CVApr 11, 2023
Overload: Latency Attacks on Object Detection for Edge DevicesErh-Chung Chen, Pin-Yu Chen, I-Hsin Chung et al.
Nowadays, the deployment of deep learning-based applications is an essential task owing to the increasing demands on intelligent services. In this paper, we investigate latency attacks on deep learning applications. Unlike common adversarial attacks for misclassification, the goal of latency attacks is to increase the inference time, which may stop applications from responding to the requests within a reasonable time. This kind of attack is ubiquitous for various applications, and we use object detection to demonstrate how such kind of attacks work. We also design a framework named Overload to generate latency attacks at scale. Our method is based on a newly formulated optimization problem and a novel technique, called spatial attention. This attack serves to escalate the required computing costs during the inference time, consequently leading to an extended inference time for object detection. It presents a significant threat, especially to systems with limited computing resources. We conducted experiments using YOLOv5 models on Nvidia NX. Compared to existing methods, our method is simpler and more effective. The experimental results show that with latency attacks, the inference time of a single image can be increased ten times longer in reference to the normal setting. Moreover, our findings pose a potential new threat to all object detection tasks requiring non-maximum suppression (NMS), as our attack is NMS-agnostic.
CVApr 24, 2024
Steal Now and Attack Later: Evaluating Robustness of Object Detection against Black-box Adversarial AttacksErh-Chung Chen, Pin-Yu Chen, I-Hsin Chung et al.
Latency attacks against object detection represent a variant of adversarial attacks that aim to inflate the inference time by generating additional ghost objects in a target image. However, generating ghost objects in the black-box scenario remains a challenge since information about these unqualified objects remains opaque. In this study, we demonstrate the feasibility of generating ghost objects in adversarial examples by extending the concept of "steal now, decrypt later" attacks. These adversarial examples, once produced, can be employed to exploit potential vulnerabilities in the AI service, giving rise to significant security concerns. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed attack achieves successful attacks across various commonly used models and Google Vision API without any prior knowledge about the target model. Additionally, the average cost of each attack is less than \$ 1 dollars, posing a significant threat to AI security.
LGJun 28, 2024
Data-Driven Lipschitz Continuity: A Cost-Effective Approach to Improve Adversarial RobustnessErh-Chung Chen, Pin-Yu Chen, I-Hsin Chung et al.
As deep neural networks (DNNs) are increasingly deployed in sensitive applications, ensuring their security and robustness has become critical. A major threat to DNNs arises from adversarial attacks, where small input perturbations can lead to incorrect predictions. Recent advances in adversarial training improve robustness by incorporating additional examples from external datasets or generative models. However, these methods often incur high computational costs, limiting their practicality and hindering real-world deployment. In this paper, we propose a cost-efficient alternative based on Lipschitz continuity that achieves robustness comparable to models trained with extensive supplementary data. Unlike conventional adversarial training, our method requires only a single pass over the dataset without gradient estimation, making it highly efficient. Furthermore, our method can integrate seamlessly with existing adversarial training frameworks and enhances the robustness of models without requiring extra generative data. Experimental results show that our approach not only reduces computational overhead but also maintains or improves the defensive capabilities of robust neural networks. This work opens a promising direction for developing practical, scalable defenses against adversarial attacks.
CVNov 3, 2021
LTD: Low Temperature Distillation for Gradient Masking-free Adversarial TrainingErh-Chung Chen, Che-Rung Lee
Adversarial training is a widely adopted strategy to bolster the robustness of neural network models against adversarial attacks. This paper revisits the fundamental assumptions underlying image classification and suggests that representing data as one-hot labels is a key factor that leads to vulnerabilities. However, in real-world datasets, data ambiguity often arises, with samples exhibiting characteristics of multiple classes, rendering one-hot label representations imprecise. To address this, we introduce a novel approach, Low-Temperature Distillation (LTD), designed to refine label representations. Unlike previous approaches, LTD incorporates a relatively low temperature in the teacher model, while maintaining a fixed temperature for the student model during both training and inference. This strategy not only refines assumptions about data distribution but also strengthens model robustness and avoids the gradient masking problem commonly encountered in defensive distillation. Experimental results demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed method when combined with existing frameworks, achieving robust accuracy rates of 58.19%, 31.13%, and 42.08% on the CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet datasets, respectively, without the need for additional data.