Yue Zhao

Jianmin Guo, Yu Jiang, Yue Zhao et al.

Deep learning (DL) systems are increasingly applied to safety-critical domains such as autonomous driving cars. It is of significant importance to ensure the reliability and robustness of DL systems. Existing testing methodologies always fail to include rare inputs in the testing dataset and exhibit low neuron coverage. In this paper, we propose DLFuzz, the frst differential fuzzing testing framework to guide DL systems exposing incorrect behaviors. DLFuzz keeps minutely mutating the input to maximize the neuron coverage and the prediction difference between the original input and the mutated input, without manual labeling effort or cross-referencing oracles from other DL systems with the same functionality. We present empirical evaluations on two well-known datasets to demonstrate its efficiency. Compared with DeepXplore, the state-of-the-art DL whitebox testing framework, DLFuzz does not require extra efforts to find similar functional DL systems for cross-referencing check, but could generate 338.59% more adversarial inputs with 89.82% smaller perturbations, averagely obtain 2.86% higher neuron coverage, and save 20.11% time consumption.

Xuejing Yuan, Yuxuan Chen, Yue Zhao et al.

The popularity of ASR (automatic speech recognition) systems, like Google Voice, Cortana, brings in security concerns, as demonstrated by recent attacks. The impacts of such threats, however, are less clear, since they are either less stealthy (producing noise-like voice commands) or requiring the physical presence of an attack device (using ultrasound). In this paper, we demonstrate that not only are more practical and surreptitious attacks feasible but they can even be automatically constructed. Specifically, we find that the voice commands can be stealthily embedded into songs, which, when played, can effectively control the target system through ASR without being noticed. For this purpose, we developed novel techniques that address a key technical challenge: integrating the commands into a song in a way that can be effectively recognized by ASR through the air, in the presence of background noise, while not being detected by a human listener. Our research shows that this can be done automatically against real world ASR applications. We also demonstrate that such CommanderSongs can be spread through Internet (e.g., YouTube) and radio, potentially affecting millions of ASR users. We further present a new mitigation technique that controls this threat.