Eduard Marin

Amjad Yousef Majid, Eduard Marin

In the rapidly evolving field of serverless computing, efficient function scheduling and resource scaling are critical for optimizing performance and cost. This paper presents a comprehensive review of the application of Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) techniques in these areas. We begin by providing an overview of serverless computing, highlighting its benefits and challenges, with a particular focus on function scheduling and resource scaling. We then delve into the principles of deep reinforcement learning (DRL) and its potential for addressing these challenges. A systematic review of recent studies applying DRL to serverless computing is presented, covering various algorithms, models, and performances. Our analysis reveals that DRL, with its ability to learn and adapt from an environment, shows promising results in improving the efficiency of function scheduling and resource scaling in serverless computing. However, several challenges remain, including the need for more realistic simulation environments, handling of cold starts, and the trade-off between learning time and scheduling performance. We conclude by discussing potential future directions for this research area, emphasizing the need for more robust DRL models, better benchmarking methods, and the exploration of multi-agent reinforcement learning for more complex serverless architectures. This review serves as a valuable resource for researchers and practitioners aiming to understand and advance the application of DRL in serverless computing.

Debopriya Roy Dipta, Thore Tiemann, Eduard Marin et al.

Microarchitectural attacks continue to evolve, uncovering new exploitation vectors in modern processors. From a defensive perspective, assessing a system's susceptibility to such attacks remains challenging. Developing functional attack implementations is labor-intensive, requires deep microarchitectural expertise, and is highly sensitive to execution environments. Consequently, existing attacks often lack portability, limiting systematic and scalable vulnerability assessment. Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) suggest a potential avenue for lowering these barriers. However, it remains unclear whether LLMs can reliably generate functionally correct microarchitectural attack code suitable for rigorous vulnerability testing. In this work, we present uGen, the first LLM-driven framework for automated microarchitectural attack code generation. A key challenge we address is identifying attack-specific knowledge gaps in LLMs. Through a systematic study of state-of-the-art models (GPT, Claude, and Qwen3), we find that LLMs frequently misgenerate or misplace critical attack primitives. Guided by this analysis, uGen employs a retrieval-augmented, multi-agent design that injects missing domain knowledge to synthesize functionally correct microarchitectural attack PoCs tailored to defender requirements. We evaluate uGen on cache-based and speculative-execution attacks across diverse set of microarchitectures, vulnerable functions, and LLM platforms. In the deployment stage, uGen achieves up to 100% success rate for Spectre-v1 (Claude Sonnet-4) and 80% for Prime+Probe (Qwen3-Coder). Finally, we demonstrate that uGen can generate a successful PoC code with a cost of $1.25 in under four minutes.

Debopriya Roy Dipta, Thore Tiemann, Berk Gulmezoglu et al.

The cloud computing landscape has evolved significantly in recent years, embracing various sandboxes to meet the diverse demands of modern cloud applications. These sandboxes encompass container-based technologies like Docker and gVisor, microVM-based solutions like Firecracker, and security-centric sandboxes relying on Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) such as Intel SGX and AMD SEV. However, the practice of placing multiple tenants on shared physical hardware raises security and privacy concerns, most notably side-channel attacks. In this paper, we investigate the possibility of fingerprinting containers through CPU frequency reporting sensors in Intel and AMD CPUs. One key enabler of our attack is that the current CPU frequency information can be accessed by user-space attackers. We demonstrate that Docker images exhibit a unique frequency signature, enabling the distinction of different containers with up to 84.5% accuracy even when multiple containers are running simultaneously in different cores. Additionally, we assess the effectiveness of our attack when performed against several sandboxes deployed in cloud environments, including Google's gVisor, AWS' Firecracker, and TEE-based platforms like Gramine (utilizing Intel SGX) and AMD SEV. Our empirical results show that these attacks can also be carried out successfully against all of these sandboxes in less than 40 seconds, with an accuracy of over 70% in all cases. Finally, we propose a noise injection-based countermeasure to mitigate the proposed attack on cloud environments.

Eduard Marin, Diego Perino, Roberto Di Pietro

Serverless Computing is a virtualisation-related paradigm that promises to simplify application management and to solve the last challenges in the field: scale down and easy to use. The implied cost reduction, coupled with a simplified management of underlying applications, are expected to further push the adoption of virtualisation-based solutions, including cloud-computing or telco-cloud solutions. However, in this quest for efficiency, security is not ranked among the top priorities, also because of the (misleading) belief that current solutions developed for virtualised environments could be applied (as is) to this new paradigm. Unfortunately, this is not the case, due to the highlighted idiosyncratic features of serverless computing. In this paper, we review the current serverless architectures, abstract and categorise their founding principles, and provide an in depth analyse of them from the point of view of security, referring to principles and practices of the cybersecurity domain. In particular, we show the security shortcomings of the analysed serverless architectural paradigms, point to possible countermeasures, and highlight a few research directions.

Fan Mo, Hamed Haddadi, Kleomenis Katevas et al.

We propose and implement a Privacy-preserving Federated Learning ($PPFL$) framework for mobile systems to limit privacy leakages in federated learning. Leveraging the widespread presence of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) in high-end and mobile devices, we utilize TEEs on clients for local training, and on servers for secure aggregation, so that model/gradient updates are hidden from adversaries. Challenged by the limited memory size of current TEEs, we leverage greedy layer-wise training to train each model's layer inside the trusted area until its convergence. The performance evaluation of our implementation shows that $PPFL$ can significantly improve privacy while incurring small system overheads at the client-side. In particular, $PPFL$ can successfully defend the trained model against data reconstruction, property inference, and membership inference attacks. Furthermore, it can achieve comparable model utility with fewer communication rounds (0.54$\times$) and a similar amount of network traffic (1.002$\times$) compared to the standard federated learning of a complete model. This is achieved while only introducing up to ~15% CPU time, ~18% memory usage, and ~21% energy consumption overhead in $PPFL$'s client-side.