2.0OSApr 2
DAXFS: A Lock-Free Shared Filesystem for CXL Disaggregated MemoryCong Wang, Yiwei Yang, Yusheng Zheng
CXL (Compute Express Link) enables multiple hosts to share byte-addressable memory with hardware cache coherence, but no existing filesystem exploits this for lock-free multi-host coordination. We present DaxFS, a Linux filesystem for CXL shared memory that uses cmpxchg atomic operations, which CXL makes coherent across host boundaries, as its sole coordination primitive. A CAS-based hash overlay enables lock-free concurrent writes from multiple hosts without any centralized coordinator. A cooperative shared page cache with a novel multi-host clock eviction algorithm (MH-clock) provides demand-paged caching in shared DAX memory, with fully decentralized victim selection via cmpxchg. We validate multi-host correctness using QEMU-emulated CXL 3.0, where two virtual hosts share a memory region with TCP-forwarded atomics. Under cross-host contention, DaxFS maintains >99% CAS accuracy with no lost updates. On single-host DRAM-backed DAX, DaxFS exceeds tmpfs throughput across all write workloads, achieving up to 2.68x higher random write throughput with 4 threads and 1.18x higher random read throughput at 64 KB. Preliminary GPU microbenchmarks show that the cmpxchg-based design extends to GPU threads performing page cache operations at PCIe 5.0 bandwidth limits.
18.5CRAug 11, 2025
Selective KV-Cache Sharing to Mitigate Timing Side-Channels in LLM InferenceKexin Chu, Zecheng Lin, Dawei Xiang et al.
Global KV-cache sharing has emerged as a key optimization for accelerating large language model (LLM) inference. However, it exposes a new class of timing side-channel attacks, enabling adversaries to infer sensitive user inputs via shared cache entries. Existing defenses, such as per-user isolation, eliminate leakage but degrade performance by up to 38.9% in time-to-first-token (TTFT), making them impractical for high-throughput deployment. To address this gap, we introduce SafeKV (Secure and Flexible KV Cache Sharing), a privacy-aware KV-cache management framework that selectively shares non-sensitive entries while confining sensitive content to private caches. SafeKV comprises three components: (i) a hybrid, multi-tier detection pipeline that integrates rule-based pattern matching, a general-purpose privacy detector, and context-aware validation; (ii) a unified radix-tree index that manages public and private entries across heterogeneous memory tiers (HBM, DRAM, SSD); and (iii) entropy-based access monitoring to detect and mitigate residual information leakage. Our evaluation shows that SafeKV mitigates 94% - 97% of timing-based side-channel attacks. Compared to per-user isolation method, SafeKV improves TTFT by up to 40.58% and throughput by up to 2.66X across diverse LLMs and workloads. SafeKV reduces cache-induced TTFT overhead from 50.41% to 11.74% on Qwen3-235B. By combining fine-grained privacy control with high cache reuse efficiency, SafeKV reclaims the performance advantages of global sharing while providing robust runtime privacy guarantees for LLM inference.
KEN: Kernel Extensions using Natural LanguageYusheng Zheng, Yiwei Yang, Maolin Chen et al.
The ability to modify and extend an operating system is an important feature for improving a system's security, reliability, and performance. The extended Berkeley Packet Filters (eBPF) ecosystem has emerged as the standard mechanism for extending the Linux kernel and has recently been ported to Windows. eBPF programs inject new logic into the kernel that the system will execute before or after existing logic. While the eBPF ecosystem provides a flexible mechanism for kernel extension, it is difficult for developers to write eBPF programs today. An eBPF developer must have deep knowledge of the internals of the operating system to determine where to place logic and cope with programming limitations on the control flow and data accesses of their eBPF program enforced by the eBPF verifier. This paper presents KEN, an alternative framework that alleviates the difficulty of writing an eBPF program by allowing Kernel Extensions to be written in Natural language. KEN uses recent advances in large language models (LLMs) to synthesize an eBPF program given a user's English language prompt. To ensure that LLM's output is semantically equivalent to the user's prompt, KEN employs a combination of LLM-empowered program comprehension, symbolic execution, and a series of feedback loops. KEN's key novelty is the combination of these techniques. In particular, the system uses symbolic execution in a novel structure that allows it to combine the results of program synthesis and program comprehension and build on the recent success that LLMs have shown for each of these tasks individually. To evaluate KEN, we developed a new corpus of natural language prompts for eBPF programs. We show that KEN produces correct eBPF programs on 80% which is an improvement of a factor of 2.67 compared to an LLM-empowered program synthesis baseline.
Attack as Defense: Characterizing Adversarial Examples using RobustnessZhe Zhao, Guangke Chen, Jingyi Wang et al.
As a new programming paradigm, deep learning has expanded its application to many real-world problems. At the same time, deep learning based software are found to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Though various defense mechanisms have been proposed to improve robustness of deep learning software, many of them are ineffective against adaptive attacks. In this work, we propose a novel characterization to distinguish adversarial examples from benign ones based on the observation that adversarial examples are significantly less robust than benign ones. As existing robustness measurement does not scale to large networks, we propose a novel defense framework, named attack as defense (A2D), to detect adversarial examples by effectively evaluating an example's robustness. A2D uses the cost of attacking an input for robustness evaluation and identifies those less robust examples as adversarial since less robust examples are easier to attack. Extensive experiment results on MNIST, CIFAR10 and ImageNet show that A2D is more effective than recent promising approaches. We also evaluate our defence against potential adaptive attacks and show that A2D is effective in defending carefully designed adaptive attacks, e.g., the attack success rate drops to 0% on CIFAR10.