Andrei Seoev

Andrei Seoev, Dmitry Belousov, Anastasiia Smirnova et al.

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) represents billions of dollars in extracted value that fundamentally shapes blockchain network dynamics and participant incentives. While research has focused on MEV extraction and mitigation, we lack systematic methods to attribute MEV opportunities to their on-chain origins. This paper formalizes the MEV opportunity attribution problem and introduces a systems framework for identifying which transactions create arbitrage opportunities and quantifying their contributions. We design and evaluate four attribution methods for atomic arbitrage on EVM-compatible networks: bot-data-driven, simulation-based, coefficient-based, and Shapley-based approaches. Through large-scale retrospective analysis spanning over one million blocks on Polygon, we demonstrate that the majority of atomic arbitrage opportunities can be traced to single source transactions, validating our central hypothesis about competitive MEV markets. We quantify a highly concentrated distribution of MEV creation, where a small subset of protocols generates most opportunities, and provide comparative analysis of method trade-offs in accuracy, cost, and scalability. Our findings offer insights for protocol designers reducing MEV leakage, validators optimizing transaction ordering, and analysts measuring ecosystem health through opportunity creation.

Andrei Seoev, Leonid Gremyachikh, Anastasiia Smirnova et al.

In blockchain networks, the strategic ordering of transactions within blocks has emerged as a significant source of profit extraction, known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). The transition from spam-based Priority Gas Auctions to structured auction mechanisms like Polygon Atlas has transformed MEV extraction from public bidding wars into sealed-bid competitions under extreme time constraints. While this shift reduces network congestion, it introduces complex strategic challenges where searchers must make optimal bidding decisions within a sub-second window without knowledge of competitor behavior or presence. Traditional game-theoretic approaches struggle in this high-frequency, partially observable environment due to their reliance on complete information and static equilibrium assumptions. We present a reinforcement learning framework for MEV extraction on Polygon Atlas and make three contributions: (1) A novel simulation environment that accurately models the stochastic arrival of arbitrage opportunities and probabilistic competition in Atlas auctions; (2) A PPO-based bidding agent optimized for real-time constraints, capable of adaptive strategy formulation in continuous action spaces while maintaining production-ready inference speeds; (3) Empirical validation demonstrating our history-conditioned agent captures 49\% of available profits when deployed alongside existing searchers and 81\% when replacing the market leader, significantly outperforming static bidding strategies. Our work establishes that reinforcement learning provides a critical advantage in high-frequency MEV environments where traditional optimization methods fail, offering immediate value for industrial participants and protocol designers alike.