Michel Boyer

QUANT-PH
h-index16
3papers
51citations
Novelty32%
AI Score18

3 Papers

1.2QUANT-PHNov 27, 2017
Composable security against collective attacks of a modified BB84 QKD protocol with information only in one basis

Michel Boyer, Rotem Liss, Tal Mor

Quantum Cryptography uses the counter-intuitive properties of Quantum Mechanics for performing cryptographic tasks in a secure and reliable way. The Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol BB84 has been proven secure against several important types of attacks: collective attacks and joint attacks. Here we analyze the security of a modified BB84 protocol, for which information is sent only in the z basis while testing is done in both the z and the x bases, against collective attacks. The proof follows the framework of a previous paper (Boyer, Gelles, and Mor, 2009), but it avoids a classical information-theoretical analysis and proves a fully composable security. We show that this modified BB84 protocol is as secure against collective attacks as the original BB84 protocol, and that it requires more bits for testing.

3.3QUANT-PHJan 24, 2017
Experimentally feasible protocol for semiquantum key distribution

Michel Boyer, Matty Katz, Rotem Liss et al.

Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols make it possible for two quantum parties to generate a secret shared key. Semiquantum key distribution (SQKD) protocols, such as "QKD with classical Bob" and "QKD with classical Alice" (that have both been proven robust), achieve this goal even if one of the parties is classical. However, existing SQKD protocols are not experimentally feasible with current technology. Here we suggest a new protocol, "Classical Alice with a controllable mirror", that can be experimentally implemented with current technology (using 4-level systems instead of qubits), and we prove it to be robust.

3.3QUANT-PHDec 3, 2013
Attacks on Fixed Apparatus Quantum Key Distribution Schemes

Michel Boyer, Ran Gelles, Tal Mor

We consider quantum key distribution implementations in which the receiver's apparatus is fixed and does not depend on his choice of basis at each qubit transmission. We show that, although theoretical quantum key distribution is proven secure, such implementations are totally insecure against a strong eavesdropper that has one-time (single) access to the receiver's equipment. The attack we present here, the "fixed-apparatus attack" causes a potential risk to the usefulness of several recent implementations.