L. Meng

Hang Ye, Gaoxiang Duan, Haoran Zeng et al.

Multivariate long-term and efficient time series forecasting is a key requirement for a variety of practical applications, and there are complex interleaving time dynamics in time series data that require decomposition modeling. Traditional time series decomposition methods are single and rely on fixed rules, which are insufficient for mining the potential information of the series and adapting to the dynamic characteristics of complex series. On the other hand, the Transformer-based models for time series forecasting struggle to effectively model long sequences and intricate dynamic relationships due to their high computational complexity. To overcome these limitations, we introduce KARMA, with an Adaptive Time Channel Decomposition module (ATCD) to dynamically extract trend and seasonal components. It further integrates a Hybrid Frequency-Time Decomposition module (HFTD) to further decompose Series into frequency-domain and time-domain. These components are coupled with multi-scale Mamba-based KarmaBlock to efficiently process global and local information in a coordinated manner. Experiments on eight real-world datasets from diverse domains well demonstrated that KARMA significantly outperforms mainstream baseline methods in both predictive accuracy and computational efficiency. Code and full results are available at this repository: https://github.com/yedadasd/KARMA

Luoxi Meng, Henry Feng, Ilia Shumailov et al.

Browser-using agents (BUAs) are an emerging class of AI agents that interact with web browsers in human-like ways, including clicking, scrolling, filling forms, and navigating across pages. While these agents help automate repetitive online tasks, they are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks that trick an agent into performing undesired actions, such as leaking private information or issuing unintended state-changing requests. We propose ceLLMate, a browser-level sandboxing framework that restricts the agent's ambient authority and reduces the blast radius of prompt injections. We address the semantic gap challenge that is fundamental to BUAs -- writing and enforcing security policies for low-level UI tools like clicks and keystrokes is brittle and error-prone. Our core insight is to perform sandboxing at the HTTP layer because all side-effecting UI operations will result in network communication to the website's backend. We implement ceLLMate as an agent-agnostic browser extension and demonstrate how it enables sandboxing policies that block prompt injection attacks in the WASP benchmark with 7.25--15% latency overhead.