Giuseppe Ettorre

Cosimo Galeone, Minsu Park, Giuseppe Ettorre et al.

Deployed language models must produce outputs that are both correct and format-compliant. We study this structured-output reliability gap using two mathematical benchmarks -- GSM8K and MATH -- as a controlled testbed: ground truth is unambiguous and the output contract is strict (JSON with required fields). We evaluate three 7-9B models under five prompting strategies and report output accuracy -- the joint event of mathematical correctness and valid JSON structure -- as the primary metric. A systematic format failure emerges: NAIVE prompting (no system prompt) achieves up to 85% task accuracy on GSM8K but 0% output accuracy across all models and datasets. REFERENCE prompting (a minimal hand-written JSON format prompt) fares little better, yielding 0% output accuracy for two of four models tested. Constrained decoding enforces syntactic validity but incurs 3.6x-8.2x latency overhead and in several settings degrades task performance substantially. To overcome this limitation, we developed AloLab, an iterative system-prompt optimizer (meta-agent: Claude Sonnet 4.5) requiring only black-box API access to the target model; it reaches 84-87% output accuracy on GSM8K and 34-40% on MATH across five independent runs per model, with 29/30 paired McNemar comparisons against the best static prompt significant at p < 0.05, at near-NAIVE inference latency and without model fine-tuning. The same format failure extends to GPT-4o (OpenAI, 2024), a proprietary closed-source model: REFERENCE achieves 0% output accuracy due to systematic markdown-fence wrapping, while AloLab reaches 95.2% [94.8, 95.6]. An ablation replacing the Sonnet 4.5 meta-agent with Claude 3 Haiku reduces mean output accuracy to 61.0% and increases run-to-run standard deviation from <1 pp to 21.8 pp, confirming that meta-agent capability is a primary driver of optimization quality.

Cosimo Galeone, Anna Ettorre, Minsu Park et al.

A central aspiration of mechanistic interpretability is controllability: if we know where a behavior is represented in a model's activations, we should be able to modify it. This rests on a hidden premise -- that the direction which detects a behavior and the direction which controls it are the same, or close. We test this geometrically: what is the angle between the direction that best detects a behavior and the one that best causes it? If detection implies control the cosine is near 1; otherwise it quantifies a detection-intervention gap. On Gemma 2-2B-it, output format (clean JSON vs markdown fencing) collapses both roles onto one axis. Hallucination does not: the model detects fake entities with perfect linear separability (AUC = 1.000 from layer 5), yet that direction sits at cos = 0.12 (about 83 degrees) from the direction producing a refusal -- a small, reproducible alignment, far from the cos = 1 that "detection is control" would require. A detector built from activations, with no chosen tokens, likewise fails to align (cos = -0.06). The gap generalizes: across four models from three families and two scales (1B-9B), cos stays in [0.12, 0.20], identical before and after instruction tuning (0.1197 vs 0.1200), placing its origin in pretraining. A 15-degree rotation toward the refusal direction partially bridges it -- 73% and 60% refusal on two held-out fake-entity categories at 1.8% false positives. We then ask whether this cosine predicts steerability, and it does not: detection is a high-dimensional class, not a single direction, and what separates the steerable case is functional, not readable from a static angle. The cosine is a weight-computable signature of the dissociation between knowing and steering, not a predictor of it.