John Lazarsfeld

John Lazarsfeld, Dan Alistarh

We study a cooperative multi-agent bandit setting in the distributed GOSSIP model: in every round, each of $n$ agents chooses an action from a common set, observes the action's corresponding reward, and subsequently exchanges information with a single randomly chosen neighbor, which may inform its choice in the next round. We introduce and analyze families of memoryless and time-independent protocols for this setting, inspired by opinion dynamics that are well-studied for other algorithmic tasks in the GOSSIP model. For stationary reward settings, we prove for the first time that these simple protocols exhibit best-of-both-worlds behavior, simultaneously obtaining constant cumulative regret scaling like $R(T)/T = \widetilde O(1/T)$, and also reaching consensus on the highest-mean action within $\widetilde O(\sqrt{n})$ rounds. We obtain these results by showing a new connection between the global evolution of these decentralized protocols and a class of zero-sum multiplicative weights update} processes. Using this connection, we establish a general framework for analyzing the population-level regret and other properties of our protocols. Finally, we show our protocols are also surprisingly robust to adversarial rewards, and in this regime we obtain sublinear regret scaling like $R(T)/T = \widetilde O(1/\sqrt{T})$ as long as the number of rounds does not grow too fast as a function of $n$.

John Lazarsfeld, Aaron Johnson, Emmanuel Adeniran

The Maximal Information Coefficient (MIC) is a powerful statistic to identify dependencies between variables. However, it may be applied to sensitive data, and publishing it could leak private information. As a solution, we present algorithms to approximate MIC in a way that provides differential privacy. We show that the natural application of the classic Laplace mechanism yields insufficient accuracy. We therefore introduce the MICr statistic, which is a new MIC approximation that is more compatible with differential privacy. We prove MICr is a consistent estimator for MIC, and we provide two differentially private versions of it. We perform experiments on a variety of real and synthetic datasets. The results show that the private MICr statistics significantly outperform direct application of the Laplace mechanism. Moreover, experiments on real-world datasets show accuracy that is usable when the sample size is at least moderately large.

John Lazarsfeld, Anas Barakat, Georgios Piliouras et al.

This paper studies the convergence of the Optimistic Multiplicative Weights Update algorithm (OMWU) in two player zero-sum games. Recent works have identified instances on which the last-iterate of OMWU can converge arbitrarily slowly, but understanding when and why this slow convergence occurs has remained open. In this work, we develop a new analysis framework that gives sharp, quantitative explanations for this behavior. Our analysis is based on viewing the algorithm's dual iterates as an optimistic skew-gradient descent with respect to an energy function. We prove over the dual iterates that energy is dissipative, and by establishing tight bounds on the magnitude of dissipation, our analysis quantifies the geometric bottlenecks that arise when the corresponding primal iterates are close to the simplex boundary. This further translates into a new linear last-iterate convergence rate in KL divergence on games with a unique and interior Nash equilibrium. Compared to prior work, this new rate contains a much sharper dependence on game-specific constants, and we prove this dependence is optimal. Moreover, these geometric insights further translate into new separations on uniform convergence rates for OMWU. On the one hand, we prove constant lower bounds on the uniform best-iterate convergence rate in KL divergence and total variation distance from Nash. On the other hand, we establish for the $2\times 2$ setting a new ${\widetilde O}(T^{-1/2})$ best-iterate rate in duality gap, improving substantially over prior work. Together, this shows in general that uniform convergence rate guarantees do not transfer across different measures of distance to Nash.

John Lazarsfeld, Georgios Piliouras, Ryann Sim et al.

This paper investigates the sublinear regret guarantees of two non-no-regret algorithms in zero-sum games: Fictitious Play, and Online Gradient Descent with constant stepsizes. In general adversarial online learning settings, both algorithms may exhibit instability and linear regret due to no regularization (Fictitious Play) or small amounts of regularization (Gradient Descent). However, their ability to obtain tighter regret bounds in two-player zero-sum games is less understood. In this work, we obtain strong new regret guarantees for both algorithms on a class of symmetric zero-sum games that generalize the classic three-strategy Rock-Paper-Scissors to a weighted, n-dimensional regime. Under symmetric initializations of the players' strategies, we prove that Fictitious Play with any tiebreaking rule has $O(\sqrt{T})$ regret, establishing a new class of games for which Karlin's Fictitious Play conjecture holds. Moreover, by leveraging a connection between the geometry of the iterates of Fictitious Play and Gradient Descent in the dual space of payoff vectors, we prove that Gradient Descent, for almost all symmetric initializations, obtains a similar $O(\sqrt{T})$ regret bound when its stepsize is a sufficiently large constant. For Gradient Descent, this establishes the first "fast and furious" behavior (i.e., sublinear regret without time-vanishing stepsizes) for zero-sum games larger than 2x2.

Anas Barakat, Wayne Lin, John Lazarsfeld et al.

We introduce symmetric cone games (SCGs), a broad class of multi-player games where each player's strategy lies in a generalized simplex (the trace-one slice of a symmetric cone). This framework unifies a wide spectrum of settings, including normal-form games (simplex strategies), quantum games (density matrices), and continuous games with ball-constrained strategies. It also captures several structured machine learning and optimization problems, such as distance metric learning and Fermat-Weber facility location, as two-player zero-sum SCGs. To compute approximate Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum SCGs, we propose a single online learning algorithm: Optimistic Symmetric Cone Multiplicative Weights Updates (OSCMWU). Unlike prior methods tailored to specific geometries, OSCMWU provides closed-form, projection-free updates over any symmetric cone and achieves an optimal $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/ε)$ iteration complexity for computing $ε$-saddle points. Our analysis builds on the Optimistic Follow-the-Regularized-Leader framework and hinges on a key technical contribution: We prove that the symmetric cone negative entropy is strongly convex with respect to the trace-one norm. This result extends known results for the simplex and spectraplex to all symmetric cones, and may be of independent interest.

John Lazarsfeld, Aaron Johnson

The Maximal Information Coefficient (MIC) of Reshef et al. (Science, 2011) is a statistic for measuring dependence between variable pairs in large datasets. In this note, we prove that MIC is a consistent estimator of the corresponding population statistic MIC$_*$. This corrects an error in an argument of Reshef et al. (JMLR, 2016), which we describe.