Ruimeng Hu

Ruimeng Hu, Mathieu Laurière

Stochastic optimal control and games have a wide range of applications, from finance and economics to social sciences, robotics, and energy management. Many real-world applications involve complex models that have driven the development of sophisticated numerical methods. Recently, computational methods based on machine learning have been developed for solving stochastic control problems and games. In this review, we focus on deep learning methods that have unlocked the possibility of solving such problems, even in high dimensions or when the structure is very complex, beyond what traditional numerical methods can achieve. We consider mostly the continuous time and continuous space setting. Many of the new approaches build on recent neural-network-based methods for solving high-dimensional partial differential equations or backward stochastic differential equations, or on model-free reinforcement learning for Markov decision processes that have led to breakthrough results. This paper provides an introduction to these methods and summarizes the state-of-the-art works at the crossroad of machine learning and stochastic control and games.

Jiequn Han, Ruimeng Hu, Jihao Long

One of the core problems in mean-field control and mean-field games is to solve the corresponding McKean-Vlasov forward-backward stochastic differential equations (MV-FBSDEs). Most existing methods are tailored to special cases in which the mean-field interaction only depends on expectation or other moments and thus inadequate to solve problems when the mean-field interaction has full distribution dependence. In this paper, we propose a novel deep learning method for computing MV-FBSDEs with a general form of mean-field interactions. Specifically, built on fictitious play, we recast the problem into repeatedly solving standard FBSDEs with explicit coefficient functions. These coefficient functions are used to approximate the MV-FBSDEs' model coefficients with full distribution dependence, and are updated by solving another supervising learning problem using training data simulated from the last iteration's FBSDE solutions. We use deep neural networks to solve standard BSDEs and approximate coefficient functions in order to solve high-dimensional MV-FBSDEs. Under proper assumptions on the learned functions, we prove that the convergence of the proposed method is free of the curse of dimensionality (CoD) by using a class of integral probability metrics previously developed in [Han, Hu and Long, arXiv:2104.12036]. The proved theorem shows the advantage of the method in high dimensions. We present the numerical performance in high-dimensional MV-FBSDE problems, including a mean-field game example of the well-known Cucker-Smale model whose cost depends on the full distribution of the forward process.

Andrea Angiuli, Jean-Pierre Fouque, Ruimeng Hu et al.

We present the development and analysis of a reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm designed to solve continuous-space mean field game (MFG) and mean field control (MFC) problems in a unified manner. The proposed approach pairs the actor-critic (AC) paradigm with a representation of the mean field distribution via a parameterized score function, which can be efficiently updated in an online fashion, and uses Langevin dynamics to obtain samples from the resulting distribution. The AC agent and the score function are updated iteratively to converge, either to the MFG equilibrium or the MFC optimum for a given mean field problem, depending on the choice of learning rates. A straightforward modification of the algorithm allows us to solve mixed mean field control games (MFCGs). The performance of our algorithm is evaluated using linear-quadratic benchmarks in the asymptotic infinite horizon framework.

Chengfan Gao, Siping Gao, Ruimeng Hu et al.

The optimal stopping problem is one of the core problems in financial markets, with broad applications such as pricing American and Bermudan options. The deep BSDE method [Han, Jentzen and E, PNAS, 115(34):8505-8510, 2018] has shown great power in solving high-dimensional forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs), and inspired many applications. However, the method solves backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) in a forward manner, which can not be used for optimal stopping problems that in general require running BSDE backwardly. To overcome this difficulty, a recent paper [Wang, Chen, Sudjianto, Liu and Shen, arXiv:1807.06622, 2018] proposed the backward deep BSDE method to solve the optimal stopping problem. In this paper, we provide the rigorous theory for the backward deep BSDE method. Specifically, 1. We derive the a posteriori error estimation, i.e., the error of the numerical solution can be bounded by the training loss function; and; 2. We give an upper bound of the loss function, which can be sufficiently small subject to universal approximations. We give two numerical examples, which present consistent performance with the proved theory.

Yao Xuan, Robert Balkin, Jiequn Han et al.

Game theory has been an effective tool in the control of disease spread and in suggesting optimal policies at both individual and area levels. In this AMS Notices article, we focus on the decision-making development for the intervention of COVID-19, aiming to provide mathematical models and efficient machine learning methods, and justifications for related policies that have been implemented in the past and explain how the authorities' decisions affect their neighboring regions from a game theory viewpoint.

Robert Balkin, Hector D. Ceniceros, Ruimeng Hu

In this paper, we propose a numerical methodology for finding the closed-loop Nash equilibrium of stochastic delay differential games through deep learning. These games are prevalent in finance and economics where multi-agent interaction and delayed effects are often desired features in a model, but are introduced at the expense of increased dimensionality of the problem. This increased dimensionality is especially significant as that arising from the number of players is coupled with the potential infinite dimensionality caused by the delay. Our approach involves parameterizing the controls of each player using distinct recurrent neural networks. These recurrent neural network-based controls are then trained using a modified version of Brown's fictitious play, incorporating deep learning techniques. To evaluate the effectiveness of our methodology, we test it on finance-related problems with known solutions. Furthermore, we also develop new problems and derive their analytical Nash equilibrium solutions, which serve as additional benchmarks for assessing the performance of our proposed deep learning approach.

Ming Min, Ruimeng Hu, Tomoyuki Ichiba

Real-world data can be multimodal distributed, e.g., data describing the opinion divergence in a community, the interspike interval distribution of neurons, and the oscillators natural frequencies. Generating multimodal distributed real-world data has become a challenge to existing generative adversarial networks (GANs). For example, neural stochastic differential equations (Neural SDEs), treated as infinite-dimensional GANs, have demonstrated successful performance mainly in generating unimodal time series data. In this paper, we propose a novel time series generator, named directed chain GANs (DC-GANs), which inserts a time series dataset (called a neighborhood process of the directed chain or input) into the drift and diffusion coefficients of the directed chain SDEs with distributional constraints. DC-GANs can generate new time series of the same distribution as the neighborhood process, and the neighborhood process will provide the key step in learning and generating multimodal distributed time series. The proposed DC-GANs are examined on four datasets, including two stochastic models from social sciences and computational neuroscience, and two real-world datasets on stock prices and energy consumption. To our best knowledge, DC-GANs are the first work that can generate multimodal time series data and consistently outperforms state-of-the-art benchmarks with respect to measures of distribution, data similarity, and predictive ability.

Michael Barnett, William Brock, Lars Peter Hansen et al.

We study the implications of model uncertainty in a climate-economics framework with three types of capital: "dirty" capital that produces carbon emissions when used for production, "clean" capital that generates no emissions but is initially less productive than dirty capital, and knowledge capital that increases with R\&D investment and leads to technological innovation in green sector productivity. To solve our high-dimensional, non-linear model framework we implement a neural-network-based global solution method. We show there are first-order impacts of model uncertainty on optimal decisions and social valuations in our integrated climate-economic-innovation framework. Accounting for interconnected uncertainty over climate dynamics, economic damages from climate change, and the arrival of a green technological change leads to substantial adjustments to investment in the different capital types in anticipation of technological change and the revelation of climate damage severity.

Liya Guo, Ruimeng Hu, Xu Yang et al.

Continuous-time stochastic control with time-inhomogeneous jump-diffusion dynamics is central in finance and economics, but computing optimal policies is difficult under explicit time dependence, discontinuous shocks, and high dimensionality. We propose an actor-critic framework that serves as a mesh-free solver for entropy-regularized control problems and stochastic games with jumps. The approach is built on a time-inhomogeneous little q-function and an appropriate occupation measure, yielding a policy-gradient representation that accommodates time-dependent drift, volatility, and jump terms. To represent expressive stochastic policies in continuous-action spaces, we parameterize the actor using conditional normalizing flows, enabling flexible non-Gaussian policies while retaining exact likelihood evaluation for entropy regularization and policy optimization. We validate the method on time-inhomogeneous linear-quadratic control, Merton portfolio optimization, and a multi-agent portfolio game, using explicit solutions or high-accuracy benchmarks. Numerical results demonstrate stable learning under jump discontinuities, accurate approximation of optimal stochastic policies, and favorable scaling with respect to dimension and number of agents.

Mo Zhou, Haosheng Zhou, Ruimeng Hu

We propose the Mean-Field Actor-Critic (MFAC) flow, a continuous-time learning dynamics for solving mean-field games (MFGs), combining techniques from reinforcement learning and optimal transport. The MFAC framework jointly evolves the control (actor), value function (critic), and distribution components through coupled gradient-based updates governed by partial differential equations (PDEs). A central innovation is the Optimal Transport Geodesic Picard (OTGP) flow, which drives the distribution toward equilibrium along Wasserstein-2 geodesics. We conduct a rigorous convergence analysis using Lyapunov functionals and establish global exponential convergence of the MFAC flow under a suitable timescale. Our results highlight the algorithmic interplay among actor, critic, and distribution components. Numerical experiments illustrate the theoretical findings and demonstrate the effectiveness of the MFAC framework in computing MFG equilibria.

Ruimeng Hu, Jihao Long, Haosheng Zhou

We propose a novel neural network architecture, called Non-Trainable Modification (NTM), for computing Nash equilibria in stochastic differential games (SDGs) on graphs. These games model a broad class of graph-structured multi-agent systems arising in finance, robotics, energy, and social dynamics, where agents interact locally under uncertainty. The NTM architecture imposes a graph-guided sparsification on feedforward neural networks, embedding fixed, non-trainable components aligned with the underlying graph topology. This design enhances interpretability and stability, while significantly reducing the number of trainable parameters in large-scale, sparse settings. We theoretically establish a universal approximation property for NTM in static games on graphs and numerically validate its expressivity and robustness through supervised learning tasks. Building on this foundation, we incorporate NTM into two state-of-the-art game solvers, Direct Parameterization and Deep BSDE, yielding their sparse variants (NTM-DP and NTM-DBSDE). Numerical experiments on three SDGs across various graph structures demonstrate that NTM-based methods achieve performance comparable to their fully trainable counterparts, while offering improved computational efficiency.

Ming Min, Ruimeng Hu

Existing deep learning methods for solving mean-field games (MFGs) with common noise fix the sampling common noise paths and then solve the corresponding MFGs. This leads to a nested-loop structure with millions of simulations of common noise paths in order to produce accurate solutions, which results in prohibitive computational cost and limits the applications to a large extent. In this paper, based on the rough path theory, we propose a novel single-loop algorithm, named signatured deep fictitious play, by which we can work with the unfixed common noise setup to avoid the nested-loop structure and reduce the computational complexity significantly. The proposed algorithm can accurately capture the effect of common uncertainty changes on mean-field equilibria without further training of neural networks, as previously needed in the existing machine learning algorithms. The efficiency is supported by three applications, including linear-quadratic MFGs, mean-field portfolio game, and mean-field game of optimal consumption and investment. Overall, we provide a new point of view from the rough path theory to solve MFGs with common noise with significantly improved efficiency and an extensive range of applications. In addition, we report the first deep learning work to deal with extended MFGs (a mean-field interaction via both the states and controls) with common noise.

Jiequn Han, Ruimeng Hu, Jihao Long

This paper concerns the convergence of empirical measures in high dimensions. We propose a new class of probability metrics and show that under such metrics, the convergence is free of the curse of dimensionality (CoD). Such a feature is critical for high-dimensional analysis and stands in contrast to classical metrics ({\it e.g.}, the Wasserstein metric). The proposed metrics fall into the category of integral probability metrics, for which we specify criteria of test function spaces to guarantee the property of being free of CoD. Examples of the selected test function spaces include the reproducing kernel Hilbert spaces, Barron space, and flow-induced function spaces. Three applications of the proposed metrics are presented: 1. The convergence of empirical measure in the case of random variables; 2. The convergence of $n$-particle system to the solution to McKean-Vlasov stochastic differential equation; 3. The construction of an $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium for a homogeneous $n$-player game by its mean-field limit. As a byproduct, we prove that, given a distribution close to the target distribution measured by our metric and a certain representation of the target distribution, we can generate a distribution close to the target one in terms of the Wasserstein metric and relative entropy. Overall, we show that the proposed class of metrics is a powerful tool to analyze the convergence of empirical measures in high dimensions without CoD.

Jiequn Han, Ruimeng Hu

Stochastic control problems with delay are challenging due to the path-dependent feature of the system and thus its intrinsic high dimensions. In this paper, we propose and systematically study deep neural networks-based algorithms to solve stochastic control problems with delay features. Specifically, we employ neural networks for sequence modeling (\emph{e.g.}, recurrent neural networks such as long short-term memory) to parameterize the policy and optimize the objective function. The proposed algorithms are tested on three benchmark examples: a linear-quadratic problem, optimal consumption with fixed finite delay, and portfolio optimization with complete memory. Particularly, we notice that the architecture of recurrent neural networks naturally captures the path-dependent feature with much flexibility and yields better performance with more efficient and stable training of the network compared to feedforward networks. The superiority is even evident in the case of portfolio optimization with complete memory, which features infinite delay.

Yao Xuan, Robert Balkin, Jiequn Han et al.

Game theory has been an effective tool in the control of disease spread and in suggesting optimal policies at both individual and area levels. In this paper, we propose a multi-region SEIR model based on stochastic differential game theory, aiming to formulate optimal regional policies for infectious diseases. Specifically, we enhance the standard epidemic SEIR model by taking into account the social and health policies issued by multiple region planners. This enhancement makes the model more realistic and powerful. However, it also introduces a formidable computational challenge due to the high dimensionality of the solution space brought by the presence of multiple regions. This significant numerical difficulty of the model structure motivates us to generalize the deep fictitious algorithm introduced in [Han and Hu, MSML2020, pp.221--245, PMLR, 2020] and develop an improved algorithm to overcome the curse of dimensionality. We apply the proposed model and algorithm to study the COVID-19 pandemic in three states: New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The model parameters are estimated from real data posted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). We are able to show the effects of the lockdown/travel ban policy on the spread of COVID-19 for each state and how their policies affect each other.

Jiequn Han, Ruimeng Hu, Jihao Long

Stochastic differential games have been used extensively to model agents' competitions in Finance, for instance, in P2P lending platforms from the Fintech industry, the banking system for systemic risk, and insurance markets. The recently proposed machine learning algorithm, deep fictitious play, provides a novel efficient tool for finding Markovian Nash equilibrium of large $N$-player asymmetric stochastic differential games [J. Han and R. Hu, Mathematical and Scientific Machine Learning Conference, pages 221-245, PMLR, 2020]. By incorporating the idea of fictitious play, the algorithm decouples the game into $N$ sub-optimization problems, and identifies each player's optimal strategy with the deep backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) method parallelly and repeatedly. In this paper, we prove the convergence of deep fictitious play (DFP) to the true Nash equilibrium. We can also show that the strategy based on DFP forms an $\eps$-Nash equilibrium. We generalize the algorithm by proposing a new approach to decouple the games, and present numerical results of large population games showing the empirical convergence of the algorithm beyond the technical assumptions in the theorems.

Jiequn Han, Ruimeng Hu

We propose a deep neural network-based algorithm to identify the Markovian Nash equilibrium of general large $N$-player stochastic differential games. Following the idea of fictitious play, we recast the $N$-player game into $N$ decoupled decision problems (one for each player) and solve them iteratively. The individual decision problem is characterized by a semilinear Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, to solve which we employ the recently developed deep BSDE method. The resulted algorithm can solve large $N$-player games for which conventional numerical methods would suffer from the curse of dimensionality. Multiple numerical examples involving identical or heterogeneous agents, with risk-neutral or risk-sensitive objectives, are tested to validate the accuracy of the proposed algorithm in large group games. Even for a fifty-player game with the presence of common noise, the proposed algorithm still finds the approximate Nash equilibrium accurately, which, to our best knowledge, is difficult to achieve by other numerical algorithms.

Ruimeng Hu

In this paper, we apply the idea of fictitious play to design deep neural networks (DNNs), and develop deep learning theory and algorithms for computing the Nash equilibrium of asymmetric $N$-player non-zero-sum stochastic differential games, for which we refer as \emph{deep fictitious play}, a multi-stage learning process. Specifically at each stage, we propose the strategy of letting individual player optimize her own payoff subject to the other players' previous actions, equivalent to solve $N$ decoupled stochastic control optimization problems, which are approximated by DNNs. Therefore, the fictitious play strategy leads to a structure consisting of $N$ DNNs, which only communicate at the end of each stage. The resulted deep learning algorithm based on fictitious play is scalable, parallel and model-free, {\it i.e.}, using GPU parallelization, it can be applied to any $N$-player stochastic differential game with different symmetries and heterogeneities ({\it e.g.}, existence of major players). We illustrate the performance of the deep learning algorithm by comparing to the closed-form solution of the linear quadratic game. Moreover, we prove the convergence of fictitious play under appropriate assumptions, and verify that the convergent limit forms an open-loop Nash equilibrium. We also discuss the extensions to other strategies designed upon fictitious play and closed-loop Nash equilibrium in the end.

Ruimeng Hu

In this paper, we propose deep learning algorithms for ranking response surfaces, with applications to optimal stopping problems in financial mathematics. The problem of ranking response surfaces is motivated by estimating optimal feedback policy maps in stochastic control problems, aiming to efficiently find the index associated to the minimal response across the entire continuous input space $\mathcal{X} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$. By considering points in $\mathcal{X}$ as pixels and indices of the minimal surfaces as labels, we recast the problem as an image segmentation problem, which assigns a label to every pixel in an image such that pixels with the same label share certain characteristics. This provides an alternative method for efficiently solving the problem instead of using sequential design in our previous work [R. Hu and M. Ludkovski, SIAM/ASA Journal on Uncertainty Quantification, 5 (2017), 212--239]. Deep learning algorithms are scalable, parallel and model-free, i.e., no parametric assumptions needed on the response surfaces. Considering ranking response surfaces as image segmentation allows one to use a broad class of deep neural networks, e.g., UNet, SegNet, DeconvNet, which have been widely applied and numerically proved to possess high accuracy in the field. We also systematically study the dependence of deep learning algorithms on the input data generated on uniform grids or by sequential design sampling, and observe that the performance of deep learning is {\it not} sensitive to the noise and locations (close to/away from boundaries) of training data. We present a few examples including synthetic ones and the Bermudan option pricing problem to show the efficiency and accuracy of this method.

Ruimeng Hu, Mike Ludkovski

We propose and analyze sequential design methods for the problem of ranking several response surfaces. Namely, given $L \ge 2$ response surfaces over a continuous input space $\cal X$, the aim is to efficiently find the index of the minimal response across the entire $\cal X$. The response surfaces are not known and have to be noisily sampled one-at-a-time. This setting is motivated by stochastic control applications and requires joint experimental design both in space and response-index dimensions. To generate sequential design heuristics we investigate stepwise uncertainty reduction approaches, as well as sampling based on posterior classification complexity. We also make connections between our continuous-input formulation and the discrete framework of pure regret in multi-armed bandits. To model the response surfaces we utilize kriging surrogates. Several numerical examples using both synthetic data and an epidemics control problem are provided to illustrate our approach and the efficacy of respective adaptive designs.