative affordances in each work enrich linguistic meaning. We present recommendations for future grounded task design to naturally elicit pragmatic phenomena, and suggest directions that focus on a broader range of communicative contexts and affordances.

Jennifer Hu, Sammy Floyd, Olessia Jouravlev et al.

Pragmatics and non-literal language understanding are essential to human communication, and present a long-standing challenge for artificial language models. We perform a fine-grained comparison of language models and humans on seven pragmatic phenomena, using zero-shot prompting on an expert-curated set of English materials. We ask whether models (1) select pragmatic interpretations of speaker utterances, (2) make similar error patterns as humans, and (3) use similar linguistic cues as humans to solve the tasks. We find that the largest models achieve high accuracy and match human error patterns: within incorrect responses, models favor literal interpretations over heuristic-based distractors. We also find preliminary evidence that models and humans are sensitive to similar linguistic cues. Our results suggest that pragmatic behaviors can emerge in models without explicitly constructed representations of mental states. However, models tend to struggle with phenomena relying on social expectation violations.

Pei Zhou, Andrew Zhu, Jennifer Hu et al.

We propose a novel task, G4C, to study teacher-student natural language interactions in a goal-driven and grounded environment. Dungeons and Dragons (D&D), a role-playing game, provides an ideal setting to investigate such interactions. Here, the Dungeon Master (DM), i.e., the teacher, guides the actions of several players -- students, each with their own personas and abilities -- to achieve shared goals grounded in a fantasy world. Our approach is to decompose and model these interactions into (1) the DM's intent to guide players toward a given goal; (2) the DM's guidance utterance to the players expressing this intent; and (3) a theory-of-mind (ToM) model that anticipates the players' reaction to the guidance one turn into the future. We develop a novel reinforcement learning (RL) method for training a DM that generates guidance for players by rewarding utterances where the intent matches the ToM-anticipated player actions. Human and automated evaluations show that a DM trained to explicitly model intents and incorporate ToM of the players using RL generates better-quality guidance that is 3x more likely to fulfill the DM's intent than a vanilla natural language generation (NLG) approach.

Jennifer Hu, Roger Levy, Judith Degen et al.

Scalar inferences (SI) are a signature example of how humans interpret language based on unspoken alternatives. While empirical studies have demonstrated that human SI rates are highly variable -- both within instances of a single scale, and across different scales -- there have been few proposals that quantitatively explain both cross- and within-scale variation. Furthermore, while it is generally assumed that SIs arise through reasoning about unspoken alternatives, it remains debated whether humans reason about alternatives as linguistic forms, or at the level of concepts. Here, we test a shared mechanism explaining SI rates within and across scales: context-driven expectations about the unspoken alternatives. Using neural language models to approximate human predictive distributions, we find that SI rates are captured by the expectedness of the strong scalemate as an alternative. Crucially, however, expectedness robustly predicts cross-scale variation only under a meaning-based view of alternatives. Our results suggest that pragmatic inferences arise from context-driven expectations over alternatives, and these expectations operate at the level of concepts.

Siyuan Song, Jennifer Hu, Kyle Mahowald

There has been recent interest in whether large language models (LLMs) can introspect about their own internal states. Such abilities would make LLMs more interpretable, and also validate the use of standard introspective methods in linguistics to evaluate grammatical knowledge in models (e.g., asking "Is this sentence grammatical?"). We systematically investigate emergent introspection across 21 open-source LLMs, in two domains where introspection is of theoretical interest: grammatical knowledge and word prediction. Crucially, in both domains, a model's internal linguistic knowledge can be theoretically grounded in direct measurements of string probability. We then evaluate whether models' responses to metalinguistic prompts faithfully reflect their internal knowledge. We propose a new measure of introspection: the degree to which a model's prompted responses predict its own string probabilities, beyond what would be predicted by another model with nearly identical internal knowledge. While both metalinguistic prompting and probability comparisons lead to high task accuracy, we do not find evidence that LLMs have privileged "self-access". By using general tasks, controlling for model similarity, and evaluating a wide range of open-source models, we show that LLMs cannot introspect, and add new evidence to the argument that prompted responses should not be conflated with models' linguistic generalizations.

Jennifer Hu, Michael A. Lepori, Michael Franke

Modern AI models are increasingly being used as theoretical tools to study human cognition. One dominant approach is to evaluate whether human-derived measures are predicted by a model's output: that is, the end-product of a forward pass. However, recent advances in mechanistic interpretability have begun to reveal the internal processes that give rise to model outputs, raising the question of whether models might use human-like processing strategies. Here, we investigate the relationship between real-time processing in humans and layer-time dynamics of computation in Transformers, testing 20 open-source models in 6 domains. We first explore whether forward passes show mechanistic signatures of competitor interference, taking high-level inspiration from cognitive theories. We find that models indeed appear to initially favor a competing incorrect answer in the cases where we would expect decision conflict in humans. We then systematically test whether forward-pass dynamics predict signatures of processing in humans, above and beyond properties of the model's output probability distribution. We find that dynamic measures improve prediction of human processing measures relative to static final-layer measures. Moreover, across our experiments, larger models do not always show more human-like processing patterns. Our work suggests a new way of using AI models to study human cognition: not just as a black box mapping stimuli to responses, but potentially also as explicit processing models.

Sonia K. Murthy, Rosie Zhao, Jennifer Hu et al. · deepmind

Value trade-offs are an integral part of human decision-making and language use, however, current tools for interpreting such dynamic and multi-faceted notions of values in LLMs are limited. In cognitive science, so-called "cognitive models" provide formal accounts of such trade-offs in humans, by modeling the weighting of a speaker's competing utility functions in choosing an action or utterance. Here we use a leading cognitive model of polite speech to systematically evaluate value trade-offs in two encompassing model settings: degrees of reasoning "effort" in frontier black-box models, and RL post-training dynamics of open-source models. Our results highlight patterns of higher informational utility than social utility in reasoning models' default behavior, and demonstrate that these patterns shift in predictable ways when models are prompted to prioritize certain goals over others. Our findings from LLMs' training dynamics suggest large shifts in utility values early on in training with persistent effects of the choice of base model and pretraining data, compared to feedback dataset or alignment method. Our framework offers a flexible tool for probing value trade-offs across diverse model types, providing insights for generating hypotheses about other social behaviors such as sycophancy and for shaping training regimes that better control trade-offs between values during model development.

Anna A. Ivanova, Aalok Sathe, Benjamin Lipkin et al. · ibm-research, mit

The ability to build and reason about models of the world is essential for situated language understanding. But evaluating world modeling capabilities in modern AI systems -- especially those based on language models -- has proven challenging, in large part because of the difficulty of disentangling conceptual knowledge about the world from knowledge of surface co-occurrence statistics. This paper presents Elements of World Knowledge (EWoK), a framework for evaluating language models' understanding of the conceptual knowledge underlying world modeling. EWoK targets specific concepts from multiple knowledge domains known to be important for world modeling in humans, from social interactions (help, deceive) to spatial relations (left, right). Objects, agents, and locations in the items can be flexibly filled in, enabling easy generation of multiple controlled datasets. We then introduce EWoK-core-1.0, a dataset of 4,374 items covering 11 world knowledge domains. We evaluate 20 open-weights large language models (1.3B--70B parameters) and compare them with human performance. All tested models perform worse than humans, with results varying drastically across domains. Performance on social interactions and social properties was highest and performance on physical relations and spatial relations was lowest. Overall, this dataset highlights simple cases where even large models struggle and presents rich avenues for targeted research on LLM world modeling capabilities.

Jennifer Hu, Michael C. Frank

Developmental psychologists have argued about when cognitive capacities such as language understanding or theory of mind emerge. These debates often hinge on the concept of "task demands" -- the auxiliary challenges associated with performing a particular evaluation -- that may mask the child's underlying ability. The same issues arise when measuring the capacities of language models (LMs): performance on a task is a function of the model's underlying knowledge, combined with the model's ability to interpret and perform the task given its available resources. Here, we show that for analogical reasoning, reflective reasoning, word prediction, and grammaticality judgments, evaluation methods with greater task demands yield lower performance than evaluations with reduced demands. This "demand gap" is most pronounced for models with fewer parameters and less training data. Our results illustrate that LM performance should not be interpreted as a direct indication of intelligence (or lack thereof), but as a reflection of capacities seen through the lens of researchers' design choices.

Sonia K. Murthy, Tomer Ullman, Jennifer Hu

Researchers in social science and psychology have recently proposed using large language models (LLMs) as replacements for humans in behavioral research. In addition to arguments about whether LLMs accurately capture population-level patterns, this has raised questions about whether LLMs capture human-like conceptual diversity. Separately, it is debated whether post-training alignment (RLHF or RLAIF) affects models' internal diversity. Inspired by human studies, we use a new way of measuring the conceptual diversity of synthetically-generated LLM "populations" by relating the internal variability of simulated individuals to the population-level variability. We use this approach to evaluate non-aligned and aligned LLMs on two domains with rich human behavioral data. While no model reaches human-like diversity, aligned models generally display less diversity than their instruction fine-tuned counterparts. Our findings highlight potential trade-offs between increasing models' value alignment and decreasing the diversity of their conceptual representations.

Jennifer Hu, Felix Sosa, Tomer Ullman

The question of whether large language models (LLMs) possess Theory of Mind (ToM) -- often defined as the ability to reason about others' mental states -- has sparked significant scientific and public interest. However, the evidence as to whether LLMs possess ToM is mixed, and the recent growth in evaluations has not resulted in a convergence. Here, we take inspiration from cognitive science to re-evaluate the state of ToM evaluation in LLMs. We argue that a major reason for the disagreement on whether LLMs have ToM is a lack of clarity on whether models should be expected to match human behaviors, or the computations underlying those behaviors. We also highlight ways in which current evaluations may be deviating from "pure" measurements of ToM abilities, which also contributes to the confusion. We conclude by discussing several directions for future research, including the relationship between ToM and pragmatic communication, which could advance our understanding of artificial systems as well as human cognition.

Jennifer Hu, Ethan Gotlieb Wilcox, Siyuan Song et al.

What have language models (LMs) learned about grammar? This question remains hotly debated, with major ramifications for linguistic theory. However, since probability and grammaticality are distinct notions in linguistics, it is not obvious what string probabilities can reveal about an LM's underlying grammatical knowledge. We present a theoretical analysis of the relationship between grammar, meaning, and string probability, based on simple assumptions about the generative process of corpus data. Our framework makes three predictions, which we validate empirically using 280K sentence pairs in English and Chinese: (1) correlation between the probability of strings within minimal pairs, i.e., string pairs with minimal semantic differences; (2) correlation between models' and humans' deltas within minimal pairs; and (3) poor separation in probability space between unpaired grammatical and ungrammatical strings. Our analyses give theoretical grounding for using probability to learn about LMs' structural knowledge, and suggest directions for future work in LM grammatical evaluation.

Siyuan Song, Harvey Lederman, Jennifer Hu et al.

Whether AI models can introspect is an increasingly important practical question. But there is no consensus on how introspection is to be defined. Beginning from a recently proposed ''lightweight'' definition, we argue instead for a thicker one. According to our proposal, introspection in AI is any process which yields information about internal states through a process more reliable than one with equal or lower computational cost available to a third party. Using experiments where LLMs reason about their internal temperature parameters, we show they can appear to have lightweight introspection while failing to meaningfully introspect per our proposed definition.

Adele E Goldberg, Supantho Rakshit, Jennifer Hu et al.

Recent claims suggest that large language models (LMs) underperform humans in comprehending minimally complex English statements (Dentella et al., 2024). Here, we revisit those findings and argue that human performance was overestimated, while LLM abilities were underestimated. Using the same stimuli, we report a preregistered study comparing human responses in two conditions: one allowed rereading (replicating the original study), and one that restricted rereading (a more naturalistic comprehension test). Human accuracy dropped significantly when rereading was restricted (73%), falling below that of Falcon-180B-Chat (76%) and GPT-4 (81%). The newer GPT-o1 model achieves perfect accuracy. Results further show that both humans and models are disproportionately challenged by queries involving potentially reciprocal actions (e.g., kissing), suggesting shared pragmatic sensitivities rather than model-specific deficits. Additional analyses using Llama-2-70B log probabilities, a recoding of open-ended model responses, and grammaticality ratings of other sentences reveal systematic underestimation of model performance. We find that GPT-4o can align with either naive or expert grammaticality judgments, depending on prompt framing. These findings underscore the need for more careful experimental design and coding practices in LLM evaluation, and they challenge the assumption that current models are inherently weaker than humans at language comprehension.

Jennifer Hu, Felix Sosa, Tomer Ullman

Some things are impossible, but some things may be even more impossible than impossible. Levitating a feather using one's mind is impossible in our world, but fits into our intuitive theories of possible worlds, whereas levitating a feather using the number five cannot be conceived in any possible world ("inconceivable"). While prior work has examined the distinction between improbable and impossible events, there has been little empirical research on inconceivability. Here, we investigate whether people maintain a distinction between impossibility and inconceivability, and how such distinctions might be made. We find that people can readily distinguish the impossible from the inconceivable, using categorization studies similar to those used to investigate the differences between impossible and improbable (Experiment 1). However, this distinction is not explained by people's subjective ratings of event likelihood, which are near zero and indistinguishable between impossible and inconceivable event descriptions (Experiment 2). Finally, we ask whether the probabilities assigned to event descriptions by statistical language models (LMs) can be used to separate modal categories, and whether these probabilities align with people's ratings (Experiment 3). We find high-level similarities between people and LMs: both distinguish among impossible and inconceivable event descriptions, and LM-derived string probabilities predict people's ratings of event likelihood across modal categories. Our findings suggest that fine-grained knowledge about exceedingly rare events (i.e., the impossible and inconceivable) may be learned via statistical learning over linguistic forms, yet leave open the question of whether people represent the distinction between impossible and inconceivable as a difference not of degree, but of kind.

Polina Tsvilodub, Jan-Felix Klumpp, Amir Mohammadpour et al.

This paper investigates whether LMs recruit shared computational mechanisms for general Theory of Mind (ToM) and language-specific pragmatic reasoning in order to contribute to the general question of whether LMs may be said to have emergent "social world models", i.e., representations of mental states that are repurposed across tasks (the functional integration hypothesis). Using behavioral evaluations and causal-mechanistic experiments via functional localization methods inspired by cognitive neuroscience, we analyze LMs' performance across seven subcategories of ToM abilities (Beaudoin et al., 2020) on a substantially larger localizer dataset than used in prior like-minded work. Results from stringent hypothesis-driven statistical testing offer suggestive evidence for the functional integration hypothesis, indicating that LMs may develop interconnected "social world models" rather than isolated competencies. This work contributes novel ToM localizer data, methodological refinements to functional localization techniques, and empirical insights into the emergence of social cognition in artificial systems.

Michael A. Lepori, Jennifer Hu, Ishita Dasgupta et al.

Language models (LMs) are used for a diverse range of tasks, from question answering to writing fantastical stories. In order to reliably accomplish these tasks, LMs must be able to discern the modal category of a sentence (i.e., whether it describes something that is possible, impossible, completely nonsensical, etc.). However, recent studies have called into question the ability of LMs to categorize sentences according to modality (Michaelov et al., 2025; Kauf et al., 2023). In this work, we identify linear representations that discriminate between modal categories within a variety of LMs, or modal difference vectors. Analysis of modal difference vectors reveals that LMs have access to more reliable modal categorization judgments than previously reported. Furthermore, we find that modal difference vectors emerge in a consistent order as models become more competent (i.e., through training steps, layers, and parameter count). Notably, we find that modal difference vectors identified within LM activations can be used to model fine-grained human categorization behavior. This potentially provides a novel view into how human participants distinguish between modal categories, which we explore by correlating projections along modal difference vectors with human participants' ratings of interpretable features. In summary, we derive new insights into LM modal categorization using techniques from mechanistic interpretability, with the potential to inform our understanding of modal categorization in humans.

Jennifer Hu, Kyle Mahowald, Gary Lupyan et al.

Do large language models (LLMs) make human-like linguistic generalizations? Dentella et al. (2023) ("DGL") prompt several LLMs ("Is the following sentence grammatically correct in English?") to elicit grammaticality judgments of 80 English sentences, concluding that LLMs demonstrate a "yes-response bias" and a "failure to distinguish grammatical from ungrammatical sentences". We re-evaluate LLM performance using well-established practices and find that DGL's data in fact provide evidence for just how well LLMs capture human behaviors. Models not only achieve high accuracy overall, but also capture fine-grained variation in human linguistic judgments.

Jennifer Hu, Roger Levy

Prompting is now a dominant method for evaluating the linguistic knowledge of large language models (LLMs). While other methods directly read out models' probability distributions over strings, prompting requires models to access this internal information by processing linguistic input, thereby implicitly testing a new type of emergent ability: metalinguistic judgment. In this study, we compare metalinguistic prompting and direct probability measurements as ways of measuring models' linguistic knowledge. Broadly, we find that LLMs' metalinguistic judgments are inferior to quantities directly derived from representations. Furthermore, consistency gets worse as the prompt query diverges from direct measurements of next-word probabilities. Our findings suggest that negative results relying on metalinguistic prompts cannot be taken as conclusive evidence that an LLM lacks a particular linguistic generalization. Our results also highlight the value that is lost with the move to closed APIs where access to probability distributions is limited.

Yiwen Wang, Jennifer Hu, Roger Levy et al.

Prior work has shown that structural supervision helps English language models learn generalizations about syntactic phenomena such as subject-verb agreement. However, it remains unclear if such an inductive bias would also improve language models' ability to learn grammatical dependencies in typologically different languages. Here we investigate this question in Mandarin Chinese, which has a logographic, largely syllable-based writing system; different word order; and sparser morphology than English. We train LSTMs, Recurrent Neural Network Grammars, Transformer language models, and Transformer-parameterized generative parsing models on two Mandarin Chinese datasets of different sizes. We evaluate the models' ability to learn different aspects of Mandarin grammar that assess syntactic and semantic relationships. We find suggestive evidence that structural supervision helps with representing syntactic state across intervening content and improves performance in low-data settings, suggesting that the benefits of hierarchical inductive biases in acquiring dependency relationships may extend beyond English.

Jennifer Hu, Roger Levy, Noga Zaslavsky

Models of context-sensitive communication often use the Rational Speech Act framework (RSA; Frank & Goodman, 2012), which formulates listeners and speakers in a cooperative reasoning process. However, the standard RSA formulation can only be applied to small domains, and large-scale applications have relied on imitating human behavior. Here, we propose a new approach to scalable pragmatics, building upon recent theoretical results (Zaslavsky et al., 2020) that characterize pragmatic reasoning in terms of general information-theoretic principles. Specifically, we propose an architecture and learning process in which agents acquire pragmatic policies via self-supervision instead of imitating human data. This work suggests a new principled approach for equipping artificial agents with pragmatic skills via self-supervision, which is grounded both in pragmatic theory and in information theory.

Ethan Gotlieb Wilcox, Jon Gauthier, Jennifer Hu et al.

Human reading behavior is tuned to the statistics of natural language: the time it takes human subjects to read a word can be predicted from estimates of the word's probability in context. However, it remains an open question what computational architecture best characterizes the expectations deployed in real time by humans that determine the behavioral signatures of reading. Here we test over two dozen models, independently manipulating computational architecture and training dataset size, on how well their next-word expectations predict human reading time behavior on naturalistic text corpora. We find that across model architectures and training dataset sizes the relationship between word log-probability and reading time is (near-)linear. We next evaluate how features of these models determine their psychometric predictive power, or ability to predict human reading behavior. In general, the better a model's next-word expectations, the better its psychometric predictive power. However, we find nontrivial differences across model architectures. For any given perplexity, deep Transformer models and n-gram models generally show superior psychometric predictive power over LSTM or structurally supervised neural models, especially for eye movement data. Finally, we compare models' psychometric predictive power to the depth of their syntactic knowledge, as measured by a battery of syntactic generalization tests developed using methods from controlled psycholinguistic experiments. Once perplexity is controlled for, we find no significant relationship between syntactic knowledge and predictive power. These results suggest that different approaches may be required to best model human real-time language comprehension behavior in naturalistic reading versus behavior for controlled linguistic materials designed for targeted probing of syntactic knowledge.

Noga Zaslavsky, Jennifer Hu, Roger P. Levy

What computational principles underlie human pragmatic reasoning? A prominent approach to pragmatics is the Rational Speech Act (RSA) framework, which formulates pragmatic reasoning as probabilistic speakers and listeners recursively reasoning about each other. While RSA enjoys broad empirical support, it is not yet clear whether the dynamics of such recursive reasoning may be governed by a general optimization principle. Here, we present a novel analysis of the RSA framework that addresses this question. First, we show that RSA recursion implements an alternating maximization for optimizing a tradeoff between expected utility and communicative effort. On that basis, we study the dynamics of RSA recursion and disconfirm the conjecture that expected utility is guaranteed to improve with recursion depth. Second, we show that RSA can be grounded in Rate-Distortion theory, while maintaining a similar ability to account for human behavior and avoiding a bias of RSA toward random utterance production. This work furthers the mathematical understanding of RSA models, and suggests that general information-theoretic principles may give rise to human pragmatic reasoning.

Jennifer Hu, Jon Gauthier, Peng Qian et al.

While state-of-the-art neural network models continue to achieve lower perplexity scores on language modeling benchmarks, it remains unknown whether optimizing for broad-coverage predictive performance leads to human-like syntactic knowledge. Furthermore, existing work has not provided a clear picture about the model properties required to produce proper syntactic generalizations. We present a systematic evaluation of the syntactic knowledge of neural language models, testing 20 combinations of model types and data sizes on a set of 34 English-language syntactic test suites. We find substantial differences in syntactic generalization performance by model architecture, with sequential models underperforming other architectures. Factorially manipulating model architecture and training dataset size (1M--40M words), we find that variability in syntactic generalization performance is substantially greater by architecture than by dataset size for the corpora tested in our experiments. Our results also reveal a dissociation between perplexity and syntactic generalization performance.

Will Monroe, Jennifer Hu, Andrew Jong et al.

Contextual influences on language often exhibit substantial cross-lingual regularities; for example, we are more verbose in situations that require finer distinctions. However, these regularities are sometimes obscured by semantic and syntactic differences. Using a newly-collected dataset of color reference games in Mandarin Chinese (which we release to the public), we confirm that a variety of constructions display the same sensitivity to contextual difficulty in Chinese and English. We then show that a neural speaker agent trained on bilingual data with a simple multitask learning approach displays more human-like patterns of context dependence and is more pragmatically informative than its monolingual Chinese counterpart. Moreover, this is not at the expense of language-specific semantic understanding: the resulting speaker model learns the different basic color term systems of English and Chinese (with noteworthy cross-lingual influences), and it can identify synonyms between the two languages using vector analogy operations on its output layer, despite having no exposure to parallel data.