Kai Xiao

Guillaume Leclerc, Hadi Salman, Andrew Ilyas et al.

We introduce 3DB: an extendable, unified framework for testing and debugging vision models using photorealistic simulation. We demonstrate, through a wide range of use cases, that 3DB allows users to discover vulnerabilities in computer vision systems and gain insights into how models make decisions. 3DB captures and generalizes many robustness analyses from prior work, and enables one to study their interplay. Finally, we find that the insights generated by the system transfer to the physical world. We are releasing 3DB as a library (https://github.com/3db/3db) alongside a set of example analyses, guides, and documentation: https://3db.github.io/3db/ .

Milad Nasr, Nicholas Carlini, Chawin Sitawarin et al. · eth-zurich

How should we evaluate the robustness of language model defenses? Current defenses against jailbreaks and prompt injections (which aim to prevent an attacker from eliciting harmful knowledge or remotely triggering malicious actions, respectively) are typically evaluated either against a static set of harmful attack strings, or against computationally weak optimization methods that were not designed with the defense in mind. We argue that this evaluation process is flawed. Instead, we should evaluate defenses against adaptive attackers who explicitly modify their attack strategy to counter a defense's design while spending considerable resources to optimize their objective. By systematically tuning and scaling general optimization techniques-gradient descent, reinforcement learning, random search, and human-guided exploration-we bypass 12 recent defenses (based on a diverse set of techniques) with attack success rate above 90% for most; importantly, the majority of defenses originally reported near-zero attack success rates. We believe that future defense work must consider stronger attacks, such as the ones we describe, in order to make reliable and convincing claims of robustness.

Kai Xiao, Logan Engstrom, Andrew Ilyas et al.

We assess the tendency of state-of-the-art object recognition models to depend on signals from image backgrounds. We create a toolkit for disentangling foreground and background signal on ImageNet images, and find that (a) models can achieve non-trivial accuracy by relying on the background alone, (b) models often misclassify images even in the presence of correctly classified foregrounds--up to 87.5% of the time with adversarially chosen backgrounds, and (c) more accurate models tend to depend on backgrounds less. Our analysis of backgrounds brings us closer to understanding which correlations machine learning models use, and how they determine models' out of distribution performance.

Kai Y. Xiao, Vincent Tjeng, Nur Muhammad Shafiullah et al.

We explore the concept of co-design in the context of neural network verification. Specifically, we aim to train deep neural networks that not only are robust to adversarial perturbations but also whose robustness can be verified more easily. To this end, we identify two properties of network models - weight sparsity and so-called ReLU stability - that turn out to significantly impact the complexity of the corresponding verification task. We demonstrate that improving weight sparsity alone already enables us to turn computationally intractable verification problems into tractable ones. Then, improving ReLU stability leads to an additional 4-13x speedup in verification times. An important feature of our methodology is its "universality," in the sense that it can be used with a broad range of training procedures and verification approaches.

Vincent Tjeng, Kai Xiao, Russ Tedrake

Neural networks have demonstrated considerable success on a wide variety of real-world problems. However, networks trained only to optimize for training accuracy can often be fooled by adversarial examples - slightly perturbed inputs that are misclassified with high confidence. Verification of networks enables us to gauge their vulnerability to such adversarial examples. We formulate verification of piecewise-linear neural networks as a mixed integer program. On a representative task of finding minimum adversarial distortions, our verifier is two to three orders of magnitude quicker than the state-of-the-art. We achieve this computational speedup via tight formulations for non-linearities, as well as a novel presolve algorithm that makes full use of all information available. The computational speedup allows us to verify properties on convolutional networks with an order of magnitude more ReLUs than networks previously verified by any complete verifier. In particular, we determine for the first time the exact adversarial accuracy of an MNIST classifier to perturbations with bounded $l_\infty$ norm $ε=0.1$: for this classifier, we find an adversarial example for 4.38% of samples, and a certificate of robustness (to perturbations with bounded norm) for the remainder. Across all robust training procedures and network architectures considered, we are able to certify more samples than the state-of-the-art and find more adversarial examples than a strong first-order attack.