Zhihan Liu

Shenao Zhang, Sirui Zheng, Shuqi Ke et al.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has become the de facto standard practice for sequential decision-making problems by improving future acting policies with feedback. However, RL algorithms may require extensive trial-and-error interactions to collect useful feedback for improvement. On the other hand, recent developments in large language models (LLMs) have showcased impressive capabilities in language understanding and generation, yet they fall short in exploration and self-improvement capabilities for planning tasks, lacking the ability to autonomously refine their responses based on feedback. Therefore, in this paper, we study how the policy prior provided by the LLM can enhance the sample efficiency of RL algorithms. Specifically, we develop an algorithm named LINVIT that incorporates LLM guidance as a regularization factor in value-based RL, leading to significant reductions in the amount of data needed for learning, particularly when the difference between the ideal policy and the LLM-informed policy is small, which suggests that the initial policy is close to optimal, reducing the need for further exploration. Additionally, we present a practical algorithm SLINVIT that simplifies the construction of the value function and employs subgoals to reduce the search complexity. Our experiments across three interactive environments ALFWorld, InterCode, and BlocksWorld demonstrate that our method achieves state-of-the-art success rates and also surpasses previous RL and LLM approaches in terms of sample efficiency. Our code is available at https://github.com/agentification/Language-Integrated-VI.

Kai Zhang, Xiangchao Chen, Bo Liu et al. · microsoft-research

A long-term goal of language agents is to learn and improve through their own experience, ultimately outperforming humans in complex, real-world tasks. However, training agents from experience data with reinforcement learning remains difficult in many environments, which either lack verifiable rewards (e.g., websites) or require inefficient long-horizon rollouts (e.g., multi-turn tool use). As a result, most current agents rely on supervised fine-tuning on expert data, which is challenging to scale and generalizes poorly. This limitation stems from the nature of expert demonstrations: they capture only a narrow range of scenarios and expose the agent to limited environment diversity. We address this limitation with a middle-ground paradigm we call early experience: interaction data generated by the agent's own actions, where the resulting future states serve as supervision without reward signals. Within this paradigm we study two strategies of using such data: (1) Implicit world modeling, which uses collected states to ground the policy in environment dynamics; and (2) Self-reflection, where the agent learns from its suboptimal actions to improve reasoning and decision-making. We evaluate across eight diverse environments and multiple model families. Our approaches consistently improve effectiveness and out-of-domain generalization, highlighting the value of early experience. Moreover, in environments with verifiable rewards, our results provide promising signals that early experience offers a strong foundation for subsequent reinforcement learning, positioning it as a practical bridge between imitation learning and fully experience-driven agents.

Rui Zheng, Hongyi Guo, Zhihan Liu et al.

The standard Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) framework primarily focuses on optimizing the performance of large language models using pre-collected prompts. However, collecting prompts that provide comprehensive coverage is both tedious and challenging, and often fails to include scenarios that LLMs need to improve on the most. In this paper, we investigate alignment through the lens of two-agent games, involving iterative interactions between an adversarial and a defensive agent. The adversarial agent's task at each step is to generate prompts that expose the weakness of the defensive agent. In return, the defensive agent seeks to improve its responses to these newly identified prompts it struggled with, based on feedback from the reward model. We theoretically demonstrate that this iterative reinforcement learning optimization converges to a Nash Equilibrium for the game induced by the agents. Experimental results in safety scenarios demonstrate that learning in such a competitive environment not only fully trains agents but also leads to policies with enhanced generalization capabilities for both adversarial and defensive agents.