Minbiao Han

Minbiao Han, Jonathan Light, Steven Xia et al.

Organizations often lack sufficient data to effectively train machine learning (ML) models, while others possess valuable data that remains underutilized. Data markets promise to unlock substantial value by matching data suppliers with demand from ML consumers. However, market design involves addressing intricate challenges, including data pricing, fairness, robustness, and strategic behavior. In this paper, we propose a pragmatic data-augmented AutoML market that seamlessly integrates with existing cloud-based AutoML platforms such as Google's Vertex AI and Amazon's SageMaker. Unlike standard AutoML solutions, our design automatically augments buyer-submitted training data with valuable external datasets, pricing the resulting models based on their measurable performance improvements rather than computational costs as the status quo. Our key innovation is a pricing mechanism grounded in the instrumental value - the marginal model quality improvement - of externally sourced data. This approach bypasses direct dataset pricing complexities, mitigates strategic buyer behavior, and accommodates diverse buyer valuations through menu-based options. By integrating automated data and model discovery, our solution not only enhances ML outcomes but also establishes an economically sustainable framework for monetizing external data.

Minbiao Han, Kumar Kshitij Patel, Han Shao et al.

Federated learning is a machine learning protocol that enables a large population of agents to collaborate over multiple rounds to produce a single consensus model. There are several federated learning applications where agents may choose to defect permanently$-$essentially withdrawing from the collaboration$-$if they are content with their instantaneous model in that round. This work demonstrates the detrimental impact of such defections on the final model's robustness and ability to generalize. We also show that current federated optimization algorithms fail to disincentivize these harmful defections. We introduce a novel optimization algorithm with theoretical guarantees to prevent defections while ensuring asymptotic convergence to an effective solution for all participating agents. We also provide numerical experiments to corroborate our findings and demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithm.

Minbiao Han, Michael Albert, Haifeng Xu

We study a ubiquitous learning challenge in online principal-agent problems during which the principal learns the agent's private information from the agent's revealed preferences in historical interactions. This paradigm includes important special cases such as pricing and contract design, which have been widely studied in recent literature. However, existing work considers the case where the principal can only choose a single strategy at every round to interact with the agent and then observe the agent's revealed preference through their actions. In this paper, we extend this line of study to allow the principal to offer a menu of strategies to the agent and learn additionally from observing the agent's selection from the menu. We provide a thorough investigation of several online principal-agent problem settings and characterize their sample complexities, accompanied by the corresponding algorithms we have developed. We instantiate this paradigm to several important design problems $-$ including Stackelberg (security) games, contract design, and information design. Finally, we also explore the connection between our findings and existing results about online learning in Stackelberg games, and we offer a solution that can overcome a key hard instance of Peng et al. (2019).

Minbiao Han, Fengxue Zhang, Yuxin Chen

This paper investigates the challenge of learning in black-box games, where the underlying utility function is unknown to any of the agents. While there is an extensive body of literature on the theoretical analysis of algorithms for computing the Nash equilibrium with complete information about the game, studies on Nash equilibrium in black-box games are less common. In this paper, we focus on learning the Nash equilibrium when the only available information about an agent's payoff comes in the form of empirical queries. We provide a no-regret learning algorithm that utilizes Gaussian processes to identify the equilibrium in such games. Our approach not only ensures a theoretical convergence rate but also demonstrates effectiveness across a variety collection of games through experimental validation.