Matúš Mesarčík

CL
h-index7
3papers
49citations
Novelty42%
AI Score46

3 Papers

7.3CYMay 9Code
The DSA's Blind Spot: Algorithmic Audit of Advertising and Minor Profiling on TikTok

Sara Solarova, Matej Mosnar, Matus Tibensky et al.

Adolescents spend an increasing amount of their time in digital environments where their still-developing cognitive capacities leave them unable to recognize or resist commercial persuasion. Article 28(2) of the DSA responds to this vulnerability by prohibiting profiling-based advertising to minors. However, the regulation's narrow definition of "advertisement" excludes current advertising practices including influencer paid partnerships and brand promotional content that serve functionally equivalent commercial purposes. We provide the first empirical evidence of how this definitional gap operates in practice through an algorithmic audit of TikTok. Our approach deploys sock-puppet accounts simulating a pair of minor and adult users with matching interest profiles. The content recommended to these users is automatically annotated, enabling systematic statistical analysis. Our findings reveal a stark regulatory paradox. TikTok demonstrates formal compliance with Article 28(2) by shielding minors from profiled formal advertisements, yet both disclosed and undisclosed ads exhibit significant profiling aligned with user interests (5-8 times stronger than for adult formal advertising). The strongest profiling emerges within undisclosed commercial content, where creators/brands fail to label paid partnership/promotional content and the platform neither corrects this omission nor prevents its personalized delivery to minors. These results demonstrate that minors remain exposed to algorithmically targeted commercial content through the same recommendation mechanisms the DSA seeks to constrain. We argue that protecting minors requires expanding the definition of advertisement in EU law to encompass influencer and brand promotional content, and ensuring that any such expansion is accompanied by a corresponding prohibition on profiling-based targeting of minors.

18.2CLMay 15, 2025
SemEval-2025 Task 7: Multilingual and Crosslingual Fact-Checked Claim Retrieval

Qiwei Peng, Robert Moro, Michal Gregor et al.

The rapid spread of online disinformation presents a global challenge, and machine learning has been widely explored as a potential solution. However, multilingual settings and low-resource languages are often neglected in this field. To address this gap, we conducted a shared task on multilingual claim retrieval at SemEval 2025, aimed at identifying fact-checked claims that match newly encountered claims expressed in social media posts across different languages. The task includes two subtracks: (1) a monolingual track, where social posts and claims are in the same language, and (2) a crosslingual track, where social posts and claims might be in different languages. A total of 179 participants registered for the task contributing to 52 test submissions. 23 out of 31 teams have submitted their system papers. In this paper, we report the best-performing systems as well as the most common and the most effective approaches across both subtracks. This shared task, along with its dataset and participating systems, provides valuable insights into multilingual claim retrieval and automated fact-checking, supporting future research in this field.

11.5CLDec 18, 2024
Evaluation of LLM Vulnerabilities to Being Misused for Personalized Disinformation Generation

Aneta Zugecova, Dominik Macko, Ivan Srba et al.

The capabilities of recent large language models (LLMs) to generate high-quality content indistinguishable by humans from human-written texts raises many concerns regarding their misuse. Previous research has shown that LLMs can be effectively misused for generating disinformation news articles following predefined narratives. Their capabilities to generate personalized (in various aspects) content have also been evaluated and mostly found usable. However, a combination of personalization and disinformation abilities of LLMs has not been comprehensively studied yet. Such a dangerous combination should trigger integrated safety filters of the LLMs, if there are some. This study fills this gap by evaluating vulnerabilities of recent open and closed LLMs, and their willingness to generate personalized disinformation news articles in English. We further explore whether the LLMs can reliably meta-evaluate the personalization quality and whether the personalization affects the generated-texts detectability. Our results demonstrate the need for stronger safety-filters and disclaimers, as those are not properly functioning in most of the evaluated LLMs. Additionally, our study revealed that the personalization actually reduces the safety-filter activations; thus effectively functioning as a jailbreak. Such behavior must be urgently addressed by LLM developers and service providers.