Calibre: Towards Fair and Accurate Personalized Federated Learning with Self-Supervised LearningSijia Chen, Ningxin Su, Baochun Li
In the context of personalized federated learning, existing approaches train a global model to extract transferable representations, based on which any client could train personalized models with a limited number of data samples. Self-supervised learning is considered a promising direction as the global model it produces is generic and facilitates personalization for all clients fairly. However, when data is heterogeneous across clients, the global model trained using SSL is unable to learn high-quality personalized models. In this paper, we show that when the global model is trained with SSL without modifications, its produced representations have fuzzy class boundaries. As a result, personalized learning within each client produces models with low accuracy. In order to improve SSL towards better accuracy without sacrificing its advantage in fairness, we propose Calibre, a new personalized federated learning framework designed to calibrate SSL representations by maintaining a suitable balance between more generic and more client-specific representations. Calibre is designed based on theoretically-sound properties, and introduces (1) a client-specific prototype loss as an auxiliary training objective; and (2) an aggregation algorithm guided by such prototypes across clients. Our experimental results in an extensive array of non-i.i.d.~settings show that Calibre achieves state-of-the-art performance in terms of both mean accuracy and fairness across clients. Code repo: https://github.com/TL-System/plato/tree/main/examples/ssl/calibre.
7.1LGJun 25, 2025
Hear No Evil: Detecting Gradient Leakage by Malicious Servers in Federated LearningFei Wang, Baochun Li
Recent work has shown that gradient updates in federated learning (FL) can unintentionally reveal sensitive information about a client's local data. This risk becomes significantly greater when a malicious server manipulates the global model to provoke information-rich updates from clients. In this paper, we adopt a defender's perspective to provide the first comprehensive analysis of malicious gradient leakage attacks and the model manipulation techniques that enable them. Our investigation reveals a core trade-off: these attacks cannot be both highly effective in reconstructing private data and sufficiently stealthy to evade detection -- especially in realistic FL settings that incorporate common normalization techniques and federated averaging. Building on this insight, we argue that malicious gradient leakage attacks, while theoretically concerning, are inherently limited in practice and often detectable through basic monitoring. As a complementary contribution, we propose a simple, lightweight, and broadly applicable client-side detection mechanism that flags suspicious model updates before local training begins, despite the fact that such detection may not be strictly necessary in realistic FL settings. This mechanism further underscores the feasibility of defending against these attacks with minimal overhead, offering a deployable safeguard for privacy-conscious federated learning systems.