Martin Herrmann

Martin Herrmann, Oussama Draissi, Christian Niesler et al.

Microarchitectural vulnerabilities increasingly undermine the assumption that hardware can be treated as a reliable root of trust. Prevention mechanisms often lag behind evolving attack techniques, leaving deployed systems unable to assume continued trustworthiness. We propose a shift from prevention to detection through microarchitectural-aware remote attestation. As a first instantiation of this idea, we present HammerWatch, a Rowhammer-aware remote attestation protocol that enables an external verifier to assess whether a system exhibits hardware-induced disturbance behavior. HammerWatch leverages memory-level evidence available on commodity platforms, specifically Machine-Check Exceptions (MCEs) from ECC DRAM and counter-based indicators from Per-Row Activation Counting (PRAC), and protects these measurements against kernel-level adversaries using TPM-anchored hash chains. We implement HammerWatch on commodity hardware and evaluate it on 20000 simulated benign and malicious access patterns. Our results show that the verifier reliably distinguishes Rowhammer-like behavior from benign operation under conservative heuristics, demonstrating that detection-oriented attestation is feasible and can complement incomplete prevention mechanisms

Johannes Müller, Martin Herrmann, Jan Strohbeck et al.

Sensor calibration usually is a time consuming yet important task. While classical approaches are sensor-specific and often need calibration targets as well as a widely overlapping field of view (FOV), within this work, a cooperative intelligent vehicle is used as callibration target. The vehicleis detected in the sensor frame and then matched with the information received from the cooperative awareness messagessend by the coperative intelligent vehicle. The presented algorithm is fully automated as well as sensor-independent, relying only on a very common set of assumptions. Due to the direct registration on the world frame, no overlapping FOV is necessary. The algorithm is evaluated through experiment for four laserscanners as well as one pair of stereo cameras showing a repetition error within the measurement uncertainty of the sensors. A plausibility check rules out systematic errors that might not have been covered by evaluating the repetition error.