Liya Su

Xiaoyi Chen, Siyuan Tang, Rui Zhu et al.

The rapid advancements of large language models (LLMs) have raised public concerns about the privacy leakage of personally identifiable information (PII) within their extensive training datasets. Recent studies have demonstrated that an adversary could extract highly sensitive privacy data from the training data of LLMs with carefully designed prompts. However, these attacks suffer from the model's tendency to hallucinate and catastrophic forgetting (CF) in the pre-training stage, rendering the veracity of divulged PIIs negligible. In our research, we propose a novel attack, Janus, which exploits the fine-tuning interface to recover forgotten PIIs from the pre-training data in LLMs. We formalize the privacy leakage problem in LLMs and explain why forgotten PIIs can be recovered through empirical analysis on open-source language models. Based upon these insights, we evaluate the performance of Janus on both open-source language models and two latest LLMs, i.e., GPT-3.5-Turbo and LLaMA-2-7b. Our experiment results show that Janus amplifies the privacy risks by over 10 times in comparison with the baseline and significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art privacy extraction attacks including prefix attacks and in-context learning (ICL). Furthermore, our analysis validates that existing fine-tuning APIs provided by OpenAI and Azure AI Studio are susceptible to our Janus attack, allowing an adversary to conduct such an attack at a low cost.

Yuanbo Xie, Tianyun Liu, Yingjie Zhang et al.

Modern agentic systems transform LLMs from session-bounded assistants into stateful systems that persist and evolve shared world state across sessions through memories, filesystems, tools, and other long-lived contextual artifacts. This shift fundamentally expands the attack surface of prompt injection. However, prior works on prompt injection have largely focused on model-level threats within a single session, overlooking how cross-session persistent system state fundamentally changes the system-level risk of agentic systems. Inspired by stored cross-site scripting in web systems, we introduce cross-session stored prompt injection, where a successful injection can persist within agentic system state and silently influence future executions long after the original attacker interaction has ended. To systematically study this threat, we formalize stored prompt injection and develop a taxonomy of how adversarial content persists and affects agentic systems across sessions. We further develop a benchmark and sandbox toolkit to evaluate the risks of stored prompt injection, enabling quantitative analysis of attack success across different models, attack goals, and persistence channels. Our findings highlight that persistence transforms prompt injection from an ephemeral model-level threat into a long-lived system-level vulnerability embedded within agent execution state. We hope this work draws broader attention to this emerging threat and motivates the community to systematically study and mitigate system risks arising from persistence in agentic systems.

Yuanbo Xie, Yingjie Zhang, Yulin Li et al.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems augment large language models with external knowledge, yet introduce a critical security vulnerability: RAG Knowledge Base Leakage, wherein adversarial prompts can induce the model to divulge retrieved proprietary content. Recent studies reveal that such leakage can be executed through adaptive and iterative attack strategies (named RAG extraction attack), while effective countermeasures remain notably lacking. To bridge this gap, we propose CanaryRAG, a runtime defense mechanism inspired by stack canaries in software security. CanaryRAG embeds carefully designed canary tokens into retrieved chunks and reformulates RAG extraction defense as a dual-path runtime integrity game. Leakage is detected in real time whenever either the target or oracle path violates its expected canary behavior, including under adaptive suppression and obfuscation. Extensive evaluations against existing attacks demonstrate that CanaryRAG provides robust defense, achieving substantially lower chunk recovery rates than state-of-the-art baselines while imposing negligible impact on task performance and inference latency. Moreover, as a plug-and-play solution, CanaryRAG can be seamlessly integrated into arbitrary RAG pipelines without requiring retraining or structural modifications, offering a practical and scalable safeguard for proprietary data.

Xiaoyi Chen, Haoyuan Wang, Siyuan Tang et al.

Large language models (LLMs) often memorize private information during training, raising serious privacy concerns. While machine unlearning has emerged as a promising solution, its true effectiveness against privacy attacks remains unclear. To address this, we propose PrivUn, a new evaluation framework that systematically assesses unlearning robustness through three-tier attack scenarios: direct retrieval, in-context learning recovery, and fine-tuning restoration; combined with quantitative analysis using forgetting scores, association metrics, and forgetting depth assessment. Our study exposes significant weaknesses in current unlearning methods, revealing two key findings: 1) unlearning exhibits gradient-driven ripple effects: unlike traditional forgetting which follows semantic relations (e.g., knowledge graphs), privacy unlearning propagates across latent gradient-based associations; and 2) most methods suffer from shallow forgetting, failing to remove private information distributed across multiple deep model layers. To validate these insights, we explore two strategies: association-aware core-set selection that leverages gradient similarity, and multi-layer deep intervention through representational constraints. These strategies represent a paradigm shift from shallow forgetting to deep forgetting.

Shang Shang, Xinqiang Zhao, Zhongjiang Yao et al.

To demonstrate and address the underlying maliciousness, we propose a theoretical hypothesis and analytical approach, and introduce a new black-box jailbreak attack methodology named IntentObfuscator, exploiting this identified flaw by obfuscating the true intentions behind user prompts.This approach compels LLMs to inadvertently generate restricted content, bypassing their built-in content security measures. We detail two implementations under this framework: "Obscure Intention" and "Create Ambiguity", which manipulate query complexity and ambiguity to evade malicious intent detection effectively. We empirically validate the effectiveness of the IntentObfuscator method across several models, including ChatGPT-3.5, ChatGPT-4, Qwen and Baichuan, achieving an average jailbreak success rate of 69.21\%. Notably, our tests on ChatGPT-3.5, which claims 100 million weekly active users, achieved a remarkable success rate of 83.65\%. We also extend our validation to diverse types of sensitive content like graphic violence, racism, sexism, political sensitivity, cybersecurity threats, and criminal skills, further proving the substantial impact of our findings on enhancing 'Red Team' strategies against LLM content security frameworks.