16.5CRMay 29
MAECO-Lite: Modular Ontology for Dynamic Malware AnalysisZekeri Adams, Peter Švec, Ján Kľuka et al.
Capturing dynamic malware behavior in a practical but still semantically precise manner remains a significant challenge in cyber threat intelligence. While standards such as MAEC and STIX provide widely adopted vocabularies for describing malware artifacts and observations, they represent data with considerable complexity in structures that often obscure important ontological distinctions. In particular, they tend to conflate enduring malware artifacts with the events generated during execution, thereby flattening distinctions that are central in foundational standards for ontology design. In this paper, we conduct a foundational ontological analysis of core MAEC and STIX constructs relevant to dynamic malware analysis relying on Unified Foundational Ontology (UFO) as a theoretical lens. Our analysis reveals some ontological mismatches arising from the conflation of artifacts, dispositions, and runtime events in MAEC and STIX that complicate coherent representation of dynamic malware behavior and, from a practical perspective, limit the ability to reason about execution traces. Based on these insights, we propose MAECO-Lite, a lightweight ontology designed to represent data and operationalize their processing for dynamic malware analysis. The ontology adopts a modular structure centered on samples, processes, actions, system artifacts, and MITRE ATT&CK Techniques, while maintaining a clear separation between enduring entities and runtime events. An initial evaluation using description logic concept learning algorithms shows that the simplified ontology significantly improves learning performance, demonstrating that ontologically grounded modelling can enhance both semantic clarity and computational usability.
CRMay 5, 2024
Explainable Malware Detection with Tailored Logic Explained NetworksPeter Anthony, Francesco Giannini, Michelangelo Diligenti et al.
Malware detection is a constant challenge in cybersecurity due to the rapid development of new attack techniques. Traditional signature-based approaches struggle to keep pace with the sheer volume of malware samples. Machine learning offers a promising solution, but faces issues of generalization to unseen samples and a lack of explanation for the instances identified as malware. However, human-understandable explanations are especially important in security-critical fields, where understanding model decisions is crucial for trust and legal compliance. While deep learning models excel at malware detection, their black-box nature hinders explainability. Conversely, interpretable models often fall short in performance. To bridge this gap in this application domain, we propose the use of Logic Explained Networks (LENs), which are a recently proposed class of interpretable neural networks providing explanations in the form of First-Order Logic (FOL) rules. This paper extends the application of LENs to the complex domain of malware detection, specifically using the large-scale EMBER dataset. In the experimental results we show that LENs achieve robustness that exceeds traditional interpretable methods and that are rivaling black-box models. Moreover, we introduce a tailored version of LENs that is shown to generate logic explanations with higher fidelity with respect to the model's predictions.
AIDec 30, 2014
Workshop Notes of the 6th International Workshop on Acquisition, Representation and Reasoning about Context with Logic (ARCOE-Logic 2014)Michael Fink, Martin Homola, Alessandra Mileo
ARCOE-Logic 2014, the 6th International Workshop on Acquisition, Representation and Reasoning about Context with Logic, was held in co-location with the 19th International Conference on Knowledge Engineering and Knowledge Management (EKAW 2014) on November 25, 2014 in Linköping, Sweden. These notes contain the five papers which were accepted and presented at the workshop.
AIDec 26, 2014
Different Types of Conflicting Knowledge in AmI EnvironmentsMartin Homola, Theodore Patkos
We characterize different types of conflicts that may occur in complex distributed multi-agent scenarios, such as in Ambient Intelligence (AmI) environments, and we argue that these conflicts should be resolved in a suitable order and with the appropriate strategies for each individual conflict type. We call for further research with the goal of turning conflict resolution in AmI environments and similar multi-agent domains into a more coordinated and agreed upon process.