Giulia Sandri

Claudio Novelli, Javier Argota Sanchez-Vaquerizo, Jennifer Cyr et al.

Political parties strive to understand their electorates, and focus groups are a vital tool in these efforts. AI-enhanced simulation technologies (AESTs) enable synthetic focus groups in a fraction of the time (and cost), raising the question of when and how such simulated evidence can be used in campaign research. This paper develops a decision matrix to help party strategists match research needs to appropriate simulation technologies and to identify when to escalate to hybrid or fully human focus groups. The matrix combines three dimensions: strategic purpose, deployment risk, and empirical grounding of the simulation tool. Strategic purpose is the decisive dimension, as it determines what kind of evidence the focus group is meant to produce: observing how political meanings and identities emerge through interaction (Mode 1) or testing and refining campaign messages (Mode 2). The matrix shows that, given documented failure modes such as sycophancy, persona drift, and the suppression of minority viewpoints, AESTs cannot replace human interaction in Mode 1 at any risk level. Within Mode 2, suitability depends instead on deployment risk and on the empirical grounding. Yet even here, we caution that routine reliance on AESTs may erode the qualitative craft on which sound judgment depends.

Claudio Novelli, Giulia Sandri

This chapter explores the influence of Artificial Intelligence (AI) on digital democracy, focusing on four main areas: citizenship, participation, representation, and the public sphere. It traces the evolution from electronic to virtual and network democracy, underscoring how each stage has broadened democratic engagement through technology. Focusing on digital citizenship, the chapter examines how AI can improve online engagement and promote ethical behaviour while posing privacy risks and fostering identity stereotyping. Regarding political participation, it highlights AI's dual role in mobilising civic actions and spreading misinformation. Regarding representation, AI's involvement in electoral processes can enhance voter registration, e-voting, and the efficiency of result tabulation but raises concerns regarding privacy and public trust. Also, AI's predictive capabilities shift the dynamics of political competition, posing ethical questions about manipulation and the legitimacy of democracy. Finally, the chapter examines how integrating AI and digital technologies can facilitate democratic political advocacy and personalised communication. However, this also comes with higher risks of misinformation and targeted propaganda.

Giulia Sandri, Claudio Novelli

Research on artificial intelligence and democracy has grown quickly over the last decade. A shared conclusion in this literature is that AI does not create new democratic problems so much as it makes old ones worse. We now see this across information ecosystems, in elections, and in public administration. However, despite growing evidence, we lack a clear way to prioritize risks in this area, compare them across domains, and identify where democratic control is most likely to break down. So, our problem is: How can we systematize the problems that AI systems pose to democratic processes? This paper argues that principal agent theory may fit the task. In many phases of democratic systems, principals delegate key functions to AI systems and their providers without really being able to monitor how these systems operate or the outputs they produce. Treating AI as a delegation problem helps identify accountability gaps and other governance failures. Most importantly, as we shall illustrate, it provides metrics for empirical assessments of AI impact on democracy. As a second analytical element, we draw on the NIST AI Risk Management Framework and its seven characteristics of trustworthy AI, which supply substantive criteria for evaluating delegated tasks. Operationalized across the three domains through measurable indicators and domain specific trustworthiness criteria, we propose an analytical framework that centers on institutional assessability as the central condition for democratic control over AI. However, we stress that how severe a harm is, and how much risk is acceptable, are evaluative judgments that current methodologies neither acknowledge nor operationalize. This becomes acute when such evaluative judgments are (silently) delegated to private vendors. We identify this as a strong limitation left for future work.

Claudio Novelli, Giuliano Formisano, Prathm Juneja et al.

The article argues that AI can enhance the measurement and implementation of democratic processes within political parties, known as Intra-Party Democracy (IPD). It identifies the limitations of traditional methods for measuring IPD, which often rely on formal parameters, self-reported data, and tools like surveys. Such limitations lead to the collection of partial data, rare updates, and significant demands on resources. To address these issues, the article suggests that specific data management and Machine Learning (ML) techniques, such as natural language processing and sentiment analysis, can improve the measurement (ML about) and practice (ML for) of IPD. The article concludes by considering some of the principal risks of ML for IPD, including concerns over data privacy, the potential for manipulation, and the dangers of overreliance on technology.