Simon Mauras

Shiyun Lin, Simon Mauras, Vianney Perchet et al.

We study bandit learning in matching markets, where players and arms constitute the two market sides, and the players' utilities are linear in the arm contexts. In each round, new arms arrive with observable contexts. Then, the algorithm matches them to players, aiming to minimize each player's regret against a stable matching benchmark. This contextual structure creates significant complexity: subtle context shifts can slightly alter one player's utility while completely reconfiguring the underlying benchmark, causing large regret spikes for others. We address this in two settings: stochastic contexts, drawn from a latent distribution, and adversarial contexts, which may be arbitrary. For the stochastic case, we introduce a novel minimum preference gap to capture learning difficulty and provide a fully adaptive algorithm with an instance-dependent poly-logarithmic regret upper bound. We also establish matching instance-independent regret upper and lower bounds under a mild distributional assumption. For the adversarial setting, we propose a tractable regret notion that remains valid under arbitrary contexts and achieves an instance-independent sublinear regret bound via an adaptive algorithm.

Patrick Loiseau, Simon Mauras, Minrui Xu

We study auction design in the celebrated interdependence model introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982], where a mechanism designer allocates a good, maximizing the value of the agent who receives it, while inducing truthfulness using payments. In the lesser-studied procurement auctions, one allocates a chore, minimizing the cost incurred by the agent selected to perform it. Most of the past literature in theoretical computer science considers designing truthful mechanisms with constant approximation for the value setting, with restricted domains and monotone valuation functions. In this work, we study the general computational problems of optimizing the approximation ratio of truthful mechanism, for both value and cost, in the deterministic and randomized settings. Unlike most previous works, we remove the domain restriction and the monotonicity assumption imposed on value functions. We provide theoretical explanations for why some previously considered special cases are tractable, reducing them to classical combinatorial problems, and providing efficient algorithms and characterizations. We complement our positive results with hardness results for the general case, providing query complexity lower bounds, and proving the NP-Hardness of the general case.

Shiyun Lin, Simon Mauras, Nadav Merlis et al.

We study matching markets with ties, where workers on one side of the market may have tied preferences over jobs, determined by their matching utilities. Unlike classical two-sided markets with strict preferences, no single stable matching exists that is utility-maximizing for all workers. To address this challenge, we introduce the \emph{Optimal Stable Share} (OSS)-ratio, which measures the ratio of a worker's maximum achievable utility in any stable matching to their utility in a given matching. We prove that distributions over only stable matchings can incur linear utility losses, i.e., an $Ω(N)$ OSS-ratio, where $N$ is the number of workers. To overcome this, we design an algorithm that efficiently computes a distribution over (possibly non-stable) matchings, achieving an asymptotically tight $O (\log N)$ OSS-ratio. When exact utilities are unknown, our second algorithm guarantees workers a logarithmic approximation of their optimal utility under bounded instability. Finally, we extend our offline approximation results to a bandit learning setting where utilities are only observed for matched pairs. In this setting, we consider worker-optimal stable regret, design an adaptive algorithm that smoothly interpolates between markets with strict preferences and those with statistical ties, and establish a lower bound revealing the fundamental trade-off between strict and tied preference regimes.

Chien-Chung Huang, Naonori Kakimura, Simon Mauras et al.

Maximizing a monotone submodular function under various constraints is a classical and intensively studied problem. However, in the single-pass streaming model, where the elements arrive one by one and an algorithm can store only a small fraction of input elements, there is much gap in our knowledge, even though several approximation algorithms have been proposed in the literature. In this work, we present the first lower bound on the approximation ratios for cardinality and matroid constraints that beat $1-\frac{1}{e}$ in the single-pass streaming model. Let $n$ be the number of elements in the stream. Then, we prove that any (randomized) streaming algorithm for a cardinality constraint with approximation ratio $\frac{2}{2+\sqrt{2}}+\varepsilon$ requires $Ω\left(\frac{n}{K^2}\right)$ space for any $\varepsilon>0$, where $K$ is the size limit of the output set. We also prove that any (randomized) streaming algorithm for a (partition) matroid constraint with approximation ratio $\frac{K}{2K-1}+\varepsilon$ requires $Ω\left(\frac{n}{K}\right)$ space for any $\varepsilon>0$, where $K$ is the rank of the given matroid. In addition, we give streaming algorithms when we only have a weak oracle with which we can only evaluate function values on feasible sets. Specifically, we show weak-oracle streaming algorithms for cardinality and matroid constraints with approximation ratios $\frac{K}{2K-1}$ and $\frac{1}{2}$, respectively, whose space complexity is exponential in $K$ but is independent of $n$. The former one exactly matches the known inapproximability result for a cardinality constraint in the weak oracle model. The latter one almost matches our lower bound of $\frac{K}{2K-1}$ for a matroid constraint, which almost settles the approximation ratio for a matroid constraint that can be obtained by a streaming algorithm whose space complexity is independent of $n$.

Claire Mathieu, Simon Mauras

A top-list is a possibly incomplete ranking of elements: only a subset of the elements are ranked, with all unranked elements tied for last. Top-list aggregation, a generalization of the well-known rank aggregation problem, takes as input a collection of top-lists and aggregates them into a single complete ranking, aiming to minimize the number of upsets (pairs ranked in opposite order in the input and in the output). In this paper, we give simple approximation algorithms for top-list aggregation. * We generalize the footrule algorithm for rank aggregation. * Using inspiration from approval voting, we define the score of an element as the frequency with which it is ranked, i.e. appears in an input top-list. We reinterpret Ailon's RepeatChoice algorithm for top-list aggregation using the score of an element and its average rank given that it is ranked. * Using average ranks, we generalize and analyze Borda's algorithm for rank aggregation. * We design a simple 2-phase variant of the Generalized Borda's algorithm, roughly sorting by scores and breaking ties by average ranks. * We then design another 2-phase variant in which in order to break ties we use, as a black box, the Mathieu-Schudy PTAS for rank aggregation, yielding a PTAS for top-list aggregation. * Finally, we discuss the special case in which all input lists have constant length.