22.4SESep 19, 2024
AutoVerus: Automated Proof Generation for Rust CodeChenyuan Yang, Xuheng Li, Md Rakib Hossain Misu et al. · microsoft-research
Generative AI has shown its values for many software engineering tasks. Still in its infancy, large language model (LLM)-based proof generation lags behind LLM-based code generation. In this paper, we present AutoVerus. AutoVerus uses LLMs to automatically generate correctness proof for Rust code. AutoVerus is designed to match the unique features of Verus, a verification tool that can prove the correctness of Rust code using proofs and specifications also written in Rust. AutoVerus consists of a network of LLM agents that are crafted and orchestrated to mimic human experts' three phases of proof construction: preliminary proof generation, proof refinement guided by generic tips, and proof debugging guided by verification errors. To thoroughly evaluate AutoVerus and help foster future research in this direction, we have built a benchmark suite of 150 non-trivial proof tasks, based on existing code-generation benchmarks and verification benchmarks. Our evaluation shows that AutoVerus can automatically generate correct proof for more than 90% of them, with more than half of them tackled in less than 30 seconds or 3 LLM calls.
20.1SEOct 21, 2024Code
Automated Proof Generation for Rust Code via Self-EvolutionTianyu Chen, Shuai Lu, Shan Lu et al.
Ensuring correctness is crucial for code generation. Formal verification offers a definitive assurance of correctness, but demands substantial human effort in proof construction and hence raises a pressing need for automation. The primary obstacle lies in the severe lack of data-there is much fewer proofs than code snippets for Large Language Models (LLMs) to train upon. In this paper, we introduce SAFE, a framework that overcomes the lack of human-written proofs to enable automated proof generation of Rust code. SAFE establishes a self-evolving cycle where data synthesis and fine-tuning collaborate to enhance the model capability, leveraging the definitive power of a symbolic verifier in telling correct proofs from incorrect ones. SAFE also re-purposes the large number of synthesized incorrect proofs to train the self-debugging capability of the fine-tuned models, empowering them to fix incorrect proofs based on the verifier's feedback. SAFE demonstrates superior efficiency and precision compared to GPT-4o. Through tens of thousands of synthesized proofs and the self-debugging mechanism, we improve the capability of open-source models, initially unacquainted with formal verification, to automatically write proofs for Rust code. This advancement leads to a significant improvement in performance, achieving a 52.52% accuracy rate in a benchmark crafted by human experts, a significant leap over GPT-4o's performance of 14.39%.
22.6CLMar 26, 2025Code
Optimizing Safe and Aligned Language Generation: A Multi-Objective GRPO ApproachXuying Li, Zhuo Li, Yuji Kosuga et al.
Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values and safety constraints is challenging, especially when objectives like helpfulness, truthfulness, and avoidance of harm conflict. Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has achieved notable success in steering models, but is complex and can be unstable. Recent approaches such as Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) simplify preference-based fine-tuning but may introduce bias or trade-off certain objectives~\cite{dpo}. In this work, we propose a Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) framework with a multi-label reward regression model to achieve safe and aligned language generation. The GRPO algorithm optimizes a policy by comparing groups of sampled responses, eliminating the need for a separate value critic and improving training efficiency~\cite{grpo}. We train a reward model to predict multiple alignment scores (e.g., safety, helpfulness, etc.), which are combined into a single reward signal. We provide a theoretical derivation for using this learned multi-aspect reward within GRPO and discuss its advantages and limitations. Empirically, our approach improves all the safety and quality metrics evaluated in language generation tasks on model scales (0.5B, 7B, and 14B parameters), demonstrating a robust balance of objectives. We compare GRPO to PPO-based RLHF and DPO, highlighting that GRPO achieves alignment with significantly lower computational cost and explicit multi-objective handling. \textbf{We will open-source all trained models at https://huggingface.co/hydroxai.
14.7CLMar 2, 2025
Output Length Effect on DeepSeek-R1's Safety in Forced ThinkingXuying Li, Zhuo Li, Yuji Kosuga et al.
Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong reasoning capabilities, but their safety under adversarial conditions remains a challenge. This study examines the impact of output length on the robustness of DeepSeek-R1, particularly in Forced Thinking scenarios. We analyze responses across various adversarial prompts and find that while longer outputs can improve safety through self-correction, certain attack types exploit extended generations. Our findings suggest that output length should be dynamically controlled to balance reasoning effectiveness and security. We propose reinforcement learning-based policy adjustments and adaptive token length regulation to enhance LLM safety.
9.6AIDec 5, 2024
Targeting the Core: A Simple and Effective Method to Attack RAG-based Agents via Direct LLM ManipulationXuying Li, Zhuo Li, Yuji Kosuga et al.
AI agents, powered by large language models (LLMs), have transformed human-computer interactions by enabling seamless, natural, and context-aware communication. While these advancements offer immense utility, they also inherit and amplify inherent safety risks such as bias, fairness, hallucinations, privacy breaches, and a lack of transparency. This paper investigates a critical vulnerability: adversarial attacks targeting the LLM core within AI agents. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that a deceptively simple adversarial prefix, such as \textit{Ignore the document}, can compel LLMs to produce dangerous or unintended outputs by bypassing their contextual safeguards. Through experimentation, we demonstrate a high attack success rate (ASR), revealing the fragility of existing LLM defenses. These findings emphasize the urgent need for robust, multi-layered security measures tailored to mitigate vulnerabilities at the LLM level and within broader agent-based architectures.