Lingjie Chen

Zhengfu He, Wentao Shu, Xuyang Ge et al.

Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) have emerged as a powerful unsupervised method for extracting sparse representations from language models, yet scalable training remains a significant challenge. We introduce a suite of 256 SAEs, trained on each layer and sublayer of the Llama-3.1-8B-Base model, with 32K and 128K features. Modifications to a state-of-the-art SAE variant, Top-K SAEs, are evaluated across multiple dimensions. In particular, we assess the generalizability of SAEs trained on base models to longer contexts and fine-tuned models. Additionally, we analyze the geometry of learned SAE latents, confirming that \emph{feature splitting} enables the discovery of new features. The Llama Scope SAE checkpoints are publicly available at~\url{https://huggingface.co/fnlp/Llama-Scope}, alongside our scalable training, interpretation, and visualization tools at \url{https://github.com/OpenMOSS/Language-Model-SAEs}. These contributions aim to advance the open-source Sparse Autoencoder ecosystem and support mechanistic interpretability research by reducing the need for redundant SAE training.

Zhanhui Zhou, Lingjie Chen, Chao Yang et al.

One way to mitigate risks in vision-language models (VLMs) is to remove dangerous samples in their training data. However, such data moderation can be easily bypassed when harmful images are split into small, benign-looking patches, scattered across many training samples. VLMs may then learn to piece these fragments together during training and generate harmful responses at inference, either from full images or text references. For instance, if trained on image patches from a bloody scene paired with the descriptions "safe," VLMs may later describe, the full image or a text reference to the scene, as "safe." We define the core ability of VLMs enabling this attack as $\textit{visual stitching}$ -- the ability to integrate visual information spread across multiple training samples that share the same textual descriptions. In our work, we first demonstrate visual stitching abilities in common open-source VLMs on three datasets where each image is labeled with a unique synthetic ID: we split each $(\texttt{image}, \texttt{ID})$ pair into $\{(\texttt{patch}, \texttt{ID})\}$ pairs at different granularity for finetuning, and we find that tuned models can verbalize the correct IDs from full images or text reference. Building on this, we simulate the adversarial data poisoning scenario mentioned above by using patches from dangerous images and replacing IDs with text descriptions like ``safe'' or ``unsafe'', demonstrating how harmful content can evade moderation in patches and later be reconstructed through visual stitching, posing serious VLM safety risks. Code is available at https://github.com/ZHZisZZ/visual-stitching.