Xi He

Haochen Sun, Xi He

Differential privacy (DP) has become the gold standard for preserving individual privacy in data analysis. However, an implicit yet fundamental assumption underlying these rigorous privacy guarantees is the correct implementation and execution of DP mechanisms. Several incidents of unintended privacy loss have occurred due to numerical issues and inappropriate configurations of DP software, which have been successfully exploited in privacy attacks. To better understand the seriousness of defective DP software, we ask the following question: is it possible to elevate these passive defects into active privacy attacks while maintaining covertness? To address this question, we present the Gaussian pancake mechanism (GPM), a novel mechanism that is computationally indistinguishable from the widely used Gaussian mechanism (GM), yet exhibits arbitrarily weaker statistical DP guarantees. This unprecedented separation enables a new class of backdoor attacks: by indistinguishably passing off as the authentic GM, GPM can covertly degrade statistical privacy. Unlike the unintentional privacy loss caused by GM's numerical issues, GPM is an adversarial yet undetectable backdoor attack against data privacy. We formally prove GPM's covertness, characterize its statistical leakage, and demonstrate a concrete distinguishing attack that can achieve near-perfect success rates under suitable parameter choices, both theoretically and empirically. Our results underscore the importance of using transparent, open-source DP libraries and highlight the need for rigorous scrutiny and formal verification of DP implementations to prevent subtle, undetectable privacy compromises in real-world systems.

Priyanka Nanayakkara, Johes Bater, Xi He et al.

Organizations often collect private data and release aggregate statistics for the public's benefit. If no steps toward preserving privacy are taken, adversaries may use released statistics to deduce unauthorized information about the individuals described in the private dataset. Differentially private algorithms address this challenge by slightly perturbing underlying statistics with noise, thereby mathematically limiting the amount of information that may be deduced from each data release. Properly calibrating these algorithms -- and in turn the disclosure risk for people described in the dataset -- requires a data curator to choose a value for a privacy budget parameter, $ε$. However, there is little formal guidance for choosing $ε$, a task that requires reasoning about the probabilistic privacy-utility trade-off. Furthermore, choosing $ε$ in the context of statistical inference requires reasoning about accuracy trade-offs in the presence of both measurement error and differential privacy (DP) noise. We present Visualizing Privacy (ViP), an interactive interface that visualizes relationships between $ε$, accuracy, and disclosure risk to support setting and splitting $ε$ among queries. As a user adjusts $ε$, ViP dynamically updates visualizations depicting expected accuracy and risk. ViP also has an inference setting, allowing a user to reason about the impact of DP noise on statistical inferences. Finally, we present results of a study where 16 research practitioners with little to no DP background completed a set of tasks related to setting $ε$ using both ViP and a control. We find that ViP helps participants more correctly answer questions related to judging the probability of where a DP-noised release is likely to fall and comparing between DP-noised and non-private confidence intervals.

Shubhankar Mohapatra, Sajin Sasy, Xi He et al.

Hyperparameter optimization is a ubiquitous challenge in machine learning, and the performance of a trained model depends crucially upon their effective selection. While a rich set of tools exist for this purpose, there are currently no practical hyperparameter selection methods under the constraint of differential privacy (DP). We study honest hyperparameter selection for differentially private machine learning, in which the process of hyperparameter tuning is accounted for in the overall privacy budget. To this end, we i) show that standard composition tools outperform more advanced techniques in many settings, ii) empirically and theoretically demonstrate an intrinsic connection between the learning rate and clipping norm hyperparameters, iii) show that adaptive optimizers like DPAdam enjoy a significant advantage in the process of honest hyperparameter tuning, and iv) draw upon novel limiting behaviour of Adam in the DP setting to design a new and more efficient optimizer.

Amrita Roy Chowdhury, Chenghong Wang, Xi He et al.

Differential privacy (DP) has steadily become the de-facto standard for achieving privacy in data analysis, which is typically implemented either in the "central" or "local" model. The local model has been more popular for commercial deployments as it does not require a trusted data collector. This increased privacy, however, comes at a cost of utility and algorithmic expressibility as compared to the central model. In this work, we propose, Crypt$ε$, a system and programming framework that (1) achieves the accuracy guarantees and algorithmic expressibility of the central model (2) without any trusted data collector like in the local model. Crypt$ε$ achieves the "best of both worlds" by employing two non-colluding untrusted servers that run DP programs on encrypted data from the data owners. Although straightforward implementations of DP programs using secure computation tools can achieve the above goal theoretically, in practice they are beset with many challenges such as poor performance and tricky security proofs. To this end, Crypt$ε$ allows data analysts to author logical DP programs that are automatically translated to secure protocols that work on encrypted data. These protocols ensure that the untrusted servers learn nothing more than the noisy outputs, thereby guaranteeing DP (for computationally bounded adversaries) for all Crypt$ε$ programs. Crypt$ε$ supports a rich class of DP programs that can be expressed via a small set of transformation and measurement operators followed by arbitrary post-processing. Further, we propose performance optimizations leveraging the fact that the output is noisy. We demonstrate Crypt$ε$'s feasibility for practical DP analysis with extensive empirical evaluations on real datasets.