Tomer Barak

Tomer Barak, Yonatan Loewenstein

The nature of abstract reasoning is a matter of debate. Modern artificial neural network (ANN) models, like large language models, demonstrate impressive success when tested on abstract reasoning problems. However, it has been argued that their success reflects some form of memorization of similar problems (data contamination) rather than a general-purpose abstract reasoning capability. This concern is supported by evidence of brittleness, and the requirement of extensive training. In our study, we explored whether abstract reasoning can be achieved using the toolbox of ANNs, without prior training. Specifically, we studied an ANN model in which the weights of a naive network are optimized during the solution of the problem, using the problem data itself, rather than any prior knowledge. We tested this modeling approach on visual reasoning problems and found that it performs relatively well. Crucially, this success does not rely on memorization of similar problems. We further suggest an explanation of how it works. Finally, as problem solving is performed by changing the ANN weights, we explored the connection between problem solving and the accumulation of knowledge in the ANNs.

Tomer Barak, Yonatan Loewenstein

In this paper, we aimed to help bridge the gap between human fluid intelligence - the ability to solve novel tasks without prior training - and the performance of deep neural networks, which typically require extensive prior training. An essential cognitive component for solving intelligence tests, which in humans are used to measure fluid intelligence, is the ability to identify regularities in sequences. This motivated us to construct a benchmark task, which we term \textit{sequence consistency evaluation} (SCE), whose solution requires the ability to identify regularities in sequences. Given the proven capabilities of deep networks, their ability to solve such tasks after extensive training is expected. Surprisingly, however, we show that naive (randomly initialized) deep learning models that are trained on a \textit{single} SCE with a \textit{single} optimization step can still solve non-trivial versions of the task relatively well. We extend our findings to solve, without any prior training, real-world anomaly detection tasks in the visual and auditory modalities. These results demonstrate the fluid-intelligent computational capabilities of deep networks. We discuss the implications of our work for constructing fluid-intelligent machines.

Tomer Barak, Yonatan Loewenstein

When individuals encounter observations that violate their expectations, when will they adjust their expectations and when will they maintain them despite these observations? For example, when individuals expect objects of type A to be smaller than objects B, but observe the opposite, when will they adjust their expectation about the relationship between the two objects (to A being larger than B)? Naively, one would predict that the larger the violation, the greater the adaptation. However, experiments reveal that when violations are extreme, individuals are more likely to hold on to their prior expectations rather than adjust them. To address this puzzle, we tested the adaptation of artificial neural networks (ANNs) capable of relational learning and found a similar phenomenon: Standard learning dynamics dictates that small violations would lead to adjustments of expected relations while larger ones would be resolved using a different mechanism -- a change in object representation that bypasses the need for adaptation of the relational expectations. These results suggest that the experimentally-observed stability of prior expectations when facing large expectation violations is a natural consequence of learning dynamics and does not require any additional mechanisms. We conclude by discussing the effect of intermediate adaptation steps on this stability.

Tomer Barak, Yehonatan Avidan, Yonatan Loewenstein

In the cognitive sciences, it is common to distinguish between crystal intelligence, the ability to utilize knowledge acquired through past learning or experience and fluid intelligence, the ability to solve novel problems without relying on prior knowledge. Using this cognitive distinction between the two types of intelligence, extensively-trained deep networks that can play chess or Go exhibit crystal but not fluid intelligence. In humans, fluid intelligence is typically studied and quantified using intelligence tests. Previous studies have shown that deep networks can solve some forms of intelligence tests, but only after extensive training. Here we present a computational model that solves intelligence tests without any prior training. This ability is based on continual inductive reasoning, and is implemented by deep unsupervised latent-prediction networks. Our work demonstrates the potential fluid intelligence of deep networks. Finally, we propose that the computational principles underlying our approach can be used to model fluid intelligence in the cognitive sciences.