Ruichao Liang

Ziwei Wang, Yuanhe Zhang, Jing Chen et al.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) employ reasoning to address complex tasks. Such explicit reasoning requires extended context lengths, resulting in substantially higher resource consumption. Prior work has shown that adversarially crafted inputs can trigger redundant reasoning processes, exposing LRMs to resource-exhaustion vulnerabilities. However, the reasoning process itself, especially its reflective component, has received limited attention, even though it can lead to over-reflection and consume excessive computing power. In this paper, we introduce Recursive Entropy to quantify the risk of resource consumption in reflection, thereby revealing the safety issues inherent in inference itself. Based on Recursive Entropy, we introduce RECUR, a resource exhaustion attack via Recursive Entropy guided Counterfactual Utilization and Reflection. It constructs counterfactual questions to verify the inherent flaws and risks of LRMs. Extensive experiments demonstrate that, under benign inference, recursive entropy exhibits a pronounced decreasing trend. RECUR disrupts this trend, increasing the output length by up to 11x and decreasing throughput by 90%. Our work provides a new perspective on robust reasoning.

Ruichao Liang, Jing Chen, Xianglong Li et al.

Smart contract vulnerabilities in Decentralized Finance caused over billions of dollars losses every year, yet the security community faces a critical bottleneck: identifying a vulnerability is not the same as proving it is exploitable. Manual PoC construction is prohibitively labor-intensive, leaving most disclosed vulnerabilities unverified and protocols exposed long before mitigation is applied. In this paper, we propose \sys, a knowledge-driven agentic system for end-to-end contract vulnerability detection and exploit synthesis. Our core insight is that exploit synthesis is not a code generation task but a \emph{structured reasoning problem} that requires grounded knowledge of protocol semantics, failure root cause, and exploit primitives. \sys organizes this knowledge into a \emph{Hierarchical Knowledge Graph} (HKG) that serves as structured memory for LLM-guided multi-hop reasoning. To validate exploit feasibility beyond code synthesis, \sys employs a two-stage validation framework that checks exploit-path reachability via SMT solving and profit realizability via asset-level state simulation, ensuring generated PoCs satisfy both logical and economic viability constraints. Evaluated on 88 real-world DeFi attacks and 72 audited projects (2,573 contracts), \sys achieves 98\% recall and 0.9 F1-score in detection, and a 96.6\% exploit success rate (ESR), reproducing 85 historical exploits and recovering over \$116.2M revenue. \sys outperforms SOTA fuzzers (\textsc{Verite}, \textsc{ItyFuzz}) by up to $5\times$ in ESR and $300\times$ in recoverable value, and the LLM-based exploit generator \textsc{A1} by $2\times$ and $8.5\times$ respectively. In bug bounty evaluation, \sys identified 16 confirmed 0-day vulnerabilities, helping secure over \$70.6M and earning \$2,900 in bounties.

Ziwei Wang, Jing Chen, Ruichao Liang et al.

Despite rigorous safety alignment, Large Language Models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. Existing black-box methods often rely on heuristic templates or exhaustive trials, lacking mechanistic interpretability and query efficiency. In this study, we investigate an intrinsic vulnerability in the safety mechanisms of LLMs, where safety alignment relies on a small set of sparsely distributed attention heads, leaving much of the representational space weakly monitored. We formalize this phenomenon with a mathematical jailbreaking model that characterizes the delicate boundary of effective text obfuscation and analytically explains observed jailbreak behaviors. Guided by this model, we propose Babel, an efficient black-box attack framework that exploits the identified safety gap through systematic obfuscation sampling with iterative, feedback-driven distribution refinement, enabling reliable and high-success jailbreak attacks without access to model internals. Comprehensive evaluations on frontier commercial models demonstrate that Babel achieves state-of-the-art attack success rates and superior query efficiency. Specifically, compared to state-of-the-art methods, Babel increases the attack success rate on GPT-4o from 41.33% to 82.67% and on Claude-3-5-haiku from 38.33% to 78.33% within an average of 40 queries, providing a robust red-teaming methodology for LLMs safety research.