Yushi Yang

Harry Mayne, Yushi Yang, Adam Mahdi

Steering vectors are a promising approach to control the behaviour of large language models. However, their underlying mechanisms remain poorly understood. While sparse autoencoders (SAEs) may offer a potential method to interpret steering vectors, recent findings show that SAE-reconstructed vectors often lack the steering properties of the original vectors. This paper investigates why directly applying SAEs to steering vectors yields misleading decompositions, identifying two reasons: (1) steering vectors fall outside the input distribution for which SAEs are designed, and (2) steering vectors can have meaningful negative projections in feature directions, which SAEs are not designed to accommodate. These limitations hinder the direct use of SAEs for interpreting steering vectors.

Yushi Yang, Shreyansh Padarha, Andrew Lee et al.

Agentic reinforcement learning (RL) trains large language models to autonomously call tools during reasoning, with search as the most common application. These models excel at multi-step reasoning tasks, but their safety properties are not well understood. In this study, we show that RL-trained search models inherit refusal from instruction tuning and often deflect harmful requests by turning them into safe queries. However, this safety is fragile. Two simple attacks, one that forces the model to begin response with search (Search attack), another that encourages models to repeatedly search (Multi-search attack), trigger cascades of harmful searches and answers. Across two model families (Qwen, Llama) with both local and web search, these attacks lower refusal rates by up to 60.0%, answer safety by 82.5%, and search-query safety by 82.4%. The attacks succeed by triggering models to generate harmful, request-mirroring search queries before they can generate the inherited refusal tokens. This exposes a core weakness of current RL training: it rewards continued generation of effective queries without accounting for their harmfulness. As a result, RL search models have vulnerabilities that users can easily exploit, making it urgent to develop safety-aware agentic RL pipelines optimising for safe search.