Matthew Smith

Simon Deltadahl, Julian Gilbey, Christine Van Laer et al.

Accurate classification of haematological cells is critical for diagnosing blood disorders, but presents significant challenges for machine automation owing to the complexity of cell morphology, heterogeneities of biological, pathological, and imaging characteristics, and the imbalance of cell type frequencies. We introduce CytoDiffusion, a diffusion-based classifier that effectively models blood cell morphology, combining accurate classification with robust anomaly detection, resistance to distributional shifts, interpretability, data efficiency, and superhuman uncertainty quantification. Our approach outperforms state-of-the-art discriminative models in anomaly detection (AUC 0.990 vs. 0.918), resistance to domain shifts (85.85% vs. 74.38% balanced accuracy), and performance in low-data regimes (95.88% vs. 94.95% balanced accuracy). Notably, our model generates synthetic blood cell images that are nearly indistinguishable from real images, as demonstrated by an authenticity test in which expert haematologists achieved only 52.3% accuracy (95% CI: [50.5%, 54.2%]) in distinguishing real from generated images. Furthermore, we enhance model explainability through the generation of directly interpretable counterfactual heatmaps. Our comprehensive evaluation framework, encompassing these multiple performance dimensions, establishes a new benchmark for medical image analysis in haematology, ultimately enabling improved diagnostic accuracy in clinical settings. Our code is available at https://github.com/CambridgeCIA/CytoDiffusion.

Matthew Smith, Martin Strohmeier, Jon Harman et al.

Many wireless communications systems found in aircraft lack standard security mechanisms, leaving them fundamentally vulnerable to attack. With affordable software-defined radios available, a novel threat has emerged, allowing a wide range of attackers to easily interfere with wireless avionic systems. Whilst these vulnerabilities are known, concrete attacks that exploit them are still novel and not yet well understood. This is true in particular with regards to their kinetic impact on the handling of the attacked aircraft and consequently its safety. To investigate this, we invited 30 Airbus A320 type-rated pilots to fly simulator scenarios in which they were subjected to attacks on their avionics. We implement and analyse novel wireless attacks on three safety-related systems: Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) and the Instrument Landing System (ILS). We found that all three analysed attack scenarios created significant control impact and cost of disruption through turnarounds, avoidance manoeuvres, and diversions. They further increased workload, distrust in the affected system, and in 38% of cases caused the attacked safety system to be switched off entirely. All pilots felt the scenarios were useful, with 93.3% feeling that simulator training for wireless attacks could be valuable.

Matthew Smith, Daniel Moser, Martin Strohmeier et al.

The manner in which Aircraft Communications, Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) is being used has significantly changed over time. Whilst originally used by commercial airliners to track their flights and provide automated timekeeping on crew, today it serves as a multi-purpose air-ground data link for many aviation stakeholders including private jet owners, state actors and military. Since ACARS messages are still mostly sent in the clear over a wireless channel, any sensitive information sent with ACARS can potentially lead to a privacy breach for users. Naturally, different stakeholders consider different types of data sensitive. In this paper we propose a privacy framework matching aviation stakeholders to a range of sensitive information types and assess the impact for each. Based on more than one million ACARS messages, collected over several months, we then demonstrate that current ACARS usage systematically breaches privacy for all stakeholder groups. We further support our findings with a number of cases of significant privacy issues for each group and analyze the impact of such leaks. While it is well-known that ACARS messages are susceptible to eavesdropping attacks, this work is the first to quantify the extent and impact of privacy leakage in the real world for the relevant aviation stakeholders.