Hélène Fargier

Hélène Fargier, Pierre-François Gimenez, Jérôme Mengin et al.

This paper considers the task of learning users' preferences on a combinatorial set of alternatives, as generally used by online configurators, for example. In many settings, only a set of selected alternatives during past interactions is available to the learner. Fargier et al. [2018] propose an approach to learn, in such a setting, a model of the users' preferences that ranks previously chosen alternatives as high as possible; and an algorithm to learn, in this setting, a particular model of preferences: lexicographic preferences trees (LP-trees). In this paper, we study complexity-theoretical problems related to this approach. We give an upper bound on the sample complexity of learning an LP-tree, which is logarithmic in the number of attributes. We also prove that computing the LP tree that minimises the empirical risk can be done in polynomial time when restricted to the class of linear LP-trees.

Hélène Fargier, Stefan Mengel, Jérôme Mengin

Conditional preference statements have been used to compactly represent preferences over combinatorial domains. They are at the core of CP-nets and their generalizations, and lexicographic preference trees. Several works have addressed the complexity of some queries (optimization, dominance in particular). We extend in this paper some of these results, and study other queries which have not been addressed so far, like equivalence, and transformations, like conditioning and variable elimination, thereby contributing to a knowledge compilation map for languages based on conditional preference statements. We also study the expressiveness and complexity of queries and transformations for generalized additive utilities.

Didier Dubois, Hélène Fargier, Jean-François Bonnefon

Making a decision is often a matter of listing and comparing positive and negative arguments. In such cases, the evaluation scale for decisions should be considered bipolar, that is, negative and positive values should be explicitly distinguished. That is what is done, for example, in Cumulative Prospect Theory. However, contraryto the latter framework that presupposes genuine numerical assessments, human agents often decide on the basis of an ordinal ranking of the pros and the cons, and by focusing on the most salient arguments. In other terms, the decision process is qualitative as well as bipolar. In this article, based on a bipolar extension of possibility theory, we define and axiomatically characterize several decision rules tailored for the joint handling of positive and negative arguments in an ordinal setting. The simplest rules can be viewed as extensions of the maximin and maximax criteria to the bipolar case, and consequently suffer from poor decisive power. More decisive rules that refine the former are also proposed. These refinements agree both with principles of efficiency and with the spirit of order-of-magnitude reasoning, that prevails in qualitative decision theory. The most refined decision rule uses leximin rankings of the pros and the cons, and the ideas of counting arguments of equal strength and cancelling pros by cons. It is shown to come down to a special case of Cumulative Prospect Theory, and to subsume the Take the Best heuristic studied by cognitive psychologists.

Helene Fargier, Jerome Lang, Roger Martin-Clouaire et al.

The Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP) framework offers a simple and sound basis for representing and solving simple decision problems, without uncertainty. This paper is devoted to an extension of the CSP framework enabling us to deal with some decisions problems under uncertainty. This extension relies on a differentiation between the agent-controllable decision variables and the uncontrollable parameters whose values depend on the occurrence of uncertain events. The uncertainty on the values of the parameters is assumed to be given under the form of a probability distribution. Two algorithms are given, for computing respectively decisions solving the problem with a maximal probability, and conditional decisions mapping the largest possible amount of possible cases to actual decisions.

Didier Dubois, Helene Fargier, Henri Prade

This paper investigates the problem of finding a preference relation on a set of acts from the knowledge of an ordering on events (subsets of states of the world) describing the decision-maker (DM)s uncertainty and an ordering of consequences of acts, describing the DMs preferences. However, contrary to classical approaches to decision theory, we try to do it without resorting to any numerical representation of utility nor uncertainty, and without even using any qualitative scale on which both uncertainty and preference could be mapped. It is shown that although many axioms of Savage theory can be preserved and despite the intuitive appeal of the method for constructing a preference over acts, the approach is inconsistent with a probabilistic representation of uncertainty, but leads to the kind of uncertainty theory encountered in non-monotonic reasoning (especially preferential and rational inference), closely related to possibility theory. Moreover the method turns out to be either very little decisive or to lead to very risky decisions, although its basic principles look sound. This paper raises the question of the very possibility of purely symbolic approaches to Savage-like decision-making under uncertainty and obtains preliminary negative results.

Helene Fargier, Patrice Perny

This paper investigates a purely qualitative version of Savage's theory for decision making under uncertainty. Until now, most representation theorems for preference over acts rely on a numerical representation of utility and uncertainty where utility and uncertainty are commensurate. Disrupting the tradition, we relax this assumption and introduce a purely ordinal axiom requiring that the Decision Maker (DM) preference between two acts only depends on the relative position of their consequences for each state. Within this qualitative framework, we determine the only possible form of the decision rule and investigate some instances compatible with the transitivity of the strict preference. Finally we propose a mild relaxation of our ordinality axiom, leaving room for a new family of qualitative decision rules compatible with transitivity.

Didier Dubois, Helene Fargier

The aim of this work is to provide a unified framework for ordinal representations of uncertainty lying at the crosswords between possibility and probability theories. Such confidence relations between events are commonly found in monotonic reasoning, inconsistency management, or qualitative decision theory. They start either from probability theory, making it more qualitative, or from possibility theory, making it more expressive. We show these two trends converge to a class of genuine probability theories. We provide characterization results for these useful tools that preserve the qualitative nature of possibility rankings, while enjoying the power of expressivity of additive representations.

Helene Fargier, Nahla Ben Amor, Wided Guezguez

When the information about uncertainty cannot be quantified in a simple, probabilistic way, the topic of possibilistic decision theory is often a natural one to consider. The development of possibilistic decision theory has lead to a series of possibilistic criteria, e.g pessimistic possibilistic qualitative utility, possibilistic likely dominance, binary possibilistic utility and possibilistic Choquet integrals. This paper focuses on sequential decision making in possibilistic decision trees. It proposes a complexity study of the problem of finding an optimal strategy depending on the monotonicity property of the optimization criteria which allows the application of dynamic programming that offers a polytime reduction of the decision problem. It also shows that possibilistic Choquet integrals do not satisfy this property, and that in this case the optimization problem is NP - hard.