Henrik Palmer Olsen

Shanshan Xu, Johan Lindholm, Amogh Raina et al.

Legal proposition generation is central to legal reasoning and doctrinal scholarship, yet remain under-examined in Legal NLP. This paper investigates the automatic generation and evaluation of legal propositions from decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union using large language models (LLMs). We introduce LP-Eval, a three-step evaluation rubric co-designed with legal experts that decomposes legal proposition quality into formal validity and substantive dimensions. Using this rubric, we release a dataset of two experts' annotations for 100 LLM-generated legal propositions. Our results show that LLMs can generate predominantly well-formed and high-quality propositions, while expert evaluations reveal higher quality for propositions derived from well established cases than from recent ones. We further examine LLMs as evaluators and find that rubric-guided LLM judgments align more closely with expert assessments than direct overall scoring, but remain insensitive to finer-grained distinctions captured by human experts.

Hilde Weerts, Raphaële Xenidis, Fabien Tarissan et al.

Various metrics and interventions have been developed to identify and mitigate unfair outputs of machine learning systems. While individuals and organizations have an obligation to avoid discrimination, the use of fairness-aware machine learning interventions has also been described as amounting to 'algorithmic positive action' under European Union (EU) non-discrimination law. As the Court of Justice of the European Union has been strict when it comes to assessing the lawfulness of positive action, this would impose a significant legal burden on those wishing to implement fair-ml interventions. In this paper, we propose that algorithmic fairness interventions often should be interpreted as a means to prevent discrimination, rather than a measure of positive action. Specifically, we suggest that this category mistake can often be attributed to neutrality fallacies: faulty assumptions regarding the neutrality of fairness-aware algorithmic decision-making. Our findings raise the question of whether a negative obligation to refrain from discrimination is sufficient in the context of algorithmic decision-making. Consequently, we suggest moving away from a duty to 'not do harm' towards a positive obligation to actively 'do no harm' as a more adequate framework for algorithmic decision-making and fair ml-interventions.

Hilde Weerts, Raphaële Xenidis, Fabien Tarissan et al.

Concerns regarding unfairness and discrimination in the context of artificial intelligence (AI) systems have recently received increased attention from both legal and computer science scholars. Yet, the degree of overlap between notions of algorithmic bias and fairness on the one hand, and legal notions of discrimination and equality on the other, is often unclear, leading to misunderstandings between computer science and law. What types of bias and unfairness does the law address when it prohibits discrimination? What role can fairness metrics play in establishing legal compliance? In this paper, we aim to illustrate to what extent European Union (EU) non-discrimination law coincides with notions of algorithmic fairness proposed in computer science literature and where they differ. The contributions of this paper are as follows. First, we analyse seminal examples of algorithmic unfairness through the lens of EU non-discrimination law, drawing parallels with EU case law. Second, we set out the normative underpinnings of fairness metrics and technical interventions and compare these to the legal reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU. Specifically, we show how normative assumptions often remain implicit in both disciplinary approaches and explain the ensuing limitations of current AI practice and non-discrimination law. We conclude with implications for AI practitioners and regulators.