Zhongqi Wang

Zhongqi Wang, Jie Zhang, Shiguang Shan et al.

While text-to-image diffusion models demonstrate impressive generation capabilities, they also exhibit vulnerability to backdoor attacks, which involve the manipulation of model outputs through malicious triggers. In this paper, for the first time, we propose a comprehensive defense method named T2IShield to detect, localize, and mitigate such attacks. Specifically, we find the "Assimilation Phenomenon" on the cross-attention maps caused by the backdoor trigger. Based on this key insight, we propose two effective backdoor detection methods: Frobenius Norm Threshold Truncation and Covariance Discriminant Analysis. Besides, we introduce a binary-search approach to localize the trigger within a backdoor sample and assess the efficacy of existing concept editing methods in mitigating backdoor attacks. Empirical evaluations on two advanced backdoor attack scenarios show the effectiveness of our proposed defense method. For backdoor sample detection, T2IShield achieves a detection F1 score of 88.9$\%$ with low computational cost. Furthermore, T2IShield achieves a localization F1 score of 86.4$\%$ and invalidates 99$\%$ poisoned samples. Codes are released at https://github.com/Robin-WZQ/T2IShield.

Zhongqi Wang, Jie Zhang, Shiguang Shan et al.

Recent studies have revealed that text-to-image diffusion models are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where attackers implant stealthy textual triggers to manipulate model outputs. Previous backdoor detection methods primarily focus on the static features of backdoor samples. However, a vital property of diffusion models is their inherent dynamism. This study introduces a novel backdoor detection perspective named Dynamic Attention Analysis (DAA), showing that these dynamic characteristics serve as better indicators for backdoor detection. Specifically, by examining the dynamic evolution of cross-attention maps, we observe that backdoor samples exhibit distinct feature evolution patterns at the $<$EOS$>$ token compared to benign samples. To quantify these dynamic anomalies, we first introduce DAA-I, which treats the tokens' attention maps as spatially independent and measures dynamic feature using the Frobenius norm. Furthermore, to better capture the interactions between attention maps and refine the feature, we propose a dynamical system-based approach, referred to as DAA-S. This model formulates the spatial correlations among attention maps using a graph-based state equation and we theoretically analyze the global asymptotic stability of this method. Extensive experiments across five representative backdoor attack scenarios demonstrate that our approach significantly surpasses existing detection methods, achieving an average F1 Score of 79.49% and an AUC of 87.67%. The code is available at https://github.com/Robin-WZQ/DAA.

Jie Zhang, Zhongqi Wang, Shiguang Shan et al.

Backdoor attacks targeting text-to-image diffusion models have advanced rapidly. However, current backdoor samples often exhibit two key abnormalities compared to benign samples: 1) Semantic Consistency, where backdoor prompts tend to generate images with similar semantic content even with significant textual variations to the prompts; 2) Attention Consistency, where the trigger induces consistent structural responses in the cross-attention maps. These consistencies leave detectable traces for defenders, making backdoors easier to identify. In this paper, toward stealthy backdoor samples, we propose Trigger without Trace (TwT) by explicitly mitigating these consistencies. Specifically, our approach leverages syntactic structures as backdoor triggers to amplify the sensitivity to textual variations, effectively breaking down the semantic consistency. Besides, a regularization method based on Kernel Maximum Mean Discrepancy (KMMD) is proposed to align the distribution of cross-attention responses between backdoor and benign samples, thereby disrupting attention consistency. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method achieves a 97.5% attack success rate while exhibiting stronger resistance to defenses. It achieves an average of over 98% backdoor samples bypassing three state-of-the-art detection mechanisms, revealing the vulnerabilities of current backdoor defense methods. The code is available at https://github.com/Robin-WZQ/TwT.