Yuhang Huang

h-index6
2papers
144citations

2 Papers

2.3GROct 20, 2023
DeepFracture: A Generative Approach for Predicting Brittle Fractures with Neural Discrete Representation Learning

Yuhang Huang, Takashi Kanai

In the field of brittle fracture animation, generating realistic destruction animations using physics-based simulation methods is computationally expensive. While techniques based on Voronoi diagrams or pre-fractured patterns are effective for real-time applications, they fail to incorporate collision conditions when determining fractured shapes during runtime. This paper introduces a novel learning-based approach for predicting fractured shapes based on collision dynamics at runtime. Our approach seamlessly integrates realistic brittle fracture animations with rigid body simulations, utilising boundary element method (BEM) brittle fracture simulations to generate training data. To integrate collision scenarios and fractured shapes into a deep learning framework, we introduce generative geometric segmentation, distinct from both instance and semantic segmentation, to represent 3D fragment shapes. We propose an eight-dimensional latent code to address the challenge of optimising multiple discrete fracture pattern targets that share similar continuous collision latent codes. This code will follow a discrete normal distribution corresponding to a specific fracture pattern within our latent impulse representation design. This adaptation enables the prediction of fractured shapes using neural discrete representation learning. Our experimental results show that our approach generates considerably more detailed brittle fractures than existing techniques, while the computational time is typically reduced compared to traditional simulation methods at comparable resolutions.

13.7CRMar 8
Give Them an Inch and They Will Take a Mile:Understanding and Measuring Caller Identity Confusion in MCP-Based AI Systems

Yuhang Huang, Boyang Ma, Biwei Yan et al.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an open and standardized interface that enables large language models (LLMs) to interact with external tools and services, and is increasingly adopted by AI agents. However, the security of MCP-based systems remains largely unexplored.In this work, we conduct a large-scale security analysis of MCP servers integrated within MCP clients. We show that treating MCP servers as trusted entities without authenticating the caller identity is fundamentally insecure. Since MCP servers often cannot distinguish who is invoking a request, a single authorization decision may implicitly grant access to multiple, potentially untrusted callers.Our empirical study reveals that most MCP servers rely on persistent authorization states, allowing tool invocations after an initial authorization without re-authentication, regardless of the caller. In addition, many MCP servers fail to enforce authentication at the per-tool level, enabling unauthorized access to sensitive operations.These findings demonstrate that one-time authorization and server-level trust significantly expand the attack surface of MCP-based systems, highlighting the need for explicit caller authentication and fine-grained authorization mechanisms.