Chao Du

Zhangchi Zhu, Lu Wang, Pu Zhao et al.

Learning from positive and unlabeled data is known as positive-unlabeled (PU) learning in literature and has attracted much attention in recent years. One common approach in PU learning is to sample a set of pseudo-negatives from the unlabeled data using ad-hoc thresholds so that conventional supervised methods can be applied with both positive and negative samples. Owing to the label uncertainty among the unlabeled data, errors of misclassifying unlabeled positive samples as negative samples inevitably appear and may even accumulate during the training processes. Those errors often lead to performance degradation and model instability. To mitigate the impact of label uncertainty and improve the robustness of learning with positive and unlabeled data, we propose a new robust PU learning method with a training strategy motivated by the nature of human learning: easy cases should be learned first. Similar intuition has been utilized in curriculum learning to only use easier cases in the early stage of training before introducing more complex cases. Specifically, we utilize a novel ``hardness'' measure to distinguish unlabeled samples with a high chance of being negative from unlabeled samples with large label noise. An iterative training strategy is then implemented to fine-tune the selection of negative samples during the training process in an iterative manner to include more ``easy'' samples in the early stage of training. Extensive experimental validations over a wide range of learning tasks show that this approach can effectively improve the accuracy and stability of learning with positive and unlabeled data. Our code is available at https://github.com/woriazzc/Robust-PU

Zhiyang Zhang, Xi Chen, Fangkai Yang et al.

Large language model (LLM)-based AI delegates are increasingly utilized to act on behalf of users, assisting them with a wide range of tasks through conversational interfaces. Despite their advantages, concerns arise regarding the potential risk of privacy leaks, particularly in scenarios involving social interactions. While existing research has focused on protecting privacy by limiting the access of AI delegates to sensitive user information, many social scenarios require disclosing private details to achieve desired social goals, necessitating a balance between privacy protection and disclosure. To address this challenge, we first conduct a pilot study to investigate user perceptions of AI delegates across various social relations and task scenarios, and then propose a novel AI delegate system that enables privacy-conscious self-disclosure. Our user study demonstrates that the proposed AI delegate strategically protects privacy, pioneering its use in diverse and dynamic social interactions.

Kuofeng Gao, Tianyu Pang, Chao Du et al.

Recent studies have shown that LLMs are vulnerable to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, where adversarial inputs like spelling errors or non-semantic prompts trigger endless outputs without generating an [EOS] token. These attacks can potentially cause high latency and make LLM services inaccessible to other users or tasks. However, when there are speech-to-text interfaces (e.g., voice commands to a robot), executing such DoS attacks becomes challenging, as it is difficult to introduce spelling errors or non-semantic prompts through speech. A simple DoS attack in these scenarios would be to instruct the model to "Keep repeating Hello", but we observe that relying solely on natural instructions limits output length, which is bounded by the maximum length of the LLM's supervised finetuning (SFT) data. To overcome this limitation, we propose poisoning-based DoS (P-DoS) attacks for LLMs, demonstrating that injecting a single poisoned sample designed for DoS purposes can break the output length limit. For example, a poisoned sample can successfully attack GPT-4o and GPT-4o mini (via OpenAI's finetuning API) using less than $1, causing repeated outputs up to the maximum inference length (16K tokens, compared to 0.5K before poisoning). Additionally, we perform comprehensive ablation studies on open-source LLMs and extend our method to LLM agents, where attackers can control both the finetuning dataset and algorithm. Our findings underscore the urgent need for defenses against P-DoS attacks to secure LLMs. Our code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/P-DoS.