Nelson Vadori

Nelson Vadori, Leo Ardon, Sumitra Ganesh et al.

We study a game between liquidity provider and liquidity taker agents interacting in an over-the-counter market, for which the typical example is foreign exchange. We show how a suitable design of parameterized families of reward functions coupled with shared policy learning constitutes an efficient solution to this problem. By playing against each other, our deep-reinforcement-learning-driven agents learn emergent behaviors relative to a wide spectrum of objectives encompassing profit-and-loss, optimal execution and market share. In particular, we find that liquidity providers naturally learn to balance hedging and skewing, where skewing refers to setting their buy and sell prices asymmetrically as a function of their inventory. We further introduce a novel RL-based calibration algorithm which we found performed well at imposing constraints on the game equilibrium. On the theoretical side, we are able to show convergence rates for our multi-agent policy gradient algorithm under a transitivity assumption, closely related to generalized ordinal potential games.

Nelson Vadori, Rahul Savani

It was recently observed that Elo ratings fail at preserving transitive relations among strategies and therefore cannot correctly extract the transitive component of a game. We provide a characterization of transitive games as a weak variant of ordinal potential games and show that Elo ratings actually do preserve transitivity when computed in the right space, using suitable invertible mappings. Leveraging this insight, we introduce a new game decomposition of an arbitrary game into transitive and cyclic components that is learnt using a neural network-based architecture and that prioritises capturing the sign pattern of the game, namely transitive and cyclic relations among strategies. We link our approach to the known concept of sign-rank, and evaluate our methodology using both toy examples and empirical data from real-world games.

Nelson Vadori

One of the most fundamental questions in quantitative finance is the existence of continuous-time diffusion models that fit market prices of a given set of options. Traditionally, one employs a mix of intuition, theoretical and empirical analysis to find models that achieve exact or approximate fits. Our contribution is to show how a suitable game theoretical formulation of this problem can help solve this question by leveraging existing developments in modern deep multi-agent reinforcement learning to search in the space of stochastic processes. Our experiments show that we are able to learn local volatility, as well as path-dependence required in the volatility process to minimize the price of a Bermudan option. Our algorithm can be seen as a particle method \textit{à la} Guyon \textit{et} Henry-Labordere where particles, instead of being designed to ensure $σ_{loc}(t,S_t)^2 = \mathbb{E}[σ_t^2|S_t]$, are learning RL-driven agents cooperating towards more general calibration targets.

Antoine Gorceix, Bastien Le Chenadec, Ahmad Rammal et al.

In this paper, we study the ability of large language models to learn specific mathematical rules such as distributivity or simplifying equations. We present an empirical analysis of their ability to generalize these rules, as well as to reuse them in the context of word problems. For this purpose, we provide a rigorous methodology to build synthetic data incorporating such rules, and perform fine-tuning of large language models on such data. Our experiments show that our model can learn and generalize these rules to some extent, as well as suitably reuse them in the context of word problems.

Leo Ardon, Nelson Vadori, Thomas Spooner et al.

We present a new financial framework where two families of RL-based agents representing the Liquidity Providers and Liquidity Takers learn simultaneously to satisfy their objective. Thanks to a parametrized reward formulation and the use of Deep RL, each group learns a shared policy able to generalize and interpolate over a wide range of behaviors. This is a step towards a fully RL-based market simulator replicating complex market conditions particularly suited to study the dynamics of the financial market under various scenarios.

Nelson Vadori, Rahul Savani, Thomas Spooner et al.

Cheung and Piliouras (2020) recently showed that two variants of the Multiplicative Weights Update method - OMWU and MWU - display opposite convergence properties depending on whether the game is zero-sum or cooperative. Inspired by this work and the recent literature on learning to optimize for single functions, we introduce a new framework for learning last-iterate convergence to Nash Equilibria in games, where the update rule's coefficients (learning rates) along a trajectory are learnt by a reinforcement learning policy that is conditioned on the nature of the game: \textit{the game signature}. We construct the latter using a new decomposition of two-player games into eight components corresponding to commutative projection operators, generalizing and unifying recent game concepts studied in the literature. We compare the performance of various update rules when their coefficients are learnt, and show that the RL policy is able to exploit the game signature across a wide range of game types. In doing so, we introduce CMWU, a new algorithm that extends consensus optimization to the constrained case, has local convergence guarantees for zero-sum bimatrix games, and show that it enjoys competitive performance on both zero-sum games with constant coefficients and across a spectrum of games when its coefficients are learnt.

Thomas Spooner, Nelson Vadori, Sumitra Ganesh

Policy gradient methods can solve complex tasks but often fail when the dimensionality of the action-space or objective multiplicity grow very large. This occurs, in part, because the variance on score-based gradient estimators scales quadratically. In this paper, we address this problem through a factor baseline which exploits independence structure encoded in a novel action-target influence network. Factored policy gradients (FPGs), which follow, provide a common framework for analysing key state-of-the-art algorithms, are shown to generalise traditional policy gradients, and yield a principled way of incorporating prior knowledge of a problem domain's generative processes. We provide an analysis of the proposed estimator and identify the conditions under which variance is reduced. The algorithmic aspects of FPGs are discussed, including optimal policy factorisation, as characterised by minimum biclique coverings, and the implications for the bias-variance trade-off of incorrectly specifying the network. Finally, we demonstrate the performance advantages of our algorithm on large-scale bandit and traffic intersection problems, providing a novel contribution to the latter in the form of a spatial approximation.

Nelson Vadori, Sumitra Ganesh, Prashant Reddy et al.

Training multi-agent systems (MAS) to achieve realistic equilibria gives us a useful tool to understand and model real-world systems. We consider a general sum partially observable Markov game where agents of different types share a single policy network, conditioned on agent-specific information. This paper aims at i) formally understanding equilibria reached by such agents, and ii) matching emergent phenomena of such equilibria to real-world targets. Parameter sharing with decentralized execution has been introduced as an efficient way to train multiple agents using a single policy network. However, the nature of resulting equilibria reached by such agents has not been yet studied: we introduce the novel concept of Shared equilibrium as a symmetric pure Nash equilibrium of a certain Functional Form Game (FFG) and prove convergence to the latter for a certain class of games using self-play. In addition, it is important that such equilibria satisfy certain constraints so that MAS are calibrated to real world data for practical use: we solve this problem by introducing a novel dual-Reinforcement Learning based approach that fits emergent behaviors of agents in a Shared equilibrium to externally-specified targets, and apply our methods to a n-player market example. We do so by calibrating parameters governing distributions of agent types rather than individual agents, which allows both behavior differentiation among agents and coherent scaling of the shared policy network to multiple agents.

Nelson Vadori, Sumitra Ganesh, Prashant Reddy et al.

We introduce a novel framework to account for sensitivity to rewards uncertainty in sequential decision-making problems. While risk-sensitive formulations for Markov decision processes studied so far focus on the distribution of the cumulative reward as a whole, we aim at learning policies sensitive to the uncertain/stochastic nature of the rewards, which has the advantage of being conceptually more meaningful in some cases. To this end, we present a new decomposition of the randomness contained in the cumulative reward based on the Doob decomposition of a stochastic process, and introduce a new conceptual tool - the \textit{chaotic variation} - which can rigorously be interpreted as the risk measure of the martingale component associated to the cumulative reward process. We innovate on the reinforcement learning side by incorporating this new risk-sensitive approach into model-free algorithms, both policy gradient and value function based, and illustrate its relevance on grid world and portfolio optimization problems.

Sumitra Ganesh, Nelson Vadori, Mengda Xu et al.

Market makers play an important role in providing liquidity to markets by continuously quoting prices at which they are willing to buy and sell, and managing inventory risk. In this paper, we build a multi-agent simulation of a dealer market and demonstrate that it can be used to understand the behavior of a reinforcement learning (RL) based market maker agent. We use the simulator to train an RL-based market maker agent with different competitive scenarios, reward formulations and market price trends (drifts). We show that the reinforcement learning agent is able to learn about its competitor's pricing policy; it also learns to manage inventory by smartly selecting asymmetric prices on the buy and sell sides (skewing), and maintaining a positive (or negative) inventory depending on whether the market price drift is positive (or negative). Finally, we propose and test reward formulations for creating risk averse RL-based market maker agents.