Xerxes D. Arsiwalla

Ivan Herreros-Alonso, Xerxes D. Arsiwalla, Paul F. M. J. Verschure

How does our motor system solve the problem of anticipatory control in spite of a wide spectrum of response dynamics from different musculo-skeletal systems, transport delays as well as response latencies throughout the central nervous system? To a great extent, our highly-skilled motor responses are a result of a reactive feedback system, originating in the brain-stem and spinal cord, combined with a feed-forward anticipatory system, that is adaptively fine-tuned by sensory experience and originates in the cerebellum. Based on that interaction we design the counterfactual predictive control (CFPC) architecture, an anticipatory adaptive motor control scheme in which a feed-forward module, based on the cerebellum, steers an error feedback controller with counterfactual error signals. Those are signals that trigger reactions as actual errors would, but that do not code for any current or forthcoming errors. In order to determine the optimal learning strategy, we derive a novel learning rule for the feed-forward module that involves an eligibility trace and operates at the synaptic level. In particular, our eligibility trace provides a mechanism beyond co-incidence detection in that it convolves a history of prior synaptic inputs with error signals. In the context of cerebellar physiology, this solution implies that Purkinje cell synapses should generate eligibility traces using a forward model of the system being controlled. From an engineering perspective, CFPC provides a general-purpose anticipatory control architecture equipped with a learning rule that exploits the full dynamics of the closed-loop system.

Xerxes D. Arsiwalla

In this commentary article to 'The Puzzle of Ideography' by Morin, we put forth a new cognitive account of the puzzle of ideography, that complements the standardization account of Morin. Efficient standardization of spoken language is phenomenologically attributed to a modality effect coupled with chunking of cognitive representations, further aided by multi-sensory integration and the serialized nature of attention. These cognitive mechanisms are crucial for explaining why languages dominate graphic codes for general-purpose human communication.

Xerxes D. Arsiwalla

This work explores the hypothesis that subjectively attributed meaning constitutes the phenomenal content of conscious experience. That is, phenomenal content is semantic. This form of subjective meaning manifests as an intrinsic and non-representational character of qualia. Empirically, subjective meaning is ubiquitous in conscious experiences. We point to phenomenological studies that lend evidence to support this. Furthermore, this notion of meaning closely relates to what Frege refers to as "sense", in metaphysics and philosophy of language. It also aligns with Peirce's "interpretant", in semiotics. We discuss how Frege's sense can also be extended to the raw feels of consciousness. Sense and reference both play a role in phenomenal experience. Moreover, within the context of the mind-matter relation, we provide a formalization of subjective meaning associated to one's mental representations. Identifying the precise maps between the physical and mental domains, we argue that syntactic and semantic structures transcend language, and are realized within each of these domains. Formally, meaning is a relational attribute, realized via a map that interprets syntactic structures of a formal system within an appropriate semantic space. The image of this map within the mental domain is what is relevant for experience, and thus comprises the phenomenal content of qualia. We conclude with possible implications this may have for experience-based theories of consciousness.

Camilo M. Signorelli, Xerxes D. Arsiwalla

Traditionally, the way one evaluates the performance of an Artificial Intelligence (AI) system is via a comparison to human performance in specific tasks, treating humans as a reference for high-level cognition. However, these comparisons leave out important features of human intelligence: the capability to transfer knowledge and make complex decisions based on emotional and rational reasoning. These decisions are influenced by current inferences as well as prior experiences, making the decision process strongly subjective and apparently biased. In this context, a definition of compositional intelligence is necessary to incorporate these features in future AI tests. Here, a concrete implementation of this will be suggested, using recent developments in quantum cognition, natural language and compositional meaning of sentences, thanks to categorical compositional models of meaning.

Ismael T. Freire, Xerxes D. Arsiwalla, Jordi-Ysard Puigbò et al.

A major challenge in cognitive science and AI has been to understand how autonomous agents might acquire and predict behavioral and mental states of other agents in the course of complex social interactions. How does such an agent model the goals, beliefs, and actions of other agents it interacts with? What are the computational principles to model a Theory of Mind (ToM)? Deep learning approaches to address these questions fall short of a better understanding of the problem. In part, this is due to the black-box nature of deep networks, wherein computational mechanisms of ToM are not readily revealed. Here, we consider alternative hypotheses seeking to model how the brain might realize a ToM. In particular, we propose embodied and situated agent models based on distributed adaptive control theory to predict actions of other agents in five different game theoretic tasks (Harmony Game, Hawk-Dove, Stag-Hunt, Prisoner's Dilemma and Battle of the Exes). Our multi-layer control models implement top-down predictions from adaptive to reactive layers of control and bottom-up error feedback from reactive to adaptive layers. We test cooperative and competitive strategies among seven different agent models (cooperative, greedy, tit-for-tat, reinforcement-based, rational, predictive and other's-model agents). We show that, compared to pure reinforcement-based strategies, probabilistic learning agents modeled on rational, predictive and other's-model phenotypes perform better in game-theoretic metrics across tasks. Our autonomous multi-agent models capture systems-level processes underlying a ToM and highlight architectural principles of ToM from a control-theoretic perspective.

Ismael T. Freire, Clement Moulin-Frier, Marti Sanchez-Fibla et al.

What is the role of real-time control and learning in the formation of social conventions? To answer this question, we propose a computational model that matches human behavioral data in a social decision-making game that was analyzed both in discrete-time and continuous-time setups. Furthermore, unlike previous approaches, our model takes into account the role of sensorimotor control loops in embodied decision-making scenarios. For this purpose, we introduce the Control-based Reinforcement Learning (CRL) model. CRL is grounded in the Distributed Adaptive Control (DAC) theory of mind and brain, where low-level sensorimotor control is modulated through perceptual and behavioral learning in a layered structure. CRL follows these principles by implementing a feedback control loop handling the agent's reactive behaviors (pre-wired reflexes), along with an adaptive layer that uses reinforcement learning to maximize long-term reward. We test our model in a multi-agent game-theoretic task in which coordination must be achieved to find an optimal solution. We show that CRL is able to reach human-level performance on standard game-theoretic metrics such as efficiency in acquiring rewards and fairness in reward distribution.

Xerxes D. Arsiwalla, Pedro A. M. Mediano, Paul F. M. J. Verschure

What does the informational complexity of dynamical networked systems tell us about intrinsic mechanisms and functions of these complex systems? Recent complexity measures such as integrated information have sought to operationalize this problem taking a whole-versus-parts perspective, wherein one explicitly computes the amount of information generated by a network as a whole over and above that generated by the sum of its parts during state transitions. While several numerical schemes for estimating network integrated information exist, it is instructive to pursue an analytic approach that computes integrated information as a function of network weights. Our formulation of integrated information uses a Kullback-Leibler divergence between the multi-variate distribution on the set of network states versus the corresponding factorized distribution over its parts. Implementing stochastic Gaussian dynamics, we perform computations for several prototypical network topologies. Our findings show increased informational complexity near criticality, which remains consistent across network topologies. Spectral decomposition of the system's dynamics reveals how informational complexity is governed by eigenmodes of both, the network's covariance and adjacency matrices. We find that as the dynamics of the system approach criticality, high integrated information is exclusively driven by the eigenmode corresponding to the leading eigenvalue of the covariance matrix, while sub-leading modes get suppressed. The implication of this result is that it might be favorable for complex dynamical networked systems such as the human brain or communication systems to operate near criticality so that efficient information integration might be achieved.

Xerxes D. Arsiwalla, Ricard Sole, Clement Moulin-Frier et al.

We construct a complexity-based morphospace to study systems-level properties of conscious & intelligent systems. The axes of this space label 3 complexity types: autonomous, cognitive & social. Given recent proposals to synthesize consciousness, a generic complexity-based conceptualization provides a useful framework for identifying defining features of conscious & synthetic systems. Based on current clinical scales of consciousness that measure cognitive awareness and wakefulness, we take a perspective on how contemporary artificially intelligent machines & synthetically engineered life forms measure on these scales. It turns out that awareness & wakefulness can be associated to computational & autonomous complexity respectively. Subsequently, building on insights from cognitive robotics, we examine the function that consciousness serves, & argue the role of consciousness as an evolutionary game-theoretic strategy. This makes the case for a third type of complexity for describing consciousness: social complexity. Having identified these complexity types, allows for a representation of both, biological & synthetic systems in a common morphospace. A consequence of this classification is a taxonomy of possible conscious machines. We identify four types of consciousness, based on embodiment: (i) biological consciousness, (ii) synthetic consciousness, (iii) group consciousness (resulting from group interactions), & (iv) simulated consciousness (embodied by virtual agents within a simulated reality). This taxonomy helps in the investigation of comparative signatures of consciousness across domains, in order to highlight design principles necessary to engineer conscious machines. This is particularly relevant in the light of recent developments at the crossroads of cognitive neuroscience, biomedical engineering, artificial intelligence & biomimetics.

Ivan Herreros, Xerxes D. Arsiwalla, Cosimo Della Santina et al.

How does our nervous system successfully acquire feedback control strategies in spite of a wide spectrum of response dynamics from different musculo-skeletal systems? The cerebellum is a crucial brain structure in enabling precise motor control in animals. Recent advances suggest that synaptic plasticity of cerebellar Purkinje cells involves molecular mechanisms that mimic the dynamics of the efferent motor system that they control allowing them to match the timing of their learning rule to behavior. Counter-Factual Predictive Control (CFPC) is a cerebellum-based feed-forward control scheme that exploits that principle for acquiring anticipatory actions. CFPC extends the classical Widrow-Hoff/Least Mean Squares by inserting a forward model of the downstream closed-loop system in its learning rule. Here we apply that same insight to the problem of learning the gains of a feedback controller. To that end, we frame a Model-Reference Adaptive Control (MRAC) problem and derive an adaptive control scheme treating the gains of a feedback controller as if they were the weights of an adaptive linear unit. Our results demonstrate that rather than being exclusively confined to cerebellar learning, the approach of controlling plasticity with a forward model of the subsystem controlled, an approach that we term as Model-Enhanced Least Mean Squares (ME-LMS), can provide a solution to wide set of adaptive control problems.

Clément Moulin-Frier, Jordi-Ysard Puigbò, Xerxes D. Arsiwalla et al.

In this paper, we argue that the future of Artificial Intelligence research resides in two keywords: integration and embodiment. We support this claim by analyzing the recent advances of the field. Regarding integration, we note that the most impactful recent contributions have been made possible through the integration of recent Machine Learning methods (based in particular on Deep Learning and Recurrent Neural Networks) with more traditional ones (e.g. Monte-Carlo tree search, goal babbling exploration or addressable memory systems). Regarding embodiment, we note that the traditional benchmark tasks (e.g. visual classification or board games) are becoming obsolete as state-of-the-art learning algorithms approach or even surpass human performance in most of them, having recently encouraged the development of first-person 3D game platforms embedding realistic physics. Building upon this analysis, we first propose an embodied cognitive architecture integrating heterogenous sub-fields of Artificial Intelligence into a unified framework. We demonstrate the utility of our approach by showing how major contributions of the field can be expressed within the proposed framework. We then claim that benchmarking environments need to reproduce ecologically-valid conditions for bootstrapping the acquisition of increasingly complex cognitive skills through the concept of a cognitive arms race between embodied agents.

Riccardo Zucca, Xerxes D. Arsiwalla, Hoang Le et al.

We investigate scaling properties of human brain functional networks in the resting-state. Analyzing network degree distributions, we statistically test whether their tails scale as power-law or not. Initial studies, based on least-squares fitting, were shown to be inadequate for precise estimation of power-law distributions. Subsequently, methods based on maximum-likelihood estimators have been proposed and applied to address this question. Nevertheless, no clear consensus has emerged, mainly because results have shown substantial variability depending on the data-set used or its resolution. In this study, we work with high-resolution data (10K nodes) from the Human Connectome Project and take into account network weights. We test for the power-law, exponential, log-normal and generalized Pareto distributions. Our results show that the statistics generally do not support a power-law, but instead these degree distributions tend towards the thin-tail limit of the generalized Pareto model. This may have implications for the number of hubs in human brain functional networks.