Juan Antonio Caballero-Hernández

Gibran Gomez, Kevin van Liebergen, Davide Sanvito et al.

Abuse reporting services collect reports about abuse victims have suffered. Accurate classification of the submitted reports is fundamental to analyzing the prevalence and financial impact of different abuse types (e.g., sextortion, investment, romance). Current classification approaches are problematic because they require the reporter to select the abuse type from a list, assuming the reporter has the necessary experience for the classification, which we show is frequently not the case, or require manual classification by analysts, which does not scale. To address these issues, this paper presents a novel approach to classify cryptocurrency abuse reports automatically. We first build a taxonomy of 19 frequently reported abuse types. Given as input the textual description written by the reporter, our classifier leverages a large language model (LLM) to interpret the text and assign it an abuse type in our taxonomy. We collect 290K cryptocurrency abuse reports from two popular reporting services: BitcoinAbuse and BBB's ScamTracker. We build ground truth datasets for 20K of those reports and use them to evaluate three designs for our LLM-based classifier and four LLMs, as well as a supervised ML classifier used as a baseline. Our LLM-based classifier achieves a precision of 0.92, a recall of 0.87, and an F1 score of 0.89, compared to an F1 score of 0.55 for the baseline. We demonstrate our classifier in two applications: providing financial loss statistics for fine-grained abuse types and generating tagged addresses for cryptocurrency analysis platforms.

Platon Kotzias, Juan Caballero, Leyla Bilge

Android is the most popular operating system with billions of active devices. Unfortunately, its popularity and openness makes it attractive for unwanted apps, i.e., malware and potentially unwanted programs (PUP). In Android, app installations typically happen via the official and alternative markets, but also via other smaller and less understood alternative distribution vectors such as Web downloads, pay-per-install (PPI) services, backup restoration, bloatware, and IM tools. This work performs a thorough investigation on unwanted app distribution by quantifying and comparing distribution through different vectors. At the core of our measurements are reputation logs of a large security vendor, which include 7.9M apps observed in 12M devices between June and September 2019. As a first step, we measure that between 10% and 24% of users devices encounter at least one unwanted app, and compare the prevalence of malware and PUP. An analysis of the who-installs-who relationships between installers and child apps reveals that the Play market is the main app distribution vector, responsible for 87% of all installs and 67% of unwanted app installs, but it also has the best defenses against unwanted apps. Alternative markets distribute instead 5.7% of all apps, but over 10% of unwanted apps. Bloatware is also a significant unwanted app distribution vector with 6% of those installs. And, backup restoration is an unintentional distribution vector that may even allow unwanted apps to survive users' phone replacement. We estimate unwanted app distribution via PPI to be smaller than on Windows. Finally, we observe that Web downloads are rare, but provide a riskier proposition even compared to alternative markets.