Fan Mo

Mengjia Niu, Hao Li, Jie Shi et al.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across various domains, although their susceptibility to hallucination poses significant challenges for their deployment in critical areas such as healthcare. To address this issue, retrieving relevant facts from knowledge graphs (KGs) is considered a promising method. Existing KG-augmented approaches tend to be resource-intensive, requiring multiple rounds of retrieval and verification for each factoid, which impedes their application in real-world scenarios. In this study, we propose Self-Refinement-Enhanced Knowledge Graph Retrieval (Re-KGR) to augment the factuality of LLMs' responses with less retrieval efforts in the medical field. Our approach leverages the attribution of next-token predictive probability distributions across different tokens, and various model layers to primarily identify tokens with a high potential for hallucination, reducing verification rounds by refining knowledge triples associated with these tokens. Moreover, we rectify inaccurate content using retrieved knowledge in the post-processing stage, which improves the truthfulness of generated responses. Experimental results on a medical dataset demonstrate that our approach can enhance the factual capability of LLMs across various foundational models as evidenced by the highest scores on truthfulness.

Fan Mo, Hamed Haddadi, Kleomenis Katevas et al.

We propose and implement a Privacy-preserving Federated Learning ($PPFL$) framework for mobile systems to limit privacy leakages in federated learning. Leveraging the widespread presence of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) in high-end and mobile devices, we utilize TEEs on clients for local training, and on servers for secure aggregation, so that model/gradient updates are hidden from adversaries. Challenged by the limited memory size of current TEEs, we leverage greedy layer-wise training to train each model's layer inside the trusted area until its convergence. The performance evaluation of our implementation shows that $PPFL$ can significantly improve privacy while incurring small system overheads at the client-side. In particular, $PPFL$ can successfully defend the trained model against data reconstruction, property inference, and membership inference attacks. Furthermore, it can achieve comparable model utility with fewer communication rounds (0.54$\times$) and a similar amount of network traffic (1.002$\times$) compared to the standard federated learning of a complete model. This is achieved while only introducing up to ~15% CPU time, ~18% memory usage, and ~21% energy consumption overhead in $PPFL$'s client-side.

Fan Mo, Ali Shahin Shamsabadi, Kleomenis Katevas et al.

We present DarkneTZ, a framework that uses an edge device's Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) in conjunction with model partitioning to limit the attack surface against Deep Neural Networks (DNNs). Increasingly, edge devices (smartphones and consumer IoT devices) are equipped with pre-trained DNNs for a variety of applications. This trend comes with privacy risks as models can leak information about their training data through effective membership inference attacks (MIAs). We evaluate the performance of DarkneTZ, including CPU execution time, memory usage, and accurate power consumption, using two small and six large image classification models. Due to the limited memory of the edge device's TEE, we partition model layers into more sensitive layers (to be executed inside the device TEE), and a set of layers to be executed in the untrusted part of the operating system. Our results show that even if a single layer is hidden, we can provide reliable model privacy and defend against state of the art MIAs, with only 3% performance overhead. When fully utilizing the TEE, DarkneTZ provides model protections with up to 10% overhead.

Fan Mo, Ali Shahin Shamsabadi, Kleomenis Katevas et al.

Pre-trained Deep Neural Network (DNN) models are increasingly used in smartphones and other user devices to enable prediction services, leading to potential disclosures of (sensitive) information from training data captured inside these models. Based on the concept of generalization error, we propose a framework to measure the amount of sensitive information memorized in each layer of a DNN. Our results show that, when considered individually, the last layers encode a larger amount of information from the training data compared to the first layers. We find that, while the neuron of convolutional layers can expose more (sensitive) information than that of fully connected layers, the same DNN architecture trained with different datasets has similar exposure per layer. We evaluate an architecture to protect the most sensitive layers within the memory limits of Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) against potential white-box membership inference attacks without the significant computational overhead.