Sanghyun Hong

Woojin Cho, Minju Jo, Haksoo Lim et al.

Complex physical systems are often described by partial differential equations (PDEs) that depend on parameters such as the Reynolds number in fluid mechanics. In applications such as design optimization or uncertainty quantification, solutions of those PDEs need to be evaluated at numerous points in the parameter space. While physics-informed neural networks (PINNs) have emerged as a new strong competitor as a surrogate, their usage in this scenario remains underexplored due to the inherent need for repetitive and time-consuming training. In this paper, we address this problem by proposing a novel extension, parameterized physics-informed neural networks (P$^2$INNs). P$^2$INNs enable modeling the solutions of parameterized PDEs via explicitly encoding a latent representation of PDE parameters. With the extensive empirical evaluation, we demonstrate that P$^2$INNs outperform the baselines both in accuracy and parameter efficiency on benchmark 1D and 2D parameterized PDEs and are also effective in overcoming the known "failure modes".

Zachary Coalson, Gabriel Ritter, Rakesh Bobba et al.

In this paper, we systematically evaluate the robustness of multi-exit language models against adversarial slowdown. To audit their robustness, we design a slowdown attack that generates natural adversarial text bypassing early-exit points. We use the resulting WAFFLE attack as a vehicle to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of three multi-exit mechanisms with the GLUE benchmark against adversarial slowdown. We then show our attack significantly reduces the computational savings provided by the three methods in both white-box and black-box settings. The more complex a mechanism is, the more vulnerable it is to adversarial slowdown. We also perform a linguistic analysis of the perturbed text inputs, identifying common perturbation patterns that our attack generates, and comparing them with standard adversarial text attacks. Moreover, we show that adversarial training is ineffective in defeating our slowdown attack, but input sanitization with a conversational model, e.g., ChatGPT, can remove perturbations effectively. This result suggests that future work is needed for developing efficient yet robust multi-exit models. Our code is available at: https://github.com/ztcoalson/WAFFLE

Zachary Coalson, Juhan Bae, Nicholas Carlini et al.

We study how training data contributes to the emergence of toxic behaviors in large-language models. Most prior work on reducing model toxicity adopts $reactive$ approaches, such as fine-tuning pre-trained (and potentially toxic) models to align them with human values. In contrast, we propose a $proactive$ approach$-$IF-Guide$-$which leverages influence functions to identify harmful tokens within any training data and suppress their impact during training. To this end, we first show that standard influence functions are ineffective at discovering harmful training records. We then present a novel adaptation that measures token-level attributions from training data to model toxicity, along with techniques for selecting toxic training documents and a learning objective that can be integrated into both pre-training and fine-tuning. Moreover, IF-Guide does not rely on human-preference data, which is typically required by existing alignment methods. In evaluation, we demonstrate that IF-Guide substantially reduces both explicit and implicit toxicity$-$by up to 10$\times$ compared to uncensored models, and up to 3$\times$ compared to baseline alignment methods, e.g., DPO and RAD$-$across both pre-training and fine-tuning scenarios. IF-Guide is computationally efficient: a billion-parameter model is $not$ $necessary$ for computing influence scores; a million-parameter model$-$with 7.5$\times$ fewer parameters$-$can effectively serve as a proxy for identifying harmful data. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/ztcoalson/IF-Guide

Sanghyun Hong, Michael-Andrei Panaitescu-Liess, Yiğitcan Kaya et al.

Quantization is a popular technique that $transforms$ the parameter representation of a neural network from floating-point numbers into lower-precision ones ($e.g.$, 8-bit integers). It reduces the memory footprint and the computational cost at inference, facilitating the deployment of resource-hungry models. However, the parameter perturbations caused by this transformation result in $behavioral$ $disparities$ between the model before and after quantization. For example, a quantized model can misclassify some test-time samples that are otherwise classified correctly. It is not known whether such differences lead to a new security vulnerability. We hypothesize that an adversary may control this disparity to introduce specific behaviors that activate upon quantization. To study this hypothesis, we weaponize quantization-aware training and propose a new training framework to implement adversarial quantization outcomes. Following this framework, we present three attacks we carry out with quantization: (i) an indiscriminate attack for significant accuracy loss; (ii) a targeted attack against specific samples; and (iii) a backdoor attack for controlling the model with an input trigger. We further show that a single compromised model defeats multiple quantization schemes, including robust quantization techniques. Moreover, in a federated learning scenario, we demonstrate that a set of malicious participants who conspire can inject our quantization-activated backdoor. Lastly, we discuss potential counter-measures and show that only re-training consistently removes the attack artifacts. Our code is available at https://github.com/Secure-AI-Systems-Group/Qu-ANTI-zation

Sanghyun Hong, Yiğitcan Kaya, Ionuţ-Vlad Modoranu et al.

Recent increases in the computational demands of deep neural networks (DNNs), combined with the observation that most input samples require only simple models, have sparked interest in $input$-$adaptive$ multi-exit architectures, such as MSDNets or Shallow-Deep Networks. These architectures enable faster inferences and could bring DNNs to low-power devices, e.g., in the Internet of Things (IoT). However, it is unknown if the computational savings provided by this approach are robust against adversarial pressure. In particular, an adversary may aim to slowdown adaptive DNNs by increasing their average inference time$-$a threat analogous to the $denial$-$of$-$service$ attacks from the Internet. In this paper, we conduct a systematic evaluation of this threat by experimenting with three generic multi-exit DNNs (based on VGG16, MobileNet, and ResNet56) and a custom multi-exit architecture, on two popular image classification benchmarks (CIFAR-10 and Tiny ImageNet). To this end, we show that adversarial example-crafting techniques can be modified to cause slowdown, and we propose a metric for comparing their impact on different architectures. We show that a slowdown attack reduces the efficacy of multi-exit DNNs by 90-100%, and it amplifies the latency by 1.5-5$\times$ in a typical IoT deployment. We also show that it is possible to craft universal, reusable perturbations and that the attack can be effective in realistic black-box scenarios, where the attacker has limited knowledge about the victim. Finally, we show that adversarial training provides limited protection against slowdowns. These results suggest that further research is needed for defending multi-exit architectures against this emerging threat. Our code is available at https://github.com/sanghyun-hong/deepsloth.

Jinsung Jeon, Hyundong Jin, Jonghyun Choi et al.

A standard practice in developing image recognition models is to train a model on a specific image resolution and then deploy it. However, in real-world inference, models often encounter images different from the training sets in resolution and/or subject to natural variations such as weather changes, noise types and compression artifacts. While traditional solutions involve training multiple models for different resolutions or input variations, these methods are computationally expensive and thus do not scale in practice. To this end, we propose a novel neural network model, parallel-structured and all-component Fourier neural operator (PAC-FNO), that addresses the problem. Unlike conventional feed-forward neural networks, PAC-FNO operates in the frequency domain, allowing it to handle images of varying resolutions within a single model. We also propose a two-stage algorithm for training PAC-FNO with a minimal modification to the original, downstream model. Moreover, the proposed PAC-FNO is ready to work with existing image recognition models. Extensively evaluating methods with seven image recognition benchmarks, we show that the proposed PAC-FNO improves the performance of existing baseline models on images with various resolutions by up to 77.1% and various types of natural variations in the images at inference.

Eunjin Roh, Yigitcan Kaya, Christopher Kruegel et al.

We present MADCAT, a self-supervised approach designed to address the concept drift problem in malware detection. MADCAT employs an encoder-decoder architecture and works by test-time training of the encoder on a small, balanced subset of the test-time data using a self-supervised objective. During test-time training, the model learns features that are useful for detecting both previously seen (old) data and newly arriving samples. We demonstrate the effectiveness of MADCAT in continuous Android malware detection settings. MADCAT consistently outperforms baseline methods in detection performance at test time. We also show the synergy between MADCAT and prior approaches in addressing concept drift in malware detection

Sungbok Shin, Hyeon Jeon, Sanghyun Hong et al.

Effective data visualization requires not only technical proficiency but also a deep understanding of the domain-specific context in which data exists. This context often includes tacit knowledge about data provenance, quality, and intended use, which is rarely explicit in the dataset itself. Motivated by growing demands to surface tacit knowledge, we present the Data Therapist, a web-based system that helps domain experts externalize such implicit knowledge through a mixed-initiative process combining iterative Q&A with interactive annotation. Powered by a large language model, the system automatically analyzes user-supplied datasets, prompts users with targeted questions, and supports annotation at varying levels of granularity. The resulting structured knowledge base can inform both human and automated visualization design. A qualitative study with expert pairs from Accounting, Political Science, and Computer Security revealed recurring patterns in how expert reason about their data and highlighted opportunities for AI support to enhance visualization design.

Sanghyun Hong, Nicholas Carlini, Alexey Kurakin

When machine learning training is outsourced to third parties, $backdoor$ $attacks$ become practical as the third party who trains the model may act maliciously to inject hidden behaviors into the otherwise accurate model. Until now, the mechanism to inject backdoors has been limited to $poisoning$. We argue that a supply-chain attacker has more attack techniques available by introducing a $handcrafted$ attack that directly manipulates a model's weights. This direct modification gives our attacker more degrees of freedom compared to poisoning, and we show it can be used to evade many backdoor detection or removal defenses effectively. Across four datasets and four network architectures our backdoor attacks maintain an attack success rate above 96%. Our results suggest that further research is needed for understanding the complete space of supply-chain backdoor attacks.

Sanghyun Hong, Varun Chandrasekaran, Yiğitcan Kaya et al.

Machine learning algorithms are vulnerable to data poisoning attacks. Prior taxonomies that focus on specific scenarios, e.g., indiscriminate or targeted, have enabled defenses for the corresponding subset of known attacks. Yet, this introduces an inevitable arms race between adversaries and defenders. In this work, we study the feasibility of an attack-agnostic defense relying on artifacts that are common to all poisoning attacks. Specifically, we focus on a common element between all attacks: they modify gradients computed to train the model. We identify two main artifacts of gradients computed in the presence of poison: (1) their $\ell_2$ norms have significantly higher magnitudes than those of clean gradients, and (2) their orientation differs from clean gradients. Based on these observations, we propose the prerequisite for a generic poisoning defense: it must bound gradient magnitudes and minimize differences in orientation. We call this gradient shaping. As an exemplar tool to evaluate the feasibility of gradient shaping, we use differentially private stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD), which clips and perturbs individual gradients during training to obtain privacy guarantees. We find that DP-SGD, even in configurations that do not result in meaningful privacy guarantees, increases the model's robustness to indiscriminate attacks. It also mitigates worst-case targeted attacks and increases the adversary's cost in multi-poison scenarios. The only attack we find DP-SGD to be ineffective against is a strong, yet unrealistic, indiscriminate attack. Our results suggest that, while we currently lack a generic poisoning defense, gradient shaping is a promising direction for future research.

Sanghyun Hong, Michael Davinroy, Yiğitcan Kaya et al.

New data processing pipelines and novel network architectures increasingly drive the success of deep learning. In consequence, the industry considers top-performing architectures as intellectual property and devotes considerable computational resources to discovering such architectures through neural architecture search (NAS). This provides an incentive for adversaries to steal these novel architectures; when used in the cloud, to provide Machine Learning as a Service, the adversaries also have an opportunity to reconstruct the architectures by exploiting a range of hardware side channels. However, it is challenging to reconstruct novel architectures and pipelines without knowing the computational graph (e.g., the layers, branches or skip connections), the architectural parameters (e.g., the number of filters in a convolutional layer) or the specific pre-processing steps (e.g. embeddings). In this paper, we design an algorithm that reconstructs the key components of a novel deep learning system by exploiting a small amount of information leakage from a cache side-channel attack, Flush+Reload. We use Flush+Reload to infer the trace of computations and the timing for each computation. Our algorithm then generates candidate computational graphs from the trace and eliminates incompatible candidates through a parameter estimation process. We implement our algorithm in PyTorch and Tensorflow. We demonstrate experimentally that we can reconstruct MalConv, a novel data pre-processing pipeline for malware detection, and ProxylessNAS- CPU, a novel network architecture for the ImageNet classification optimized to run on CPUs, without knowing the architecture family. In both cases, we achieve 0% error. These results suggest hardware side channels are a practical attack vector against MLaaS, and more efforts should be devoted to understanding their impact on the security of deep learning systems.

Sanghyun Hong, Pietro Frigo, Yiğitcan Kaya et al.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been shown to tolerate "brain damage": cumulative changes to the network's parameters (e.g., pruning, numerical perturbations) typically result in a graceful degradation of classification accuracy. However, the limits of this natural resilience are not well understood in the presence of small adversarial changes to the DNN parameters' underlying memory representation, such as bit-flips that may be induced by hardware fault attacks. We study the effects of bitwise corruptions on 19 DNN models---six architectures on three image classification tasks---and we show that most models have at least one parameter that, after a specific bit-flip in their bitwise representation, causes an accuracy loss of over 90%. We employ simple heuristics to efficiently identify the parameters likely to be vulnerable. We estimate that 40-50% of the parameters in a model might lead to an accuracy drop greater than 10% when individually subjected to such single-bit perturbations. To demonstrate how an adversary could take advantage of this vulnerability, we study the impact of an exemplary hardware fault attack, Rowhammer, on DNNs. Specifically, we show that a Rowhammer enabled attacker co-located in the same physical machine can inflict significant accuracy drops (up to 99%) even with single bit-flip corruptions and no knowledge of the model. Our results expose the limits of DNNs' resilience against parameter perturbations induced by real-world fault attacks. We conclude by discussing possible mitigations and future research directions towards fault attack-resilient DNNs.

Sanghyun Hong, Tae-hoon Kim, Tudor Dumitraş et al.

As there are increasing needs of sharing data for machine learning, there is growing attention for the owners of the data to claim the ownership. Visible watermarking has been an effective way to claim the ownership of visual data, yet the visibly watermarked images are not regarded as a primary source for learning visual recognition models due to the lost visual information by in the watermark and the possibility of an attack to remove the watermarks. To make the watermarked images better suited for machine learning with less risk of removal, we propose DeepStamp, a watermarking framework that, given a watermarking image and a trained network for image classification, learns to synthesize a watermarked image that are human-perceptible, robust to removals, and able to be used as training images for classification with minimal accuracy loss. To achieve the goal, we employ the generative multi-adversarial network (GMAN). In experiments with CIFAR10, we show that the DeepStamp learn to transform a watermark to be embedded in each image and the watermarked images can be used to train networks.

Yigitcan Kaya, Sanghyun Hong, Tudor Dumitras

We characterize a prevalent weakness of deep neural networks (DNNs)---overthinking---which occurs when a DNN can reach correct predictions before its final layer. Overthinking is computationally wasteful, and it can also be destructive when, by the final layer, a correct prediction changes into a misclassification. Understanding overthinking requires studying how each prediction evolves during a DNN's forward pass, which conventionally is opaque. For prediction transparency, we propose the Shallow-Deep Network (SDN), a generic modification to off-the-shelf DNNs that introduces internal classifiers. We apply SDN to four modern architectures, trained on three image classification tasks, to characterize the overthinking problem. We show that SDNs can mitigate the wasteful effect of overthinking with confidence-based early exits, which reduce the average inference cost by more than 50% and preserve the accuracy. We also find that the destructive effect occurs for 50% of misclassifications on natural inputs and that it can be induced, adversarially, with a recent backdooring attack. To mitigate this effect, we propose a new confusion metric to quantify the internal disagreements that will likely lead to misclassifications.

Sanghyun Hong, Michael Davinroy, Yiǧitcan Kaya et al.

Recent work has introduced attacks that extract the architecture information of deep neural networks (DNN), as this knowledge enhances an adversary's capability to conduct black-box attacks against the model. This paper presents the first in-depth security analysis of DNN fingerprinting attacks that exploit cache side-channels. First, we define the threat model for these attacks: our adversary does not need the ability to query the victim model; instead, she runs a co-located process on the host machine victim's deep learning (DL) system is running and passively monitors the accesses of the target functions in the shared framework. Second, we introduce DeepRecon, an attack that reconstructs the architecture of the victim network by using the internal information extracted via Flush+Reload, a cache side-channel technique. Once the attacker observes function invocations that map directly to architecture attributes of the victim network, the attacker can reconstruct the victim's entire network architecture. In our evaluation, we demonstrate that an attacker can accurately reconstruct two complex networks (VGG19 and ResNet50) having observed only one forward propagation. Based on the extracted architecture attributes, we also demonstrate that an attacker can build a meta-model that accurately fingerprints the architecture and family of the pre-trained model in a transfer learning setting. From this meta-model, we evaluate the importance of the observed attributes in the fingerprinting process. Third, we propose and evaluate new framework-level defense techniques that obfuscate our attacker's observations. Our empirical security analysis represents a step toward understanding the DNNs' vulnerability to cache side-channel attacks.