Mark Jones

Niels Holtgrefe, Leo van Iersel, Mark Jones

To measure the tree-likeness of a directed acyclic graph (DAG), a new width parameter that considers the directions of the arcs was recently introduced: scanwidth. We present the first algorithm that efficiently computes the exact scanwidth of general DAGs. For DAGs with one root and scanwidth $k$ it runs in $O(k \cdot n^k \cdot m)$ time. The algorithm also functions as an FPT algorithm with complexity $O(2^{4 \ell - 1} \cdot \ell \cdot n + n^2)$ for phylogenetic networks of level-$\ell$, a type of DAG used to depict evolutionary relationships among species. Our algorithm performs well in practice, being able to compute the scanwidth of synthetic networks up to 30 reticulations and 100 leaves within 500 seconds. Furthermore, we propose a heuristic that obtains an average practical approximation ratio of 1.5 on these networks. While we prove that the scanwidth is bounded from below by the treewidth of the underlying undirected graph, experiments suggest that for networks the parameters are close in practice.

Jason Crampton, Naomi Farley, Gregory Gutin et al.

We may enforce an information flow policy by encrypting a protected resource and ensuring that only users authorized by the policy are able to decrypt the resource. In most schemes in the literature that use symmetric cryptographic primitives, each user is assigned a single secret and derives decryption keys using this secret and publicly available information. Recent work has challenged this approach by developing schemes, based on a chain partition of the information flow policy, that do not require public information for key derivation, the trade-off being that a user may need to be assigned more than one secret. In general, many different chain partitions exist for the same policy and, until now, it was not known how to compute an appropriate one. In this paper, we introduce the notion of a tree partition, of which chain partitions are a special case. We show how a tree partition may be used to define a cryptographic enforcement scheme and prove that such schemes can be instantiated in such a way as to preserve the strongest security properties known for cryptographic enforcement schemes. We establish a number of results linking the amount of secret material that needs to be distributed to users with a weighted acyclic graph derived from the tree partition. These results enable us to develop efficient algorithms for deriving tree and chain partitions that minimize the amount of secret material that needs to be distributed.