Alexander Jordan

Nicholas Allen, François Gauthier, Alexander Jordan

Over the years, static taint analysis emerged as the analysis of choice to detect some of the most common web application vulnerabilities, such as SQL injection (SQLi) and cross-site scripting (XSS)~\cite{OWASP}. Furthermore, from an implementation perspective, the IFDS dataflow framework stood out as one of the most successful vehicles to implement static taint analysis for real-world Java applications. While existing approaches scale reasonably to medium-size applications (e.g. up to one hour analysis time for less than 100K lines of code), our experience suggests that no existing solution can scale to very large industrial code bases (e.g. more than 1M lines of code). In this paper, we present our novel IFDS-based solution to perform fast and precise static taint analysis of very large industrial Java web applications. Similar to state-of-the-art approaches to taint analysis, our IFDS-based taint analysis uses \textit{access paths} to abstract objects and fields in a program. However, contrary to existing approaches, our analysis is demand-driven, which restricts the amount of code to be analyzed, and does not rely on a computationally expensive alias analysis, thereby significantly improving scalability.

Alexander Jordan, François Gauthier, Behnaz Hassanshahi et al.

The popularity of the PDF format and the rich JavaScript environment that PDF viewers offer make PDF documents an attractive attack vector for malware developers. PDF documents present a serious threat to the security of organizations because most users are unsuspecting of them and thus likely to open documents from untrusted sources. We propose to identify malicious PDFs by using conservative abstract interpretation to statically reason about the behavior of the embedded JavaScript code. Currently, state-of-the-art tools either: (1) statically identify PDF malware based on structural similarity to known malicious samples; or (2) dynamically execute the code to detect malicious behavior. These two approaches are subject to evasion attacks that mimic the structure of benign documents or do not exhibit their malicious behavior when being analyzed dynamically. In contrast, abstract interpretation is oblivious to both types of evasions. A comparison with two state-of-the-art PDF malware detection tools shows that our conservative abstract interpretation approach achieves similar accuracy, while being more resilient to evasion attacks.