Xiaojun Xu

h-index3
2papers
26citations

2 Papers

11.4LGSep 15, 2025
Reasoned Safety Alignment: Ensuring Jailbreak Defense via Answer-Then-Check

Chentao Cao, Xiaojun Xu, Bo Han et al.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance in capabilities, ensuring their safety against jailbreak attacks remains a critical challenge. In this paper, we introduce a novel safety alignment approach called Answer-Then-Check, which enhances LLM robustness against malicious prompts by applying thinking ability to mitigate jailbreaking problems before producing a final answer to the user. Our method enables models to directly answer the question in their thought and then critically evaluate its safety before deciding whether to provide it. To implement this approach, we construct the Reasoned Safety Alignment (ReSA) dataset, comprising 80K examples that teach models to reason through direct responses and then analyze their safety. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach achieves the Pareto frontier with superior safety capability while decreasing over-refusal rates on over-refusal benchmarks. Notably, the model fine-tuned with ReSA maintains general reasoning capabilities on benchmarks like MMLU, MATH500, and HumanEval. Besides, our method equips models with the ability to perform safe completion. Unlike post-hoc methods that can only reject harmful queries, our model can provide helpful and safe alternative responses for sensitive topics (e.g., self-harm). Furthermore, we discover that training on a small subset of just 500 examples can achieve comparable performance to using the full dataset, suggesting that safety alignment may require less data than previously assumed.

9.6CLJun 16, 2024Code
Toward Optimal LLM Alignments Using Two-Player Games

Rui Zheng, Hongyi Guo, Zhihan Liu et al.

The standard Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) framework primarily focuses on optimizing the performance of large language models using pre-collected prompts. However, collecting prompts that provide comprehensive coverage is both tedious and challenging, and often fails to include scenarios that LLMs need to improve on the most. In this paper, we investigate alignment through the lens of two-agent games, involving iterative interactions between an adversarial and a defensive agent. The adversarial agent's task at each step is to generate prompts that expose the weakness of the defensive agent. In return, the defensive agent seeks to improve its responses to these newly identified prompts it struggled with, based on feedback from the reward model. We theoretically demonstrate that this iterative reinforcement learning optimization converges to a Nash Equilibrium for the game induced by the agents. Experimental results in safety scenarios demonstrate that learning in such a competitive environment not only fully trains agents but also leads to policies with enhanced generalization capabilities for both adversarial and defensive agents.