Stratis Skoulakis

Anders Bo Ipsen, Stratis Skoulakis

We study the revenue of approximate correlated equilibrium in discrete first price auctions - the set of allowable bids is $\mathcal{B} = \{0, 1/k, \dots, 1 - 1/k, 1\}$ for some $k \in \mathbb{N}$. We show that the revenue of any $ε$-approximate correlated equilibrium is at least $v_2 - Θ(1/k)- Θ(εk^2)$, where $v_2 \geq 0$ is the second-highest valuation. Our results establish the first polynomial convergence rates on the revenue generated by no-swap regret bidders in first-price auctions. For instance, if bidders admit the optimal swap regret of $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{k T})$, then the time-averaged revenue is at least $v_2 - Θ(1/k) - Θ(ε)$ after $\mathcal{O}(k^5/ε^2)$ rounds.

Ioannis Caragiannis, Dimitris Fotakis, Stratis Skoulakis

Mechanisms for allocating a divisible resource among strategic agents have been widely studied. The prominent paradigm is the proportional (Kelly) mechanism, which elicits a scalar bid per agent, allocates the resource proportionally, and charges payments equal to the bids. Follow-up mechanisms improve social welfare, but sacrifice simplicity by introducing complex allocation rules or unintuitive payments. We introduce a unified framework for designing simple resource allocation mechanisms with proportional-style allocations and uniform pricing. Our framework yields a family of mechanisms that interpolate between the Kelly mechanism and the first-price auction. These mechanisms strictly improve upon Kelly's efficiency guarantees, even achieving full efficiency in equilibrium, while also providing revenue guarantees relative to the VCG mechanism.

Ali Kavis, Stratis Skoulakis, Kimon Antonakopoulos et al.

We propose an adaptive variance-reduction method, called AdaSpider, for minimization of $L$-smooth, non-convex functions with a finite-sum structure. In essence, AdaSpider combines an AdaGrad-inspired [Duchi et al., 2011, McMahan & Streeter, 2010], but a fairly distinct, adaptive step-size schedule with the recursive stochastic path integrated estimator proposed in [Fang et al., 2018]. To our knowledge, Adaspider is the first parameter-free non-convex variance-reduction method in the sense that it does not require the knowledge of problem-dependent parameters, such as smoothness constant $L$, target accuracy $ε$ or any bound on gradient norms. In doing so, we are able to compute an $ε$-stationary point with $\tilde{O}\left(n + \sqrt{n}/ε^2\right)$ oracle-calls, which matches the respective lower bound up to logarithmic factors.

Lorenzo Brusca, Lars C. P. M. Quaedvlieg, Stratis Skoulakis et al.

This work presents a graph neural network (GNN) framework for solving the maximum independent set (MIS) problem, inspired by dynamic programming (DP). Specifically, given a graph, we propose a DP-like recursive algorithm based on GNNs that firstly constructs two smaller sub-graphs, predicts the one with the larger MIS, and then uses it in the next recursive call. To train our algorithm, we require annotated comparisons of different graphs concerning their MIS size. Annotating the comparisons with the output of our algorithm leads to a self-training process that results in more accurate self-annotation of the comparisons and vice versa. We provide numerical evidence showing the superiority of our method vs prior methods in multiple synthetic and real-world datasets.

Volkan Cevher, Georgios Piliouras, Ryann Sim et al.

In this paper we present a first-order method that admits near-optimal convergence rates for convex/concave min-max problems while requiring a simple and intuitive analysis. Similarly to the seminal work of Nemirovski and the recent approach of Piliouras et al. in normal form games, our work is based on the fact that the update rule of the Proximal Point method (PP) can be approximated up to accuracy $ε$ with only $O(\log 1/ε)$ additional gradient-calls through the iterations of a contraction map. Then combining the analysis of (PP) method with an error-propagation analysis we establish that the resulting first order method, called Clairvoyant Extra Gradient, admits near-optimal time-average convergence for general domains and last-iterate convergence in the unconstrained case.

Constantinos Daskalakis, Noah Golowich, Stratis Skoulakis et al.

Min-max optimization problems involving nonconvex-nonconcave objectives have found important applications in adversarial training and other multi-agent learning settings. Yet, no known gradient descent-based method is guaranteed to converge to (even local notions of) min-max equilibrium in the nonconvex-nonconcave setting. For all known methods, there exist relatively simple objectives for which they cycle or exhibit other undesirable behavior different from converging to a point, let alone to some game-theoretically meaningful one~\cite{flokas2019poincare,hsieh2021limits}. The only known convergence guarantees hold under the strong assumption that the initialization is very close to a local min-max equilibrium~\cite{wang2019solving}. Moreover, the afore-described challenges are not just theoretical curiosities. All known methods are unstable in practice, even in simple settings. We propose the first method that is guaranteed to converge to a local min-max equilibrium for smooth nonconvex-nonconcave objectives. Our method is second-order and provably escapes limit cycles as long as it is initialized at an easy-to-find initial point. Both the definition of our method and its convergence analysis are motivated by the topological nature of the problem. In particular, our method is not designed to decrease some potential function, such as the distance of its iterate from the set of local min-max equilibria or the projected gradient of the objective, but is designed to satisfy a topological property that guarantees the avoidance of cycles and implies its convergence.

Georgios Piliouras, Lillian Ratliff, Ryann Sim et al.

The study of learning in games has thus far focused primarily on normal form games. In contrast, our understanding of learning in extensive form games (EFGs) and particularly in EFGs with many agents lags far behind, despite them being closer in nature to many real world applications. We consider the natural class of Network Zero-Sum Extensive Form Games, which combines the global zero-sum property of agent payoffs, the efficient representation of graphical games as well the expressive power of EFGs. We examine the convergence properties of Optimistic Gradient Ascent (OGA) in these games. We prove that the time-average behavior of such online learning dynamics exhibits $O(1/T)$ rate convergence to the set of Nash Equilibria. Moreover, we show that the day-to-day behavior also converges to Nash with rate $O(c^{-t})$ for some game-dependent constant $c>0$.

Luca Viano, Stratis Skoulakis, Volkan Cevher

We present a new algorithm for imitation learning in infinite horizon linear MDPs dubbed ILARL which greatly improves the bound on the number of trajectories that the learner needs to sample from the environment. In particular, we remove exploration assumptions required in previous works and we improve the dependence on the desired accuracy $ε$ from $\mathcal{O}(ε^{-5})$ to $\mathcal{O}(ε^{-4})$. Our result relies on a connection between imitation learning and online learning in MDPs with adversarial losses. For the latter setting, we present the first result for infinite horizon linear MDP which may be of independent interest. Moreover, we are able to provide a strengthen result for the finite horizon case where we achieve $\mathcal{O}(ε^{-2})$. Numerical experiments with linear function approximation shows that ILARL outperforms other commonly used algorithms.

John Lazarsfeld, Georgios Piliouras, Ryann Sim et al.

This paper studies the optimistic variant of Fictitious Play for learning in two-player zero-sum games. While it is known that Optimistic FTRL -- a regularized algorithm with a bounded stepsize parameter -- obtains constant regret in this setting, we show for the first time that similar, optimal rates are also achievable without regularization: we prove for two-strategy games that Optimistic Fictitious Play (using any tiebreaking rule) obtains only constant regret, providing surprising new evidence on the ability of non-no-regret algorithms for fast learning in games. Our proof technique leverages a geometric view of Optimistic Fictitious Play in the dual space of payoff vectors, where we show a certain energy function of the iterates remains bounded over time. Additionally, we also prove a regret lower bound of $Ω(\sqrt{T})$ for Alternating Fictitious Play. In the unregularized regime, this separates the ability of optimism and alternation in achieving $o(\sqrt{T})$ regret.

Yi Feng, Kaito Fujii, Stratis Skoulakis et al.

Since Polyak's pioneering work, heavy ball (HB) momentum has been widely studied in minimization. However, its role in min-max games remains largely unexplored. As a key component of practical min-max algorithms like Adam, this gap limits their effectiveness. In this paper, we present a continuous-time analysis for HB with simultaneous and alternating update schemes in min-max games. Locally, we prove smaller momentum enhances algorithmic stability by enabling local convergence across a wider range of step sizes, with alternating updates generally converging faster. Globally, we study the implicit regularization of HB, and find smaller momentum guides algorithms trajectories towards shallower slope regions of the loss landscapes, with alternating updates amplifying this effect. Surprisingly, all these phenomena differ from those observed in minimization, where larger momentum yields similar effects. Our results reveal fundamental differences between HB in min-max games and minimization, and numerical experiments further validate our theoretical results.

Adrian Müller, Jon Schneider, Stratis Skoulakis et al.

In this paper, we investigate the existence of online learning algorithms with bandit feedback that simultaneously guarantee $O(1)$ regret compared to a given comparator strategy, and $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret compared to any fixed strategy, where $T$ is the number of rounds. We provide the first affirmative answer to this question whenever the comparator strategy supports every action. In the context of zero-sum games with min-max value zero, both in normal- and extensive form, we show that our results allow us to guarantee to risk at most $O(1)$ loss while being able to gain $Ω(T)$ from exploitable opponents, thereby combining the benefits of both no-regret algorithms and minimax play.

Pol Puigdemont, Stratis Skoulakis, Grigorios Chrysos et al.

Cutting plane methods are a fundamental approach for solving integer linear programs (ILPs). In each iteration of such methods, additional linear constraints (cuts) are introduced to the constraint set with the aim of excluding the previous fractional optimal solution while not affecting the optimal integer solution. In this work, we explore a novel approach within cutting plane methods: instead of only adding new cuts, we also consider the removal of previous cuts introduced at any of the preceding iterations of the method under a learnable parametric criteria. We demonstrate that in fundamental combinatorial optimization settings such cut removal policies can lead to significant improvements over both human-based and machine learning-guided cut addition policies even when implemented with simple models.

Ioannis Mavrothalassitis, Stratis Skoulakis, Leello Tadesse Dadi et al.

Given a sequence of functions $f_1,\ldots,f_n$ with $f_i:\mathcal{D}\mapsto \mathbb{R}$, finite-sum minimization seeks a point ${x}^\star \in \mathcal{D}$ minimizing $\sum_{j=1}^n f_j(x)/n$. In this work, we propose a key twist into the finite-sum minimization, dubbed as continual finite-sum minimization, that asks for a sequence of points ${x}_1^\star,\ldots,{x}_n^\star \in \mathcal{D}$ such that each ${x}^\star_i \in \mathcal{D}$ minimizes the prefix-sum $\sum_{j=1}^if_j(x)/i$. Assuming that each prefix-sum is strongly convex, we develop a first-order continual stochastic variance reduction gradient method ($\mathrm{CSVRG}$) producing an $ε$-optimal sequence with $\mathcal{\tilde{O}}(n/ε^{1/3} + 1/\sqrtε)$ overall first-order oracles (FO). An FO corresponds to the computation of a single gradient $\nabla f_j(x)$ at a given $x \in \mathcal{D}$ for some $j \in [n]$. Our approach significantly improves upon the $\mathcal{O}(n/ε)$ FOs that $\mathrm{StochasticGradientDescent}$ requires and the $\mathcal{O}(n^2 \log (1/ε))$ FOs that state-of-the-art variance reduction methods such as $\mathrm{Katyusha}$ require. We also prove that there is no natural first-order method with $\mathcal{O}\left(n/ε^α\right)$ gradient complexity for $α< 1/4$, establishing that the first-order complexity of our method is nearly tight.

Georgios Piliouras, Ryann Sim, Stratis Skoulakis

In this paper, we provide a novel and simple algorithm, Clairvoyant Multiplicative Weights Updates (CMWU) for regret minimization in general games. CMWU effectively corresponds to the standard MWU algorithm but where all agents, when updating their mixed strategies, use the payoff profiles based on tomorrow's behavior, i.e. the agents are clairvoyant. CMWU achieves constant regret of $\ln(m)/η$ in all normal-form games with m actions and fixed step-sizes $η$. Although CMWU encodes in its definition a fixed point computation, which in principle could result in dynamics that are neither computationally efficient nor uncoupled, we show that both of these issues can be largely circumvented. Specifically, as long as the step-size $η$ is upper bounded by $\frac{1}{(n-1)V}$, where $n$ is the number of agents and $[0,V]$ is the payoff range, then the CMWU updates can be computed linearly fast via a contraction map. This implementation results in an uncoupled online learning dynamic that admits a $O (\log T)$-sparse sub-sequence where each agent experiences at most $O(nV\log m)$ regret. This implies that the CMWU dynamics converge with rate $O(nV \log m \log T / T)$ to a \textit{Coarse Correlated Equilibrium}. The latter improves on the current state-of-the-art convergence rate of \textit{uncoupled online learning dynamics} \cite{daskalakis2021near,anagnostides2021near}.

Tanner Fiez, Ryann Sim, Stratis Skoulakis et al.

A seminal result in game theory is von Neumann's minmax theorem, which states that zero-sum games admit an essentially unique equilibrium solution. Classical learning results build on this theorem to show that online no-regret dynamics converge to an equilibrium in a time-average sense in zero-sum games. In the past several years, a key research direction has focused on characterizing the day-to-day behavior of such dynamics. General results in this direction show that broad classes of online learning dynamics are cyclic, and formally Poincaré recurrent, in zero-sum games. We analyze the robustness of these online learning behaviors in the case of periodic zero-sum games with a time-invariant equilibrium. This model generalizes the usual repeated game formulation while also being a realistic and natural model of a repeated competition between players that depends on exogenous environmental variations such as time-of-day effects, week-to-week trends, and seasonality. Interestingly, time-average convergence may fail even in the simplest such settings, in spite of the equilibrium being fixed. In contrast, using novel analysis methods, we show that Poincaré recurrence provably generalizes despite the complex, non-autonomous nature of these dynamical systems.

Dimitris Fotakis, Georgios Piliouras, Stratis Skoulakis

We study dynamic clustering problems from the perspective of online learning. We consider an online learning problem, called \textit{Dynamic $k$-Clustering}, in which $k$ centers are maintained in a metric space over time (centers may change positions) such as a dynamically changing set of $r$ clients is served in the best possible way. The connection cost at round $t$ is given by the \textit{$p$-norm} of the vector consisting of the distance of each client to its closest center at round $t$, for some $p\geq 1$ or $p = \infty$. We present a \textit{$Θ\left( \min(k,r) \right)$-regret} polynomial-time online learning algorithm and show that, under some well-established computational complexity conjectures, \textit{constant-regret} cannot be achieved in polynomial-time. In addition to the efficient solution of Dynamic $k$-Clustering, our work contributes to the long line of research on combinatorial online learning.

Stefanos Leonardos, Barnabé Monnot, Daniël Reijsbergen et al.

Participation in permissionless blockchains results in competition over system resources, which needs to be controlled with fees. Ethereum's current fee mechanism is implemented via a first-price auction that results in unpredictable fees as well as other inefficiencies. EIP-1559 is a recent, improved proposal that introduces a number of innovative features such as a dynamically adaptive base fee that is burned, instead of being paid to the miners. Despite intense interest in understanding its properties, several basic questions such as whether and under what conditions does this protocol self-stabilize have remained elusive thus far. We perform a thorough analysis of the resulting fee market dynamic mechanism via a combination of tools from game theory and dynamical systems. We start by providing bounds on the step-size of the base fee update rule that suffice for global convergence to equilibrium via Lyapunov arguments. In the negative direction, we show that for larger step-sizes instability and even formally chaotic behavior are possible under a wide range of settings. We complement these qualitative results with quantitative bounds on the resulting range of base fees. We conclude our analysis with a thorough experimental case study that corroborates our theoretical findings.

Stratis Skoulakis, Tanner Fiez, Ryann Sim et al.

The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally online learning in games is based on a clear distinction between a population of dynamic agents that interact given a fixed, static game. In this paper, we move away from the artificial divide between dynamic agents and static games, to introduce and analyze a large class of competitive settings where both the agents and the games they play evolve strategically over time. We focus on arguably the most archetypal game-theoretic setting -- zero-sum games (as well as network generalizations) -- and the most studied evolutionary learning dynamic -- replicator, the continuous-time analogue of multiplicative weights. Populations of agents compete against each other in a zero-sum competition that itself evolves adversarially to the current population mixture. Remarkably, despite the chaotic coevolution of agents and games, we prove that the system exhibits a number of regularities. First, the system has conservation laws of an information-theoretic flavor that couple the behavior of all agents and games. Secondly, the system is Poincaré recurrent, with effectively all possible initializations of agents and games lying on recurrent orbits that come arbitrarily close to their initial conditions infinitely often. Thirdly, the time-average agent behavior and utility converge to the Nash equilibrium values of the time-average game. Finally, we provide a polynomial time algorithm to efficiently predict this time-average behavior for any such coevolving network game.

Dimitris Fotakis, Thanasis Lianeas, Georgios Piliouras et al.

We consider a natural model of online preference aggregation, where sets of preferred items $R_1, R_2, \ldots, R_t$ along with a demand for $k_t$ items in each $R_t$, appear online. Without prior knowledge of $(R_t, k_t)$, the learner maintains a ranking $π_t$ aiming that at least $k_t$ items from $R_t$ appear high in $π_t$. This is a fundamental problem in preference aggregation with applications to, e.g., ordering product or news items in web pages based on user scrolling and click patterns. The widely studied Generalized Min-Sum-Set-Cover (GMSSC) problem serves as a formal model for the setting above. GMSSC is NP-hard and the standard application of no-regret online learning algorithms is computationally inefficient, because they operate in the space of rankings. In this work, we show how to achieve low regret for GMSSC in polynomial-time. We employ dimensionality reduction from rankings to the space of doubly stochastic matrices, where we apply Online Gradient Descent. A key step is to show how subgradients can be computed efficiently, by solving the dual of a configuration LP. Using oblivious deterministic and randomized rounding schemes, we map doubly stochastic matrices back to rankings with a small loss in the GMSSC objective.

Constantinos Daskalakis, Stratis Skoulakis, Manolis Zampetakis

Despite its important applications in Machine Learning, min-max optimization of nonconvex-nonconcave objectives remains elusive. Not only are there no known first-order methods converging even to approximate local min-max points, but the computational complexity of identifying them is also poorly understood. In this paper, we provide a characterization of the computational complexity of the problem, as well as of the limitations of first-order methods in constrained min-max optimization problems with nonconvex-nonconcave objectives and linear constraints. As a warm-up, we show that, even when the objective is a Lipschitz and smooth differentiable function, deciding whether a min-max point exists, in fact even deciding whether an approximate min-max point exists, is NP-hard. More importantly, we show that an approximate local min-max point of large enough approximation is guaranteed to exist, but finding one such point is PPAD-complete. The same is true of computing an approximate fixed point of Gradient Descent/Ascent. An important byproduct of our proof is to establish an unconditional hardness result in the Nemirovsky-Yudin model. We show that, given oracle access to some function $f : P \to [-1, 1]$ and its gradient $\nabla f$, where $P \subseteq [0, 1]^d$ is a known convex polytope, every algorithm that finds a $\varepsilon$-approximate local min-max point needs to make a number of queries that is exponential in at least one of $1/\varepsilon$, $L$, $G$, or $d$, where $L$ and $G$ are respectively the smoothness and Lipschitzness of $f$ and $d$ is the dimension. This comes in sharp contrast to minimization problems, where finding approximate local minima in the same setting can be done with Projected Gradient Descent using $O(L/\varepsilon)$ many queries. Our result is the first to show an exponential separation between these two fundamental optimization problems.

Ioannis Panageas, Stratis Skoulakis, Antonios Varvitsiotis et al.

Non-negative matrix factorization (NMF) is a fundamental non-convex optimization problem with numerous applications in Machine Learning (music analysis, document clustering, speech-source separation etc). Despite having received extensive study, it is poorly understood whether or not there exist natural algorithms that can provably converge to a local minimum. Part of the reason is because the objective is heavily symmetric and its gradient is not Lipschitz. In this paper we define a multiplicative weight update type dynamics (modification of the seminal Lee-Seung algorithm) that runs concurrently and provably avoids saddle points (first order stationary points that are not second order). Our techniques combine tools from dynamical systems such as stability and exploit the geometry of the NMF objective by reducing the standard NMF formulation over the non-negative orthant to a new formulation over (a scaled) simplex. An important advantage of our method is the use of concurrent updates, which permits implementations in parallel computing environments.