Yihao Huang

Yifan Huang, Xiaojun Jia, Wenbo Guo et al.

Large language models (LLMs) have revolutionized software development through AI-assisted coding tools, enabling developers with limited programming expertise to create sophisticated applications. However, this accessibility extends to malicious actors who may exploit these powerful tools to generate harmful software. Existing jailbreaking research primarily focuses on general attack scenarios against LLMs, with limited exploration of malicious code generation as a jailbreak target. To address this gap, we propose SPELL, a comprehensive testing framework specifically designed to evaluate the weakness of security alignment in malicious code generation. Our framework employs a time-division selection strategy that systematically constructs jailbreaking prompts by intelligently combining sentences from a prior knowledge dataset, balancing exploration of novel attack patterns with exploitation of successful techniques. Extensive evaluation across three advanced code models (GPT-4.1, Claude-3.5, and Qwen2.5-Coder) demonstrates SPELL's effectiveness, achieving attack success rates of 83.75%, 19.38%, and 68.12% respectively across eight malicious code categories. The generated prompts successfully produce malicious code in real-world AI development tools such as Cursor, with outputs confirmed as malicious by state-of-the-art detection systems at rates exceeding 73%. These findings reveal significant security gaps in current LLM implementations and provide valuable insights for improving AI safety alignment in code generation applications.

Xiaojun Jia, Sensen Gao, Simeng Qin et al.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) remain vulnerable to transferable adversarial examples. While existing methods typically achieve targeted attacks by aligning global features-such as CLIP's [CLS] token-between adversarial and target samples, they often overlook the rich local information encoded in patch tokens. This leads to suboptimal alignment and limited transferability, particularly for closed-source models. To address this limitation, we propose a targeted transferable adversarial attack method based on feature optimal alignment, called FOA-Attack, to improve adversarial transfer capability. Specifically, at the global level, we introduce a global feature loss based on cosine similarity to align the coarse-grained features of adversarial samples with those of target samples. At the local level, given the rich local representations within Transformers, we leverage clustering techniques to extract compact local patterns to alleviate redundant local features. We then formulate local feature alignment between adversarial and target samples as an optimal transport (OT) problem and propose a local clustering optimal transport loss to refine fine-grained feature alignment. Additionally, we propose a dynamic ensemble model weighting strategy to adaptively balance the influence of multiple models during adversarial example generation, thereby further improving transferability. Extensive experiments across various models demonstrate the superiority of the proposed method, outperforming state-of-the-art methods, especially in transferring to closed-source MLLMs. The code is released at https://github.com/jiaxiaojunQAQ/FOA-Attack.

Chenyang Li, Wenbing Tang, Yihao Huang et al.

Vision-and-Language Navigation (VLN) agents have made remarkable progress, but their robustness remains insufficiently studied. Existing adversarial evaluations often rely on perturbations that manifest as unusual textures rarely encountered in everyday indoor environments. Errors under such contrived conditions have limited practical relevance, as real-world agents are unlikely to encounter such artificial patterns. In this work, we focus on indoor lighting, an intrinsic yet largely overlooked scene attribute that strongly influences navigation. We propose Indoor Lighting-based Adversarial Attack (ILA), a black-box framework that manipulates global illumination to disrupt VLN agents. Motivated by typical household lighting usage, we design two attack modes: Static Indoor Lighting-based Attack (SILA), where the lighting intensity remains constant throughout an episode, and Dynamic Indoor Lighting-based Attack (DILA), where lights are switched on or off at critical moments to induce abrupt illumination changes. We evaluate ILA on two state-of-the-art VLN models across three navigation tasks. Results show that ILA significantly increases failure rates while reducing trajectory efficiency, revealing previously unrecognized vulnerabilities of VLN agents to realistic indoor lighting variations.